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This study investigated the qualitatively different ways in which engineers 
working in aerospace-related industries experience uncertainty as they make design 
decisions.  This study provides insight on how engineers increase their ability to manage 
various forms of uncertainty as they design Large Scale Complex Engineered Systems.  
The results of this study are valuable for understanding learning trajectories of engineers 
beyond their academic experiences and for linking the professional and technical skills in 
industry to the undergraduate engineering learning experience.   
Phenomenography, a qualitative research methodology, was employed to solicit 
varied experiences.  Previously published literature on design, expertise, teaming, 
uncertainty, and decision-making informed the semi-structured interview.  The twenty-
five participants were interviewed; their professional experience ranged from senior 
design students to individual contributors in private industry to director levels of 
responsibility, across corporations of sub-suppliers, suppliers, and end users.  The 
literature also provided ways to describe and validate the results of the analysis. 
The analysis produced five categories of experience of uncertainty in design decisions 
which follow the trend of previously identified design expertise levels.  There is a  
xiv 
 
dimension of quantity and quality of uncertainty that implies degree of design 
complexity, another dimension of skill in team engagement, and a third dimension, by 
which the categories are named, of an individual’s personal response to encountering 
uncertainty.  The categories follow the metaphor of a material’s increasing response to 
stress: Brittle, Plastic, Tolerant, Robust, and Resilient.  These categories provide 
complementary insight into the necessity of building large and trusted teams of people as 
part of an engineer’s strategy for designing complex systems with varied forms of 
uncertainty. 
The critical elements that participants identified in their design experiences allows 
engineering educators to develop learning interventions to simultaneously enhance a 
student’s understanding of designing complex systems and of strategically engaging in 
teamwork.  This study also supplies engineering educators with more detailed insight into 
student’s possible emotional responses to uncertainty as they engage in designing 
complex systems.  Overall, the impact of this study is to equip educators and students to 




CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Design in Aerospace Engineering Contexts 
Engineering, while still including the engineering sciences, is increasingly 
returning to design as the “art of engineering” (Seely, 1999).  Design, an ABET outcome 
(ABET, 2015), is considered an activity central to engineering (Dym, Agogino, Eris, 
Frey, & Leifer, 2005; Simon, 1996).  Researchers have shown that key features of design 
problems are being ill-structured (Goel & Pirolli, 1992; D. H. Jonassen, 2000) and co-
evolving with the solution (Dorst & Cross, 2001).  Engineers, therefore, need to be aware 
of uncertainty and be capable of engaging in design amongst these realities. 
Because of the scale and complexity of the projects, designing systems in 
aerospace must be a team effort (Roth, 2007).  Therefore, engineers in aerospace need to 
have their “professional skills” developed, especially teamwork and communication that 
are included in the ABET criteria (Shuman, Besterfield-Sacre, & McGourty, 2005).  
Researchers have clearly identified design as a social process (Louis L Bucciarelli, 2003), 
which means that the context of the design matters, including the intentions of the 
designers and the culture of the users, and the boundaries between them being negotiable.  
It also means that design is done in teams and often diverse and multidisciplinary teams.  
Investigations into multidisciplinary teamwork in authentic design tasks may guide our 
understanding of the social aspects of design (Adams, 2003; Austin-Breneman, 
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(Adams, 2003; Austin-Breneman, Honda, & Yang, 2012; Dym et al., 2005; K. Sheppard, 
Dominick, & Aronson, 2004; Thom & Gerbracht, 2008).  Especially, expert teams, but 
not engineering teams, have been studied and their practices may guide our 
understanding of professional teamwork (Ericsson, 2006) in Naturalistic Decision-
Making Environments (Ross, Shafer, & Klein, 2006). 
Unfortunately, the aerospace engineering industry is difficult to study in situ 
because of the projects’ large scales and complexities (Deshmukh & Collopy, 2010).  The 
aerospace engineering industry is constrained by the performance measures of safety, 
technical, cost, and schedule (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2011).  
These constraints are interdependent.  At a deeper level, quality and performance can be 
constrained by myriad technical parameters that may also be interdependent and contrary 
to each other.  Aerospace engineering design is fraught with technological limitations that 
can be measured as cost and schedule limitations.   
The aerospace industry is risk-averse and seeks to reduce risk and cost by 
reducing uncertainty (Hamraz, Caldwell, & Clarkson, 2012).  The term aerospace will be 
used here to include aviation and space applications.  Lately, the aerospace business has 
taken a systems-of-systems approach to design (Bloebaum & Rivas McGowan, 2012; 
DeLaurentis & Crossley, 2005; DeLaurentis, Crossley, & Mane, 2011; Lewis & Collopy, 
2012) in order to decompose the design space and to integrate the solutions with 
awareness of and planning for uncertainty resolution.  Uncertainty plays a significant role 





1.2 Experiencing Uncertainty in Design 
Successfully managing uncertainty is a desirable professional skill, and it may 
have several names.  There is a distinct call in industry and academia alike for engineers 
to be tolerant of ambiguity (Altman, 2012; Atman, Turns, & Sheppard, 2011; Crismond 
& Adams, 2012; Goff & Terpenny, 2012; Koretsky, Kelly, & Gummer, 2011), to be 
flexible (Committee on Developments in the Science of Learning, 2000; Daly, Adams, & 
Bodner, 2012; Gorman et al., 2001; Walther, Kellam, Sochacka, & Radcliffe, 2011), and 
to be adaptable (Atman, Kilgore, & McKenna, 2008; Committee on Developments in the 
Science of Learning, 2000; Gorman et al., 2001; McKenna, 2007; Rayne et al., 2006; 
Schwartz, Bransford, & Sears, 2005).  These concepts appear to be in contrast to the 
Piagetian human tendency to attempt to reduce uncertainty and non-equilibrium (Wankat 
& Oreovicz, 1993).  How do people, especially designers, move from wanting to reduce 
uncertainty to being tolerant of uncertainty? 
As the aerospace industry engages in designing Large Scale Complex Engineered 
Systems, uncertainty must be confronted by the designers.  In particular, Deshmukh and 
Collopy (2010) posed fundamental research questions that this work explores: 
“Investigation Area 2) Uncertainty and Decision-Making c) Where is the optimal balance 
between gathering information to refine uncertainties and making a design decision with 
already available information? ... Investigation Area 6) Research in Engineering 
Education a) What are the key attributes of a successful engineer in the design of large 
complex systems? How can an aspiring engineer acquire these attributes? and b) For 




A path of exploration for these research questions is to investigate aerospace 
engineers’ design and learning experiences.  Previous work has investigated which ABET 
outcomes are most important in the professional workforce, where teamwork, data 
analysis, and problem solving were top results (Passow, 2012).  Passow’s work asked the 
questions using ABET outcome vocabulary, but did not ask about uncertainty.  This 
rigorous research study can shed light into both experiences and cognition of uncertainty 
in particular, especially in the professional workforce.  Understanding the relationship 
between experiences and cognition can have an impact on the undergraduate curriculum 
to help students develop these skills more efficiently through the development of 
appropriate learning interventions. 
 
1.2.1 Literature Overview 
The literature review explores key topics: the context of aerospace engineering 
design; the concept of uncertainty from multiple perspectives; and the development of 
expertise in design.  Here is a brief description of these three topics, and from these 
topics, research questions were developed to explore the gaps in the current literature. 
There is a small but growing body of literature stemming from recent conferences 
and workshops on Large Scale Complex Engineered Systems in aerospace engineering 
design (Bloebaum & Rivas McGowan, 2012; Lewis & Collopy, 2012; Rivas McGowan, 
Seifert, & Papalambros, 2012).  In particular, the authors note a propensity for the 
aerospace industry to reduce risk through reducing uncertainty. However, more 
knowledge may cost an unallowable amount of money and schedule to obtain.  Is it worth 
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the cost and schedule to pursue the knowledge?  How do design engineers make 
decisions in this environment?  How do design engineers cope with uncertainty? 
A definition of uncertainty is necessary because there are many perspectives, from 
engineering (Van Bossuyt, Dong, Tumer, & Carvalho, 2013) to business (Herman, 
Stevens, Bird, Mendenhall, & Oddou, 2010) to psychology (MacDonald, 1970; McLain, 
1993) to communications (Bradac, 2001).  Because of the specific context of aerospace 
engineering, a taxonomy of uncertainty in Large Scale Complex Engineered Systems 
(LCSES) will be employed here to define and classify forms of uncertainty in design 
(Thunnissen, 2003).  Mainly, there are four types of uncertainty in LCSES: ambiguity, 
epistemic, aleatory, and interaction, which will be further explored in Section 1.4 and 
Section 2.5.  Because of an engineer’s likelihood of becoming specialized in a subject 
relevant to aerospace businesses, an engineer may develop different levels of awareness 
and responsibility for different forms or sources of uncertainty as they progress through 
their careers, assume different roles, acquire experience and develop expertise.. 
The development of expertise and the difference between novices and experts 
have been studied in various disciplines and contexts, including physics problem solving, 
chess, and design (M. Chi, Glaser, & Rees, 1982; M. T. H. Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 
1981; Ericsson, 2006).  The Engineering Education Research Handbook (Johri & Olds, 
2014) qualitatively describes students (presumably novices) as having a fear of 
uncertainty and expert designers as having the willingness to manage uncertainty, which 
seem to be start and end points but it does not provide a path for moving from start to 
end.  Additionally, Skill Theory (Fischer, 1980) suggests a gradual development of skill 
through tasks that require the intercoordination of lower level skills.  But there does not 
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appear to be an investigation into the experiences and tasks that induced expert designers 
to develop the skill to manage uncertainty. 
 
1.2.2 Research Questions 
Within the context of design of Large Scale Complex Engineered Systems in 
aerospace engineering, there are a multitude of forms of uncertainty that designers may or 
may not encounter.  Designers may have developed strategies for managing different 
types of uncertainty, especially as designers have moved from academia to the workforce.  
The primary research questions for this study are: 
1. What are the qualitatively different ways that engineers in aerospace businesses 
experience uncertainty in design decisions? 
2. How do aerospace design engineers develop successful uncertainty management 
skills? 
 
1.3 Purpose of Study 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the lived experiences of aerospace 
engineers who practice design in order to understand how they experience, address, and 
manage different types of uncertainty.  While there are varied ways designers address and 
manage uncertainty, it is reasonable to expect that there are a finite number of ways in 
which uncertainty in design decisions is experienced.  Identifying and categorizing these 
ways is a first step in understanding the progression from novice to expert and the second 
step is to develop approaches to promote an engineer’s development toward expertise.  
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This study gives voice to working professionals across a spectrum of years of experience 
in design, corporations, and responsibility for decision-making. 
Within the aerospace industry, there are decision-makers who have made 
judgment calls and have seen the consequences of those decisions, even though the 
situations were full of uncertainty from multiple sources.  It is imperative to include 
engineers who have decision-making authority in design and who have been identified by 
peers as good designers.  Peer identification of being a good designer, including being 
promoted to decision-making roles, implies that those decisions had desirable 
consequences and that the designer’s behaviors include some measure of successful 
management of uncertainty.  For maximum variation of understanding skill development, 
lesser-experienced engineers were also included. 
This research employed developmental phenomenography (Bowden & Green, 
2005), a qualitative approach, to understand the variation of how professionals 
experience uncertainty in their careers as decision-makers.  Participants were identified 
through chain sampling.  Data was collected in semi-structured interviews, and a whole 
transcript was the unit of analysis.  Categories of the transcripts compose the outcome 
space of results.  The attributes of the outcome space are parsimony, logical relationships, 
and simplicity. 
While the outcomes may not represent a universal truth, the outcomes are 
educationally useful.  The three corners of the triangle, research, practice, and instruction, 
employed with express intent of having each one inform the others, provide a firm 
foundation and a practical use for the results of this study.  This research will link 
professional practice to instruction. 
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1.4 Overview of Experiencing Uncertainty 
The key concept in this study is uncertainty, further defined in Section 2.1.  
Uncertainty can be classified in complex systems as ambiguity (imprecise vocabulary 
terms and expressions), interaction (unanticipated interaction of many events and/or 
disciplines), aleatory (cannot be reduced with more knowledge; frequently represented as 
a probability distribution), and epistemic (can be reduced with more knowledge) 
(Thunnissen, 2003).  The experience of uncertainty will be framed in the context of 
making design decisions in aerospace applications.  Because there are many identified 
forms of uncertainty and possibly coupled management strategies, it is prudent to include 
engineers who have experienced multiple types of uncertainty in multiple projects. 
Criteria for maximum variation in sampling of the population include the 
participants’ professional responsibilities within the larger scheme of their employers’ 
relationships to one another.  First, the participants have various education backgrounds, 
various career trajectories, and various work responsibilities.  The participants’ gender, 
race, and national origin may also affect their awareness of uncertainty.  To the extent 
that participants report the effects of these variables, their experience will be included. 
Second, the context of aerospace design, namely, system-of-systems, introduces a 
criterion for variation.  Systems-of-systems considers the companies working aerospace 
projects as having various levels within systems-of-systems, such as a raw material 
supplier, a subsystem supplier, an airframe integrator, or a primary operator, labeled 
“Base, C, B, A, and OES” (Talley & Mavris, 2008).  The level at which a company 
operates implies different priorities in costs, qualities, and schedules, which in turn may 
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become an uncertainty for others at different levels.  These criteria from Talley and 
Mavris will be identified in the data collection efforts. 
 
1.5 Educational Implications 
The foremost contribution of this study is the clear description of actual practices 
and behaviors in managing uncertainty in the context of the aerospace engineering design 
industry.  Up to now, literature proposes ideal design process models with intent to 
generalize (Dubberly, 2005; Ullman, 2003), or investigates actual practices and behaviors 
of designers outside of aerospace engineering because of limited access for researchers.  
The aerospace industry has distinguishing characteristics and its own culture that make 
applying generalized models problematic.  Aerospace merits its own investigation to 
better inform the field and the pathways for students pursuing studies toward this field.  
This description will provide aerospace engineering instructors a vocabulary to describe 
to students the industry that eagerly awaits them. 
A second contribution of this study is the investigation of content and tasks that 
may move students from a fear of uncertainty to some greater level of confidence to 
persevere in design in the face of uncertainty.  From this foundation, content and tasks 
can be aligned in order to create interventions and learning modules for the 
undergraduate curriculum, whether it is in a design course or in an engineering science 
course or some combination and sequence of both.  This investigation will tell where 
certain tasks and experiences belong. 
A third contribution of this study is the future operationalization of management 
of uncertainty in order to be measured quantitatively.  This study may reveal indicators 
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for which a scale can be developed specifically for management of uncertainty within an 
engineering design context.  This will be qualitatively different from the scales developed 
in other disciplines such as psychology and business management (MacDonald 1970, 
McLain 1993, Herman et al. 2010).  This leads to future research questions: 
1. How can an aerospace engineering student’s management of uncertainty in design 
decisions be measured? 
2. What are effective interventions and classroom modules that increase an aerospace 
engineering student’s ability to manage uncertainty in making design decisions? 
 
Primarily, this work focuses on the professional formation of undergraduates, a 
topic of national interest (Douglas, 2015).  The undergraduate curriculum benefits by 
staying up to date with industry practices.  Undergraduates have the opportunity to be 
more prepared for the competitive high-stakes workforce.  They have the opportunity to 
practice difficult aspects of design.  They have an opportunity to understand the 
workforce they are about to enter.  Industry gains new employees who are potentially 
more flexible, more adaptable, who manage uncertainty well, who tolerate ambiguity 





CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Cambridge Handbook of Engineering Education Research (Johri & Olds, 
2014) and the Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance  (Ericsson, 
2006) summarize the state of research in those areas and provide key researchers to 
review.  This framing bounds the investigation of expert decision-making behaviors of 
individuals and organizations in real-life situations full of uncertainty.  Firstly, the 
handbooks describe at a high level how experts behave and think individually inside and 
outside of an engineering design context.  Secondly, the expertise handbook describes 
qualitatively the characteristics of expert teams in Emergency Management roles, usually 
in High Reliability Organizations (HROs) such as medical emergency rooms and aircraft 
carriers (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).  Lastly, these handbooks note a significant need for: 
1. An investigation into the context of Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) in which 
uncertainty plays a major role (Ross et al., 2006) 
2. A comparison of workplace practices to undergraduate work practices.   
 
Table 1.5.1 below shows the themes that I explored in pursuit of understanding 
the scope of relevant published research.  For clarity, these themes are divided into 
categories of context, social process, decisions, skills, and learning.  The following  
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sections of this chapter provide details of the most relevant results of this literature 
review (highlighted in bold italics in Table 1.5.1), identifying relevant results to date, key 
areas for future research and unanswered questions.  The unanswered questions identified 
become the research questions that guide this study. 
 
Table 1.5.1 Classification of themes and key concepts for this study. 




































































Assess Risk  
 
2.1 Definitions and Sources of Uncertainty 
Uncertainty has different definitions and applications to different disciplines; 
therefore, acknowledgment of definitions specific to aerospace engineering design is 
necessary for this study.  Uncertainty (Thunnissen, 2003) can be classified in complex 
systems as ambiguity (imprecise vocabulary terms and expressions), interaction 
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(unanticipated interaction of many events and/or disciplines), aleatory (cannot be reduced 
with more knowledge; frequently represented as a probability distribution), and epistemic 
(can be reduced with more knowledge).  Epistemic uncertainty is further classified as 
model (approximation errors, programming errors, and numerical errors), behavioral 
(design, requirement, volitional, and human errors), and phenomenological (attempt to 
extend the ‘state of the art’).  Thunnissen’s taxonomy is reproduced in Figure 2.1.1 
below.  These classifications provide key framing for understanding designers’ 
experiences with uncertainty. 
 
 
Figure 2.1.1 Reproduction of Figure 14 Uncertainty Classification for the Design and 




Some sources of uncertainty have been identified in previous research which also 
fit into Thunnissen’s taxonomy.  Uncertainty represented mathematically is common 
(Fellin, Lessman, Oberguggenberger, & Vieider, 2005).  Design as a social process 
(Louis L. Bucciarelli, 1994), particularly in engaging multiple perspectives (Rayne et al., 
2006), could be classified as interaction.  Design and engineering thinking can be 
decidedly nonverbal (Hegarty, 2004) and visual representations can be ambiguous 
(Eppler, Mengis, & Bresciani, 2008).  Verbal communication at a global level (Downey 
et al., 2006; K. Sheppard et al., 2004), at an ethical level (Van Bossuyt et al., 2013), and 
at a review and critique level (Cardella, Buzzanell, Cummings, Tolbert, & Zoltowski, 
2014) can be ambiguous.  Management of ethical uncertainty may include maintaining 
the ambiguity instead of simplifying the cases (D. H. Jonassen et al., 2009).  Because of 
the inclusiveness of Thunnissen’s taxonomy, I selected this construct for describing 
uncertainty in aerospace design. 
 
2.2 Context: Design Environments 
There are several ways of viewing the aerospace industry and examples that 
follow.  While the focus is aerospace engineering, it may be reasonable to apply these 
concepts, skills, and behaviors to other engineering disciplines.  This section highlights 
key views and accompanying vocabulary that will be used throughout my work. 
Firstly, a Systems-of-Systems view to the aerospace industry provides context for 
decision-making based on different company priorities, norms, customers, and suppliers 
(DeLaurentis & Crossley, 2005; DeLaurentis et al., 2011; Talley & Mavris, 2008).  One 
macroscopic view of systems-of-systems includes the attributes of “physically distributed 
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systems, prime dependency of overall functionality on linkages between distributed 
systems, and system heterogeneity, especially the inclusion of sentient systems” 
(Delaurentis & Callaway, 2004), where a single aircraft may be seen as the  level.  A 
second view will be used here, from Talley and Mavris (2008) to describe various 
companies within the hierarchy.  At the top are Operational Environment and Scenario 
(OES) operators.  The intermediate levels could be airframe integrators (A level), 
powerplant integrators (B level), and subsystem integrators (C level), whose customers 
are each other and the OES operators.  The base level (D level) could be suppliers to the 
B and C level operators.  It is reasonable to assume that aerospace engineers have an 
awareness of their relative location within the hierarchy of suppliers, may have been 
employed at several different levels over their careers, and may have reflected on 
encountering and managing the effects of different company cultures. 
A second view of the aerospace engineering industry is the research-informed 
concept of Naturalistic Decision Making as a way of describing “the real world” 
workplace environment.  Key elements of a Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) 
environment include: ill-structured problems, uncertain dynamic environments, shifting 
and competing goals, action/feedback loops, time stress, high stakes, multiple players, 
and organizational goals and norms (Ericsson, 2006). The aerospace engineering design 
environment has all the elements of an NDM environment.  Understanding the details and 
nuances of these activities in the workplace will be the first step to making a comparison 
of workplace and classroom practices.  Ultimately, the aerospace engineering design 
business strives to resolve uncertainties in order to positively affect their cost and 
schedule requirements, especially to avoid failure, rework, and rebuild costs. 
16 
 
A prime example of research in the aerospace design environment is an 
investigation of cross-disciplinary teamwork in the Mars Expedition Rover during the 
first 90 Martian days of the mission (Paletz, Schunn, & Kim, 2013).  Four researchers 
visited the site and captured 400 hours of video data of operations and conversations.  
This work uses the high-stakes dynamic environment to explore the use of analogy with 
multiple players from multiple disciplines.  Analogy by itself is ambiguous (Ball & 
Christensen, 2009), thereby introducing uncertainty in communication to uncertainty of 
the function and performance of the Mars Rover.  This work shows there is a tangential 
relationship of their research questions on analogy to my research questions on 
uncertainty, and provides insight on the large volume of data that could be collected by 
observation of a large scale project. 
A third view of aerospace concerns Large Scale Complex Engineered Systems 
(LSCES) that require explicit design methodologies in order to be successful (Bloebaum 
& Rivas McGowan, 2012; Lewis & Collopy, 2012; Rivas McGowan et al., 2012).  One 
assumption is that the industry can reduce risk and therefore reduce cost by reducing 
uncertainty (Hamraz et al., 2012).  Adherence to a design process or method may identify 
sources of uncertainty and methods to resolution before rather than after a failure.  
Several design methodologies merit mention, since participants may borrow vocabulary 
and concepts from these methodologies as they describe their experiences. 
One methodology called Robust Design attempts to account for uncertainties and 
communicate the associated risks to decision-making parties (Talley & Mavris, 2008).  
Originally Robust Design was experimental and focused on obtaining consistently 
manufactured parts (Park, Lee, Lee, & Hwang, 2006).  The method separates controllable 
17 
 
from uncontrollable factors that influence the outcome of the process.  Uncontrollable 
factors are considered as noise to the process, and controllable factors are adjusted to 
counteract the effects of noise by designers to obtain the desired output.  Robust Design 
has been expanded to capture the effect of multiple decision-makers negotiating trade-
offs in design (Kalsi, Hacker, & Lewis, 2001).  The design method was once focused on 
tangible parts but has now been applied to the people that participate in the design and 
production of those parts. 
A second design methodology, Design for Six Sigma, part of Total Quality 
Management, is popular for aerospace businesses with high volume manufacturing 
(McCarty, Daniels, Bremer, & Gupta, 2005).  DFSS provides a toolbox for teams of 
engineers to gather data and create solutions in prescribed design phases.  The Six Sigma 
title refers to the statistical standard deviation, where the output of the process is within 
specifications out to the sixth standard deviation, or 3.4 defects per million opportunities.  
There is a clear emphasis in this design methodology to eliminate mistakes and sources of 
deviation, especially in high volume production.  High-volume low-error production, or 
lean production, may be relevant to some aerospace companies, such as fastener or raw 
material suppliers, and may not be as relevant to airframe and powerplant integrators, 
depending on the mindset of their leadership team. 
A third methodology, Systems Engineering Design, employs probability and 
statistics to represent risk (Green et al., 2006; National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, 2011).  In particular, NASA emphasizes continuous risk management in 
the hands of informed decision makers, stakeholders, and Subject Matter Experts.  The 
use of probability and statistics implies quantifying risks to compare to performance 
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measures.  To that end, many methods and tools have been developed to model and 
quantify uncertainties (Nikolaidis, Mourelatos, & Pandey, 2011).  The general view, then, 
is that emphasis has been placed further developing models for forms of uncertainty that 
can be quantified.  I expect to see the use of risk as an indicator of uncertainty among my 
participants. 
 
2.3 Design as a Social Process: Expert Teams 
It is significant to practice teamwork at the undergraduate level because it is an 
engineering industry reality (D. Jonassen, Strobel, & Lee, 2006).  Because aerospace 
design of complex systems is a team effort (Dym et al., 2005; S. Sheppard & Jenison, 
1997; Thom & Gerbracht, 2008; Wellington, Thomas, Powell, & Clarke, 2002), 
successful team behaviors must be explored.  Teams are distinct from mere groups in that 
teams have goal interdependence, resource interdependence, and member 
interdependence in order to succeed (Adams, 2003).  While there is a tendency among 
engineering students to foster friendships and study groups (Godfrey & Parker, 2010), 
friendship alone does not constitute a team.  Therefore, educators should provide students 
an opportunity to practice interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary teamwork in authentic 
design tasks (Austin-Breneman et al., 2012; Borrego, Karlin, McNair, & Beddoes, 2013; 
Cooke, Gorman, & Winner, 2007; Fu, Cagan, & Kotovsky, 2010; Hsiung, 2012; Jensen 
& Wood, 2003).  Next I explore relevant research on teamwork outside of engineering 
that may be applied to aerospace engineering. 
The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance (Ericsson, 2006) 
provides insight into expert team behaviors based on several research methods.  The three 
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most common research data collection methods are: observations in the field, simulation, 
and self-report.  Further explanation of research data collection methods relevant to this 
study can be found in Section 3.10.3.  Key behaviors of expert teams (military, 
manufacturing business, aviation flight crews, and healthcare, but engineering design 
teams are noticeably absent) are summarized from many research publications in Table 
25.1 of the handbook, reproduced in Table 2.3.1 below.  Some key desirable items here 
for the aerospace business include “make fewer errors”, “make better decisions”, and 
“greater chance of mission success”, which are driven by having these nine behaviors 
listed in bold font. 
 
Table 2.3.1 Reproduction of Table 25.1. Expert team performance effective processes 
and outcomes in (Ericsson, 2006). 
Expert Teams . . .  
Hold shared mental models  
They have members who anticipate each other.  
They can communicate without the need to communicate overtly. 
Optimize resources by learning and adapting  
They are self-correcting.  
They compensate for each other.  
They reallocate functions.  
Have clear roles and responsibilities  
They manage expectations.  
They have members who understand each others’ roles and how they fit together.  
They ensure team member roles are clear but not overly rigid.  
Have a clear, valued, and shared vision  
They have a clear and common purpose.  
Engage in a cycle or discipline of prebrief → performance → debrief  
They regularly provide feedback to each other, both individually and as a team.  
They establish and revise team goals and plans.  
They differentiate between higher and lower priorities.  
They have mechanisms for anticipating and reviewing issues/ problems of members.  
The periodically diagnose team “effectiveness,” including its results, its processes, and its 




Table 2.3.1 continued. 
Have strong team leadership  
They are led by someone with good leadership skills and not just technical competence.  
They have team members who believe the leaders care about them.  
They provide situation updates.  
They foster teamwork, coordination, and cooperation.  
They self-correct first.  
Develop a strong sense of “collective,” trust, teamness, and confidence  
They manage conflict well; team members confront each other effectively.  
They have a strong sense of team orientation.  
They trust other team members’ “intentions.” They strongly believe in the team’s collective 
ability to succeed.  
They develop collective efficacy.  
Manage and optimize performance outcomes  
They make fewer errors.  
They communicate often “enough”; they ensure that fellow team members have the 
information they need to be able to contribute.  
They make better decisions.  
They have a greater chance of mission success.  
Cooperate and coordinate  
They identify teamwork and task work requirements.  
They ensure that, through staffing and/ or development, the team possesses the right mix of 
competencies.  
They consciously integrate new team members.  
They distribute and assign work thoughtfully.  
They examine and adjust the team’s physical workplace to optimize communication and 
coordination. 
 
The key behavior or skill relevant to this study from the above expert teams is 
“make better decisions”.  But how are those decisions are developed, presented, and 
executed?  It is especially important to consider teaming as a factor in design because, 
according to Thunnissen’s uncertainty taxonomy, teaming may introduce ambiguity and 
interaction forms of uncertainty to the design decision; expert teams’ behaviors listed 
above may be strategies for managing uncertainty introduced by teaming.  Also, what 
constitutes “better” decisions and how does an individual person or an engineer become 
better at making decisions? 
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2.4 Expertise of Decision-making in Design Environments 
A key cognitive process in good engineering design is decision-making and 
justifying those decisions with evidence (Crismond & Adams, 2012).  Dorst (2004, 2011; 
Lawson, 2009) presents the Dreyfus model of expertise in six to eight categories and 
summarizes the approaches to design practice associated with each category, shown in 
Table 2.4.1 below.  The approaches to design practice may be considered here as the 
manner in which decisions are made by an individual designer.  This research may add a 
fourth column to Table 2.4.1 with specific treatment of uncertainty as a function of level 
of expertise. 
 
Table 2.4.1 Levels of design expertise, adapted from Dorst (2004, 2011). 
Level of Expertise Approach to Design Practice Approach to Design Practice Description 
Naïve Choice based  
Novice Convention based Consider objective features of situation, 
follow strict rules from experts 
Advanced Beginner Situation based Situational aspects important, sensitivity 
to exceptions to ‘hard rules’ 
Competent Strategy based Emotional attachment, trial-and-error, 
learning and reflecting, selects relevant 
elements, makes plan 
(Proficient)  Immediately see most important issues, 
appropriate plan, reasons what to do 
Expert Experience based Respond intuitively, perform appropriate 
action straightaway 
Master Create new schemata Dwell on success and failure, acute 
sense of context, openness to subtle cues 
Visionary Redefine field New ways of doing things, new 
definitions of the issues, operating on 
margins of domain, paying attention to 
other domains 
 
Atman and other researchers (2007; 1999) have examined individual designers at 
first year undergraduate, senior year undergraduate, and practicing engineers with greater 
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than ten years’ experience and peer identification as an expert in design.  They compared 
five themes across the participants’ age demographic using an individually-executed 
design problem for a playground.  Key differences include the experts spending more 
time than students in problem scoping and in gathering information, but not statistically 
different in developing alternative solutions or in solution quality.  The relevance of these 
studies to this study are a tendency among experts to delay a decision until there is 
sufficient information and the time on task required (ten years) to develop expertise as 
noted by peers. 
It is appropriate to acknowledge “bad” decision-making and mitigation strategies 
in an aviation flight crew context as well for completeness’ sake.  Flight trainers have 
summarized and disseminated research work in psychology to help pilots acknowledge 
their unconscious biases and make more objective and safer decisions (Benson, 2015).  
Possible culprits of bad decisions include: illusory superiority (overconfidence), optimism 
bias (having previous successes elsewhere) and confirmation bias (ignoring data that 
contradicts a decision).  Therefore, risk mitigation strategies include: a two person sign-
off (reciprocal arrangement with an uninvolved but informed person), explicit risk 
assessment tools (numerical matrices and checklists, for example), and a personal 
minimums checklist, individualized to that decision-maker’s aptitude and context.  These 
same decision traps apply to engineers (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 





2.5 Skills: Managing Uncertainty 
Managing uncertainty in design thinking is a necessary skill (Dym et al., 2005) 
among many.  Good systems designers are characterized by thinking about system 
dynamics, reasoning about uncertainty, making estimates, and conducting experiments.  
Good designers tolerate ambiguity as part of divergent-convergent thinking.  They think 
as part of a team. They communicate in several languages of design, including 
verbal/textual, graphical, shape grammars, features, mathematical/analytical models, and 
numbers.  Good designers especially maintain sight of the big picture of systems design 
and systems thinking.  Therefore, the use of the adjective “good” implies some distinct 
level of expertise in design, and by extension, some distinct level of expertise in 
reasoning about uncertainty. 
In one example of different levels of skill in managing uncertainty, recent 
engineering education research has identified management of ambiguity as a facet of 
experience of design.  In a phenomenographic context, the role of ambiguity in design 
may start as something to be eliminated, then something that is acknowledged as part of 
design, up to something welcome in design (Daly, 2008).  The research results show that 
increasing acceptance of ambiguity is a theme with increasing experience of design; 
results are shown in Table 2.5.1 below.  These results were generated across disciplines 
within and without engineering; design within the engineering discipline is the more 
pertinent topic, but these results are still useful as another model of increasing awareness 




Table 2.5.1 Reproduction of Table 4.4 in Design Across Disciplines (Daly, 2008). 
Category Role of Problem Role of 
Ambiguity 




It is set by 
someone else; 
there is no 
flexibility 










Problem is set by 
someone else or 




problems to be 






When the solution 
achieves the goal 
and is satisfactory 







Tolerant When the 









loosely set at 
“start” and 
developed by the 
designer and 
stakeholders 
along the way 
Just part of 
design 
When it can be 
built upon 
Something that 











work are evident 
Something of 













takes it over; it 
always evolves 




oneself or others 
 
In a second example of different skills in managing uncertainty, within NDM 
environments, particularly studying military officers, researchers found a set of coping 
strategies for uncertainty (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997).  These tactics fall into five larger 
categories: reduction, forestalling, assumption-based reasoning, weighing pros and cons, 
and suppression.  They conclude that different coping strategies accompany different 
types of uncertainty.  However, they do not make assertions about decision expertise 
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favoring certain strategies over others.  Coping strategies may be considered a synonym 
for managing uncertainty. 
If there are different levels of skill in managing uncertainty, then there is likely a 
way to quantify or measure skill level.  Older research in psychology situates ambiguity 
in social situations mostly and somewhat in problem-solving situations in order to create 
a scale for quantifying tolerance (MacDonald, 1970; McLain, 1993).  Newer scales for 
tolerance for ambiguity have been developed in business and have been operationalized 
as valuing diverse others, coping with change, managing conflicting perspectives, and 
dealing with unfamiliar situations (Herman et al., 2010).  Aerospace engineering design 
businesses are still businesses, so Herman’s scale may be useful.  Related scales are being 
developed to measure risk attitudes (Van Bossuyt et al., 2013).  However, to focus on 
design, development of a scale for tolerance for ambiguity in engineering design would 
requires this study’s investigation of aerospace-specific content and context first. 
 
2.6 Theories of Learning and Development of Skills 
If management of uncertainty is considered a skill, then Skill Theory (Fischer, 
1980) can describe the development of these skills in pursuit of answers to the future 
research questions of this work.  In particular, Skill Theory asserts that a skill is 
developed only if the environment induces the learner to use the relevant content in a 
task, which is a Piagetian concept.  Skill development is gradual and continuous.  Skills 
can be hierarchically arranged because higher level skills require the mastery of lower 




Table 2.6.1 Key concepts of Skill Theory. 
Keyword Definition 
Skill Unit of behavior composed of one or more sets 
Level Skill structure of gradually increasing complexity 
   Set Collection of things (cognition, action, and object that is part of the 
environment) 
   Map Structure relating two sets 
   System Relation between two subdivided sets 
   System of 
Systems 
Relation between two systems 
Tier Skills of vastly different types 
   Sensory-Motor Actions or perceptions on things or events in the world 
   Representation Simple properties of objects, events, or people; independent of 
person’s immediate actions 
   Abstract Intangible attributes that characterize broad categories of objects, 
events, or people 
Intercoordination How the person combines skills to develop from level to level 
Compounding Microdevelopmental transformation to combine two skills at a level 
into a more complex skill at the same level 
Focusing Moment-to-moment change in behavior commonly called attention 
Substitution When a person attempts to transfer a skill at level to a similar task, 
changing one component of the task 
Differentiation When a person separates into distinct subsets something that was 
initially a single set 
 
Uncertainty is abstract.  According to Skill Theory, the abstract tier of skills is 
likely to be domain-specific, so it is the responsibility of the educators within the domain 
to discover the hierarchical arrangement of the skills through research.  The practitioners 
and educators in the domain must uncover the content, the task, and the logical 
arrangement of these items for students.  A generic representation of the outcome space is 
shown in Figure 2.6.1 below, where Fischer’s original representation is in the bottom left 





Figure 2.6.1 Fischer's Skill Theory: basic notation and visual metaphor of cycles. 
 
Level VII is the starting point for Engineering Education research.  Fischer 
describes the concept of conservation as first being understood by an individual at this 
level.  For white middle-class Americans, Level VII thinking starts to appear in the early 
high school years.  These are not hard and fast rules of human cognitive development, 
however; it has been shown that it is possible to have concrete learners as first year 
college students (Kalman, 2007).  As an example of abstract thinking, “At Level 7, single 
abstract sets, a person can for the first time construct abstract identity skills”, such as 
relating a father identity to a career identity as a psychologist.  He also states “Levels 7 to 
10 include moral judgment, the managerial skills… skills required to write an effective 
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essay… skills involved in programming and operating a computer” so engineering 
sciences and engineering design fit in these higher abstract levels. 
The transformation rules “predict specific sequences of development”, which 
makes the theory exceptionally useful to Engineering Education research.  Fischer found 
five but acknowledges that there may be more if future research suggests it. The 
transformation rules are represented in the bottom right of Figure 2.6.1, where the vertical 
arrow represents macrodevelopmental transformations and the horizontal arrows 
represent microdevelopmental transformations. Developmental change may occur in 
spurts, with rapid change at the beginning and slower change as the level has been 
developed, not unlike product development S-curves (Ullman, 2003). 
Several concepts favored in Engineering Education are present in Skill Theory.  
Situated Cognition (Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989; Orgill, 2007) is a research 
theoretical framework that overlaps Skill Theory’s emphasis on task and content as 
having a direct impact on which skills are induced to be developed.  “Abstract systems-
of-systems” is Level 10 in Skill Theory, which is very similar vocabulary to aerospace as 
systems-of-systems and global thinking.  Like Vygotsky’s Zone of Proximal 
Development (Vygotsky, 1986), “the person must initially have the skills required for 
application of the transformation and must be capable of applying the transformation 
rules to those skills” in order to develop the next higher skill.  This is significant because 
it may provide clues on why the abstract systems-of-systems skill of managing 





The aerospace design industry, a system-of-systems hierarchy, produces products 
and services that operate in or are Large Scale Complex Engineered Systems.  
Uncertainty is ever present from multiple sources and is often operationalized by risk.  
Engineers in industry must have awareness of uncertainty and successful strategies for 
managing uncertainty in order to reduce risk to some socially-constructed acceptable 
level.  Managing uncertainty and making decisions are necessary cognitive skills in 
design, and there is, at the moment, a binary spectrum of “bad” to “good” skill level.  
Skill Theory, built on Piaget’s constructivism theoretical framework, asserts that abstract 
skills can be learned by intercoordinating lower level skills through the performance of a 
particular task in a particular environment.  Skills will vary because of various tasks and 
environments.  Skills may even be distributed across a team instead of simply within an 
individual.  But the particular tasks in particular environments (Johri & Olds, 2011) that 
specifically develop an increasing awareness of and tolerance of uncertainty as it impacts 
decision-making are not yet well investigated. 
 
2.8 Research Questions 
The existing literature cites many works examining design and uncertainty, but 
there are gaps.  There are models of negotiating uncertainty in social situations, but not 
specific to the aerospace context as a unique culture.  There are descriptions of the 
context of the aerospace business and Naturalistic Decision Making, but not specifically 
focused on managing uncertainty.  There are descriptions of types of uncertainty in 
aerospace applications, but not accompanying management strategies.  There are 
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descriptions of levels of design expertise, but missing the element of managing 
uncertainty per level.  There are models of learning, but not specific to learning to 
manage uncertainty.  To fill these gaps and provide a framework to inform curricula and 
professional development programs, this research seeks to address these two primary 
research questions: 
1. What are the qualitatively different ways that engineers in aerospace businesses 
experience uncertainty in design decisions? 
2. How do aerospace design engineers develop successful uncertainty management 
skills? 
 
The first set of questions above seeks to stratify the phenomenon of managing 
uncertainty in aerospace applications.  The implication of having increasing levels of 
successful management of uncertainty implies that the skill can be learned and 
developed.  Development implies the need for assessment to prove attainment of a level.  
Therefore, future research questions include: 
3. How can Skill Theory be applied to engineering learning environments? 
4. What are effective interventions and classroom modules that increase an aerospace 
engineering student’s ability to manage uncertainty in making design decisions? 
5. How can an aerospace engineering student’s management of uncertainty in design 





CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY: 
PHENOMENOGRAPHY 
In this work, theoretical framework is akin to Kuhn’s (1996) paradigm that 
guides the construction of the research questions, the data collection methods, and the 
analysis of a study (Bodner & Orgill, 2007).  The theoretical framework informs the 
methodology (Case & Light, 2011), which is composed of the data collection methods 
and analysis of the data.  A conceptual framework is defined in this work as the 
definition, description, and attributes of a concept or phenomenon under investigation, 
such as uncertainty as described by Thunnissen in Chapter 2.1.  In other words, it is 
possible to investigate the conceptual framework of uncertainty using several theoretical 
frameworks, depending on how the research question is written and which attributes are 
the most important to study. 
The following sections highlight the philosophical stance, goals, and 
accompanying methodologies and methods of several theoretical frameworks.  The focus 
of this work is the Australian tradition of phenomenography as the theoretical framework 
of choice.  
 
3.1 Comparison of Candidate Frameworks 
There are several theoretical frameworks that could be employed in pursuit of an 
answer to the general research questions from Deshmukh (2010) in Section 1.2: 
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ethnography (Creswell, 2008), phenomenology (Bodner & Orgill, 2007; Patton, 2002), 
and phenomenography (Bodner & Orgill, 2007; Bowden & Green, 2005; Marton, 1986).  
The most appropriate framework would be sensitive to the attributes of uncertainty in 
design decisions as presented in the literature review.  The attributes of interest are: 
development of the skill of managing uncertainty over time, variation of experience with 
uncertainty, operating in a Naturalistic Decision Making environment, and designing 
Large Scale Complex Engineered Systems.  Table 3.1.1 below shows a summary 
comparison of the most likely frameworks and their sensitivity to the research question’s 
attributes.  The shadowed boxes in the table represent a mismatch. 
 
Table 3.1.1  Candidate theoretical frameworks mapped to research question attributes. 
                                    Theoretical Framework 
Attribute Ethnography Phenomenology Phenomenography 
Development of skill 
over time 
Oriented towards 
beliefs rather than 
skills 
Well-suited to 
describe a lived 
experience 
Well-suited to 





Typically focus on a 
group’s shared 
experience 
Goal is to find a 
single common 
meaning of an 
experience 
Well-suited to 




describe the culture 
of aerospace in situ 
(observations in the 
field) 
Well-suited to 
describe a lived 
experience (self-
report) 
Deep, open interview 








important artifacts of 




important artifacts of 
aerospace as part of 
the phenomenon 
Deep, open interview 
allows for reflection 
on LSCES 
 
The primary goal of ethnography is to describe a culture’s behaviors and beliefs, 
and researchers have argued that the workplace is a culture worthy of investigation.  
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Ethnography has been employed to study the role of ambiguity and uncertainty in the 
progress of design (Louis L. Bucciarelli, 1994).  Ethnography has been useful in studying 
the physical sciences and engineering as well (Case & Light, 2011; Coley, Houseman, & 
Roy, 2007; Dym et al., 2005; Latour & Woolgar, 1986; Rivas McGowan et al., 2012; 
Tonso, 2006).  The aerospace business can be considered a unique culture, having a risk-
averse attitude, having a shared language centered on aviation activities, and having a 
shared belief in the importance of teaming.  However, its strength is identifying a 
common belief that transcends time, so it is not a suitable method for capturing individual 
learning through varied experiences. 
Phenomenology primarily seeks to find a common essence in lived experience 
(Bodner & Orgill, 2007; Patton, 2002).  A key element of selecting participants is that the 
participant did indeed experience the phenomenon under study.  The primary objective is 
to find a common experience (the thing itself).  In this work, the thing itself is uncertainty 
as described by Thunnissen’s uncertainty taxonomy.  Phenomenology is not well-suited 
to describing various experiences of the participants, where variation originates from 
organism, environment, and task as Skill Theory in Section 2.6 proposes. 
Phenomenography accounts primarily for variation in experience by uncovering 
the relation between the participant and the phenomenon (Bowden & Green, 2005).  The 
basic premise is that there are limited number of qualitatively different ways that a 
phenomenon can be understood or experienced (Marton, 1986).  The interpreter of the 
phenomenon is the participant, not the researcher.  In order to solicit a variety of 
experiences and to allow all relevant voices to be heard (National Commission for the 
Proptection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1978), a highly 
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varied sampling of participants is necessary.  With a proper semi-structured interview, the 
participant can unveil the environment, the products, and the processes of their 
professional experiences.  The creation of hierarchical categories as part of the analysis 
may uncover the development of the skill of managing uncertainty.  Therefore, 
phenomenography is the most suitable theoretical framework for the research questions 
in Section 2.8. 
Phenomenography suggests a logical relationship among outcomes (typically a 
hierarchy) and Skill Theory suggests a hierarchical relationship of skills.  
Phenomenography is aimed at application to education; Skill Theory is also for the 
benefit of education.  The human experience of developing the skill of management of 
uncertainty is likely varied, due at least in part to the varied nature of uncertainty in 
engineering design and decision-making.  In other words, the idea of experience may 
include but is not limited to the variety and quantity of uncertainty in design, and may 
also include an engineer’s various management strategies.  Phenomenography involves 
semi-structured interviewing as the primary data collection method.  The trade-off for 
long observations in the field or short observations around a problem-solving task then is 
open, deep interviewing as the data collection method. 
 
3.2 Key Concepts in Phenomenography 
The assumptions and the goals of phenomenography align with the assumptions 
and goals of this work.  Phenomenography is purely qualitative and non-experimental.  
Correct and mistaken concepts of the phenomenon are equally interesting to the 
researcher, because “A careful account of the different ways people think about 
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phenomena may help uncover conditions that facilitate the transition from one way of 
thinking to a qualitatively ‘better’ perception of reality” (Marton, 1986).  The following 
subsections highlight the philosophical stance and goals of phenomenography as the 
theoretical framework of choice in this work. 
 
3.2.1 Phenomenon 
Phenomenon is defined from the Greek root word as “a thing as it appeared” 
(Richardson, 1999) instead of “a thing in itself”.  The epistemological and philosophical 
stances are described as “The object of study in phenomenographic research is not the 
phenomenon being discussed per se, but rather the relation between the subjects and that 
phenomenon” (Bowden & Green, 2005): 
Phenomenographers are among a range of qualitative researchers who take 
a non-dualist stance.  We do not focus on hypothetical mental structures 
separate from the world. There is no dividing line between the inner and 
the outer worlds.  There are not two world with one held to explain the 
other.  The world is not constructed by the individual, nor is it imposed 
from the outside, ‘it is constituted as an internal relation between them. 
There is only one world, but it is a world we experience, a world in which 
we live, a world that is ours’. 
 
3.2.2 Outcome Space 
Phenomenography as a theoretical framework and methodology typically has as 
its outcome an arrangement of categories, that is often hierarchical in nature, which are 
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variations of human experience of a phenomenon.  The outcome space often implies an 
increasingly comprehensive awareness or increasingly comprehensive experiences (Daly, 
2008; Zoltowski, 2010).  The outcome space has three attributes: simple and clear, 
logically related typically by hierarchy, and parsimonious or few (L. Mann, 2014).  The 
outcomes must derive from the data and not from the researcher’s preconceived notions 
or even from the published literature’s results because the investigation focuses on the 
participants’ understanding of the phenomenon.  The goal is practical applicability, which 
is the goal in this work for engineering education. 
 
3.3 Assumptions of Phenomenography 
First, phenomenography assumes that there are a limited number of qualitatively 
different ways that people experience and understand a phenomenon (Marton, 1986).  
While there is no limit to the number of potential categories, it implies that the outcome 
space should include just a few categories.  While “few” means different numbers to 
different people, recent engineering education outcome spaces generally do not exceed 
seven unique categories (Bucks & Oakes, 2011; Daly, 2008; L. M. W. Mann, 2007; 
Zoltowski, 2010). 
Second, phenomenography makes no assumption of right or wrong 
interpretations, which would be some kind of interpretation from the researcher.  This 
would include concepts about physical phenomena, such as velocity, for which there is a 
“correct” answer (Marton, 1986).  Applying an assumption of what is right or wrong 




Third, phenomenography does not assume a dualist view of the world as 
individual constructivism and social constructivism do.  “Individual constructivism sees 
internal mental acts as being an explanation for external acts and behaviors.  The reverse 
is true for social constructivism” (Bowden & Green, 2005).  Rather, phenomenography 
assumes a relational view, a point of controversy to some critics in Section 3.8. 
 
3.4 Propositions and Expectations 
Phenomenography takes a stance of having no qualitative expectations.  Rather, 
the researcher is bound to bracket him/herself from presuppositions and hypotheses, even 
from seemingly authoritative sources (Ashworth & Lucas, 1998).  Ashworth and Lucas 
note that phenomenography suggests bracketing may go against the traditional tide of 
reviewing literature before conducting research in order for the researcher not to be 
biased. The researchers must bracket themselves (remove themselves from interpreting 
the phenomenon) (Marton, 1986). Bracketing in phenomenography derives from 
phenomenology’s epoche, meaning “to refrain from judgment” (Patton, 2002).  Since 
bracketing is almost humanly impossible, it is better to acknowledge biases, 
demonstrated in Section 3.9 below and to ensure reliability and validity. 
 
3.5 Key Researchers and Their Perspectives 
Original phenomenography, or the Swedish tradition, has been employed in order 
to understand students’ conceptions of reality, including forces and optics, and it requires 
problem solving before interviewing as part of the data collection (Marton, 1986).  As 
researchers have employed simulation techniques to expert teams (Ericsson, 2006), so 
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problem solving in Marton’s phenomenography could be considered a simulation in order 
to understand the participants’ knowing.  Observation of the participants’ interaction with 
the phenomenon is part of Original phenomenography.  Within a Large Scale Complex 
Engineered Systems context in Section 2.1, observation is not a practical data collection 
method for this application as the development times in aerospace can span many years. 
Developmental phenomenography, or the Australian tradition, typically employs 
semi-structured interviews to elicit participants’ reflections on their experience, where the 
intent is to seek depth in the experience (Bowden & Green, 2005).  While original 
phenomenography and developmental phenomenography can be centered on learning, 
developmental phenomenography does not include the observation of the participant 
encountering the phenomenon in a problem-solving task.  The literature review showed 
that the scale of the design environments being researched does not align well with 
original phenomenography because of the complexity of the problems that are 
encountered in aerospace design.  A task that could fit into the timeframe of an interview 
would be a simulation and not an actual design, thereby introducing the question if the 
subject would really apply the same techniques to the real design.  As a result, only the 
semi-structured interview in the Australian tradition was employed here.  Table 3.5.1 
below shows that the crucial difference between these two methods that affects this 












skill over time 
Well-suited to describe a lived 
experience 




Well-suited to account for 
variation 




Prescribed design task or 
problem-solving is in vivo rather 
than in situ 
Deep, open interview allows for 




Prescribed design task or 
problem-solving does not align 
with time scale or complexity 
scale of aerospace 
Deep, open interview allows for 
reflection on Large Scale Complex 
Engineered Systems 
 
3.6 Observable Phenomena in Phenomenography 
The primary observation is the relation between the subject and the phenomenon 
as the subject describes the phenomenon.  The researcher brackets his or her own 
understanding the phenomenon and of the participant, but the researcher’s deep, open 
interview technique causes the participant to reflect on the phenomenon richly (Bodner & 
Orgill, 2007).  It should be noted here that the participant’s description and the 
participant’s actions may be different from each other; therefore, phenomenographers do 
not claim that they have uncovered a positivistic truth.  Rather, researchers may claim 
that they have found something useful for education. 
The primary phenomenon is the participants’ varied experiences of uncertainty.  
Significant criteria for participant selection include the participants’ education 
backgrounds, career trajectories, cultural experiences, and professional responsibilities 
within the larger scheme of their employers’ relationships to one another.  .  The 
employing companies can be considered as having various levels within systems-of-
systems, as in Section 2.2, such as a raw material supplier (D level), a subsystem supplier 
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(B, C level), an airframe integrator (A level), or a primary operator (OES level).  The 
level at which a company operates implies different priorities in costs, qualities, and 
schedules, which in turn may become an uncertainty for others at different levels.  The 
goal of this study is to include the maximum variation possible of the criteria listed here 
in order to achieve representative variation of the experience of uncertainty in design and 
decision-making. 
 
3.7 Boundaries and Limitations 
The boundaries of phenomenography are related to the data collection method of 
semi-structured interviewing of an individual, but not a group, a team, or a project.  The 
participants reflect on their experiences, the account of which may vary from what a 
researching observer or another participant may observe.  From Table 2.4.1, a competent 
designer begins to reflect on design (Schön, 1983), making meaning of their experiences.  
Experiences for which a person has deeply reflected may be communicated as a well-
rehearsed speech, but first-time consideration to a topic may be communicated with 
pauses, uhs and ums (Buzzanell, 2012). To the extent of established trust and comfort, the 
participant will share experiences with the researcher (Rubin & Rubin, 2012).  Within 
these boundaries and within the boundary of fatigue of the participant, responsibility rests 
with the interviewer to “dig deeply” into the participants’ experiences. 
There are several limitations to acknowledge because of the data collection 
method of semi-structured interview only.  First, this theoretical framework moves the 
interpretive work from the researcher to the participant.  Also, different researchers may 
converge upon different outcome categories with the same data.  Second, what the 
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participant remembers and how the participant remembers could be limitation.  In 
learning, people tend to remember best the first thing, the last thing, and the most intense 
thing (Thorndike, 1932).  The participants, as they tell their stories, are attempting to 
make sense of their experiences (Weick, 1995), and will therefore put certain aspects in 
the foreground or background as part of their narrative (Bruner, 1986; Buzzanell, 2012).  
Third, participant selection could be a limitation, to assume that the participants have 
indeed experienced the phenomenon under investigation. In developmental 
phenomenography, it is difficult to confirm beforehand without the researcher making 
some assumptions about the phenomenon and the participant.  The key to addressing 
these limitations is ensuring validity and reliability. 
There may be limitations in the results from several attributes of participants.  
First, self-selection of participants is unavoidable in the design of this study, generally 
based on their schedule, their interest, and whether contact information is available to 
send a recruiting email.  This is especially pertinent in recruiting older female engineers 
in a business with significant gender disparity, where the women might be fatigued with 
frequent requests to represent the female population.  Second, it is unlikely that several of 
the participants will have worked on the same project, so while literature shows that 
aerospace engineering relies on teams, it might not be demonstrated well in this study.  
Third, focusing on working professionals’ experiences may limit the results’ applicability 
to the undergraduate curriculum.  As with many qualitative studies, top candidates for 
inclusion can be identified and whoever is willing will be interviewed. 
There are some mitigating steps to address the limitations.  First, including 
variation in participants’ job titles and employing companies may indirectly influence 
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variation of awareness of uncertainty.  Some job ranks may be: first level supervisor, 
chief, director, technical fellow, and vice president.  Second, thinking about systems-of-
systems in Section 2.2, employing companies may be OES, A, B, C, and D levels.  Third, 
regarding the applicability of professional experiences to curriculum experiences, the 
interview protocol has primary questions on the participants’ reflections on their learning 
trajectories, so there may be evidence linking the two experiences.  Fourth aerospace 
students in their last year of schooling can be included as the “starting point”, though the 
participants’ age is not necessarily directly correlated to level of awareness of 
uncertainty.  Each of these mitigating steps has been included in this work. 
The biggest limitation is the challenge of rigor (Sin, 2010) in developing the 
outcome space, especially to those who are purely quantitative researchers.  The first 
mitigation is a member check and edit of the transcript from the participant, but not a 
check of the outcome space (Cohen & Crabtree, July 2006).  The second mitigation is 
multiple readings of the transcripts as a whole after all the data are collected,.  The third 
mitigation is team analysis that welcomes challenge, critique, and revisiting assumptions 
(Bowden & Green, 2005).  The fourth mitigation is to be transparent in the data 
collection and analysis process; each of the steps of the process will be documented as 
appendices for further review by the research community at large.  The fifth mitigation is 
to validate the results with other published literature, and to justify any discrepancies that 





Richardson provides a thorough critique of phenomenography, including its 
incomplete development as a research methodology and its increasing application in 
education (Richardson, 1999), as do Ashworth and Lucas (1998).  Richardson claims that 
original phenomenography lacks a conceptual basis and epistemological foundation that 
other social-science research methods have, primarily compared to constructivism.  He 
contrasts phenomenography’s interviewing as shallower than ethnography’s or 
anthropology’s interviewing, especially because the analysis “depends on other people’s 
discursive accounts of their experience”.  He shows phenomenography as being similar to 
grounded theory and phenomenology in analysis.  The positive aspect of 
phenomenography is that the results are easily accessible by professors and students, so 
that pedagogy can increasingly be based upon evidence-based methods. 
 
3.9 Researcher Biases, Role of the Researcher 
In Section 3.4, one of the requirements of phenomenography is to bracket oneself 
in the analysis, or to not let biases mask key results in the study.  Since that is a near 
impossible challenge for most humans, I will acknowledge the perspective I bring to this 
study instead.  I am a half-white female engineer and pilot with industry experience, and I 
did not cope well with uncertainty for at least the first two years of my employment, and 
still may not, if imposter syndrome (Brems, Baldwin, Davis, & Namyniuk, 1994) is an 
underlying factor, which drives this research project. 
I worked as an aerodynamicist on tiltrotor aircraft for seven years (A. Cummings, 
2014).  My supervisors and coworkers told stories of the development of the aircraft.  
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Books were published by authors on the outside, either enthusiasts or technology 
naysayers within the helicopter business.  My coworkers ridiculed news articles that were 
fraught with inaccuracies.  I participated in flight test, which was considered the truth 
source against which the mathematical models were measured, but experiments have 
their own uncertainties.  It became clearer over time that no one person knew everything 
about this aircraft and that there are multiple stakeholders with conflicting priorities who 
have decision-making responsibilities and influence on the design.  It is this lengthy 
experience that drives my research questions. 
My industry experience may be a foundation of trust in recruiting participants.  
My connections to my former coworkers may build a pool of potential participants 
quickly, but perhaps not diversely.  It may also impede my follow-up questions on word 
choices because I think I have the shared aerospace language but the participant may be 
thinking about a topic differently. 
My industry experience may also cause me to have a laser focus on elements of 
the data that echo my own experience and I may ignore significant elements of the data 
that I did not personally experience.  For example, I learned the Earned Value 
Management System, which tracks cost, schedule, and deliverables as metrics comparing 
planned to actual performance.  Therefore, I realize that there are cost and schedule 
uncertainties in addition to uncertainties in making some design function according to 
specifications. 
Another bias goes against the grain of the Engineering Education research agenda 
of diversity and inclusion ("The Research Agenda for the New Discipline of Engineering 
Education," 2006).  Knowing that engineering has a persistent gender disparity, even 
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exaggerated in the population of pilots (4% of the workforce (U.S. Bureau Labor 
Statistics, May 2014)) compared to engineers, I should make every effort to include a 
representative percentage female sample in my study.  Yet, I have no personal evidence 
that competence with engineering skills or experience of uncertainty in design is 
dependent upon gender.  Therefore, I do not wish to show in my study that a variable of 
interest is gender.  I defer to my study participants, then, on highlighting whatever factors 
they think most significant. 
My tendency to analyze qualitative data in fine and detailed cuts has its roots in 
my industry experience with quantitative data.  Fine cuts of flight test data provide more 
independent variables for correlating the mathematical models, which have many 
interdependent variables.  I would naturally opt for finer cuts of experience of uncertainty 
according to Thunnissen’s uncertainty taxonomy in order to explain the outcome space.  
This tendency may be in direct contrast to the parsimony of phenomenographic outcome 
spaces. 
Antidotes to these biases may be more than three iterations categorizing the 
transcript data and analyzing as a team of researchers (Bowden & Green, 2005).  Records 
of each iteration of analysis are warranted as an appendix of the final report of this study, 
though only the final defensible outcome space merits a chapter.  Iteration and 
collaboration with a larger research team ensures validity and reliability. 
 
3.10 Methodology 
Certain decisions for the method are driven by the purely qualitative methodology 
of phenomenography.  The design of this study is non-experimental, so any changes of 
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behavior or skill noted in this work are not the result of a controlled intervention.  The 
data collection method is semi-structured interview only.  The accompanying analysis 
will be the creation of categories of qualitatively different ways that the whole transcripts 
reveal of experiencing the phenomenon of uncertainty, where within a category, 
participants have commonalities, and between categories, the participants have distinct 
differences.  I make no assertion, claim, or hypothesis at the start of data collection what 
those distinct differences might be, but only that there are unnamed differences. 
 
3.10.1 Population 
The population of interest is individuals who 1) earned an engineering degree, 2) 
have done engineering design as a part of their careers, 3) are empowered to make 
decisions and 4) are employed in aerospace businesses, whether in the US or abroad.  It is 
implied from the literature review that if a person engages in engineering design in the 
professional workforce, then that person will encounter uncertainty of at least one type.  
Participants were also included who are upper level undergraduate aerospace engineering 
students to represent a starting point of professionals entering the workforce. 
 
3.10.1.1 Sampling Frame 
A sampling frame is a “source that identifies members of the population for 
purposes of possible selection” (Blair, Czaja, & Blair, 2014).  The sampling frame 
includes employees of businesses for which the researcher and close acquaintances have 
connections, also called chain or snowball sampling.  The aerospace businesses are those 
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that are airframe integrators, primary operators, or those suppliers who directly identify 
airframe integrators or primary operators as their customers.  The attributes of the 
potential participants include a job title that indicates design and decision-making 
responsibilities. 
 
3.10.1.2 Purposeful Sampling for Maximum Variation 
Women compose 52% of the workforce in the United States but only 9% of 
employed aerospace engineers are women (U.S. Bureau Labor Statistics, May 2014).  
Women were purposefully over-sampled to insure their voices were included in the data.  
In Figure 3.10.2 below, there are six female participants, also represented in red circles in 
Figure 3.10.4.  Eight participants have connection to Bell Helicopter, see Section 3.9, but 
the majority of the participants come from other businesses. 
Attributes of the participants are demonstrated in Figure 3.10.2 below.  Job titles 
are reported according to the participants’ descriptions during the interviews.  Education 
parameters were also reported by the participants at the beginning of each interview.  
Military experience, pilot experience, and international experience were reported by 
participants as influencing factors and so are reported here.   
Different companies have a level of Systems-of-Systems applied, where company 
websites for “About Us” descriptions were used in order to make an assignment.  There 
are four main S-o-S classifications: operators, airframe and powerplant integrators, 
subsystem suppliers, and materials.  Because of the variation of experience, researcher 
and undergraduate are added in Figure 3.10.2 below.  The employers could be (or might 
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not be) but are not limited to: the customers NASA, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast 
Guard, Air Force, DARPA, FAA, and militaries of other nations; the large prime 
contractors Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Bell Helicopter, Sikorsky, AgustaWestland, 
Airbus, Eurocopter; propulsion suppliers Rolls Royce, GE Aviation, Pratt & Whitney, 
and Lycoming.  Each of the prime contractors and propulsion suppliers have their 
“second tier” suppliers.  Researchers could be but are not limited to top tier research 
institutions and universities.  Some of the more experienced individuals merited being 
classified in two levels of S-o-S because of greater than five years’ experience in two 
different levels, but the majority of individuals have one primary level. 
Figure 3.10.2, Figure 3.10.3, and Figure 3.10.4 below show the morphological 
chart (L. M. W. Mann, 2007) of pertinent participant demographics.  Figure 3.10.4 shows 
the chain sampling of 13 participants as my personal contacts, and 8 contacts as my 
contacts’ contacts, and four contacts as recruits through a professional society roster.  The 
five gray arrows are the researcher’s personal contacts that did not participate but 
forwarded the recruiting emails.  The participants all have pseudonyms assigned after the 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































It is typical to reach saturation around 20 to 30 participants (Bowden & Green, 
2005) and it is more prudent to seek more than 20 interviews due to the anticipated 
variation of uncertainty.  The reality of human research is willingness and availability of 
participants.  Personal contacts were recruited first, with not more than two emails 
separated by two weeks.  Actual participants were also asked to forward the recruiting 
email.  Other personal contacts that did not fit the profile were asked to forward the 
recruiting email to any and all of their contacts that did fit the profile.  Professional 
societies and clubs were asked to forward the email.  At least 175 unique email addresses 
received the recruiting email from February to June 2015.  The recruiting email for 
working engineers is in Appendix A. 
 
3.10.3 Data Collection 
3.10.3.1 Schedule and Budget 
Time commitments and constraints for this study require some consideration.  It is 
an appropriate plan to have a maximum of two face-to-face interviews a day to account 
for researcher fatigue, writing memos, and transcription (Rubin & Rubin, 2012), where 
the reality was one interview conducted per day.  Because of conducting interviews 
online or remotely, travel for face-to-face interviews was not considered. 
Transcripts were purchased through the vendor Rev.com at $1/audio minute, with 
about 33 hours of audio recorded in total.  Six audio files were corrupted with excessive 
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background noise, requiring me to transcribe them.  The total expenditures for 
transcription were approximately $1,400. 
Small incidental costs include purchasing a Skype phone number and minutes 
($28), renting a Mac product to use FaceTime instead of Skype ($20), and purchasing an 
audio recorder ($40) which did not to have a USB port for file transfers, thereby making 
it less useful.  Using a university software subscription for Camtasia to record 
audio/video of the Skype call and convert to audio only saved about $300. 
After a one day turn-around for transcription, one cycle of analysis was reading 
and correcting the purchased transcripts.  Transcripts were de-identified and emailed back 
to the participants, asking for a return with any corrections within two weeks.  The 
majority of participants (16 of 25) complied, including one participant that requested a 
paper copy through mail. 
Lastly, Figure 3.10.5 shows an ideal situation in blue of interviewing two 
participants a day, transcribing for one day, and sending out the transcript for a member 
check, where the red line shows actual data collection for this study.  The positive slope 
represents completing an interview.  The first data point represents IRB approval, and the 
next data point represents the first participant’s interview.  In between those two data 
points, for about one month, was the pilot study, in Section 3.10.4 below.  The data 





Figure 3.10.5 Planned and actual data collection for interview, transcription, and member 
check. 
 
3.10.3.2 Instrument Development 
A typical semi-structured interview protocol in phenomenography consists of 
contextual questions, open primary questions, situated example primary questions, and 
follow-up questions (Bowden & Green, 2005).  Contextual questions provide an 
introduction and some understanding of a participant’s current situation, encouraging the 
participant to reflect on their experiences.  Open primary questions solicit the 
participant’s understanding and meaning of the phenomenon.  Situated example primary 
questions solicit concrete examples of the participant’s own experience with the 
phenomenon.  Follow-up questions encourage further elaboration of the experience, such 
as motivations and decisions related to the experience.  Even though the literature review 
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of CHAPTER 2 has many definitions of concepts and constructs, none of them are 
included in the interview protocol because of bracketing in Section 3.4. 
Previously published work conducted provides some guidelines for constructing 
an interview protocol.  One phenomenographic study of design was crafted to elicit 
participants’ understanding of design, and the participants came from different disciplines 
(Daly, 2008).  Another phenomenographic study focused on experiences in designing for 
others, or human-centered design (Zoltowski, 2010).  A grounded theory study 
specifically asked working professionals about the problems they encounter at work (D. 
Jonassen et al., 2006).  The grounded theory study provides questions to understand a 
participant’s current workplace and responsibilities, and the phenomenographic studies 
provide questions worded particularly to elicit the participant’s understanding of the 
phenomenon under study. 
For this work, the contextual questions include the participant’s workplace 
description, the participant’s education, and the participant’s current role in the 
workplace, including design projects.  The open primary questions and situated example 
questions are the center of this work: 
 The participant’s experiences in making design decisions with uncertainty 
 The participant’s description of sources of uncertainty and the participant’s 
management of identified sources of uncertainty 
 The participant’s reflection on the learning trajectory he or she experienced related to 




One aim of the contextual questions is that the participant’s description of the 
workplace and his or her role within the workplace will match a Naturalistic Decision 
Making environment within a systems-of-systems environment.  The open primary 
questions aim to uncover what participants recognize as sources of uncertainty, how to 
manage those uncertainties, and how they learned or became aware of those uncertainties.  
Follow-up and probing questions, highlighted in italics in Appendix B, will be asked if 
the participant needs prompting.  Lastly, the aim of the entire project is to elicit words of 
wisdom from practicing engineers to upcoming engineers. 
These questions were deemed exempt from human research governance in 
Appendix A.  Minor changes not requiring review may be sent to IRB as an amendment 
to an approved study; however, in the execution of this study, no changes were necessary.  
The full instrument (interview protocol) is displayed in Appendix B. 
 
3.10.4 Pilot Study 
There are several reasons for pilot interviewing (Bowden & Green, 2005).  I as 
the novice interviewer needed practice in setting a comfortable and natural interviewing 
environment.  I also learned to bracket myself in the interview, avoiding comments and 
debates with the participant.  Very importantly, the instrument needed to be tested for 
obtaining data on the intended topic, especially to see if there is variation in experience of 
the phenomenon.  The recording media can be tested and note-taking for follow up 
questions can be practiced.  I recruited several of my personal contacts for the pilot study. 
Pilot study participants include individuals with varied experience at my home 
university.  In the aerospace engineering department, there is a former Deputy Associate 
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Administrator of NASA.  NASA may be considered an OES level operator in system-of-
systems language.  In materials engineering, there is a professor of practice with 30 
years’ experience.  Materials businesses may be considered a   level operator in system-
of-systems language.  There are also quite a few aerospace engineering graduate students, 
and one should be included in the pilot study.  With just these three potential participants, 
there is variation in experience that may test the validity of the interview protocol. 
The time commitment of the pilot study was one month.  I transcribed the 
interviews for practice to test time to transcribe. Notes from the recorded interview were 
used for preliminary assessment of the validity of the protocol.  Two iterations of the 
pilot study were scheduled as a good engineering design might include, but a second 
iteration was not necessary, so there are three pilot study participants. 
 
3.10.4.1 Pilot Study Results 
Per Section 3.10.4, the interview protocol of Appendix B was piloted in January 
2015.  One key difference in the pilot study was the ability to interview face-to-face 
rather than using online meetings; otherwise, the pilot was conducted as planned to 
conduct the full study.  The objectives were fourfold: 
1. Determine the effectiveness of the interview protocol for uncovering how a person 
experiences and manages uncertainty in design in an aerospace engineering context. 
2. Provide practice for the researcher as an interviewer. 
3. Investigate the alternative of conducting the interviews online or remotely. 
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4. Begin to uncover characteristics of participants that lead to greatest variation of 
experience with uncertainty. 
The study started with individuals who are geographically close to me.  Professors 
of practice were contacted for face-to-face pilot interviews.  A graduate student with an 
aerospace engineering undergraduate degree was also contacted.  Two were 
acquaintances and the third was recommended by an acquaintance.  The primary 
characteristic of variation among these was years of experience.  The professors of 
practice have worked in industry for more than 30 years; the graduate student worked for 
less than two years. 
Per semi-structured interview, I practiced staying engaged with the interviewee’s 
line of thought as I asked more questions from the protocol.  Two of the interviews were 
about one hour; one of the interviews was almost two hours.  It happened that the 
professors of practice drew diagrams and sketches on their available whiteboards in their 
offices for about five minutes of their interviews, while the graduate student did not 
create any visible artifacts or significant gestures during the interview. 
Immediately following the second and third pilot interviews, the interviewees 
were asked if they felt comfortable in the interview and whether they felt that I listened to 
them or interrupted their thoughts.  They reported that they felt comfortable and that they 




3.10.4.2 Pilot Interview Summaries 
Interviewee 1 views uncertainty as an everyday occurrence in the job, though he 
did not view himself as a designer broadly. His role as a director in the company was a 
“buck stops here” decision-making job.  In Systems-of-Systems description, his company 
is a base level raw materials supplier.  He told a story about investigating a design 
specification that he was certain could not be achieved by his company or any of its 
competitors.  He was puzzled, then, as to what party defined that specification.  He 
continued to ask questions until he found the designer in the Airframe & Powerplant 
Integrator company who admitted that “I just didn’t like it” and wrote this unachievable 
specification.  Interviewee 1 recognizes that uncertainty exists all the time and he seeks to 
reduce it through continued communication with other parties. 
Interviewee 2 views uncertainty as an everyday occurrence in the job, that his 
company’s role is to explore the unknown, to do things no one else has done before, and 
that is the fun challenge of the job. His company, as an Operational and Environmental 
Scenario level in Systems-of-Systems, managed Airframe & Powerplant suppliers and 
was subject to major political shifts and hidden agendas.  His decision-making roles 
included Director and above.  He told a story about the hidden political agendas being the 
greatest unknown on whether a certain project could even begin, and he was confident 
that the technical parameters could be met within the desired budget constraints.  He also 
described that budget constraints play a larger role in deciding on designs than the 
phenomenological (“state of the art”, not a research methodology) uncertainty of 
operating in an unexplored environment, which was not the case 40 years ago.  Overall, 
Interviewee 2 recognizes and manages uncertainty from multiple sources. 
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Interviewee 3 recognizes uncertainty in design, including not knowing what 
process to follow, not knowing what resources to leverage, not knowing which questions 
to ask of experts, and uncertainty in cultural differences.  From her senior design 
experience, the team struggled because they did not know of a process to follow and they 
did not know where to start, though they knew the end result was to have some device to 
participate in a competition.  This experience was frustrating and the uncertainty 
regarding a design process was “debilitating”.  She told another story of taking a class in 
her master’s degree that culminated in an international trip, which both made her aware 
of and comfortable with cross-cultural differences.  Interviewee 3 recognizes some 
sources of uncertainty in design and is beginning to develop management strategies for 
some of those forms of uncertainty. 
 
3.10.4.3 Strengths and Weaknesses 
The achievement of the objectives is assessed here.  Firstly, from the above 
summaries, it seems that the interview protocol collects the intended data, namely, 
variation of a person’s experience and management of uncertainty in aerospace design.  
Other follow up questions to investigate motivations should be included: 
1. Why is that important? 
2. What were you trying to achieve by doing that? 
3. Why was that difficult (or other word the participant uses)? 




Secondly, from the post-interview interviews of two participants, it seems that my 
interview technique is adequate and possibly improving.  The participants reported felt 
comfortable and felt like they had a voice.  The older participants appeared to have 
forgotten that the recording devices were present.  However, the younger participant 
mentioned the fact of being recorded even as far as half way through the interview.  The 
transcripts were provided to the participants for their opportunity to edit. 
Thirdly, the evidence in the three interviews suggests that the desired data is 
primarily in the audio trace of the interview.  The participants infrequently used gestures.  
Two participants drew pictures to illustrate their points, possibly because the room 
included a large writing space.  One participant referenced documentation filed in his 
office in order to refresh his memory.  One participant had a sample part of poor quality 
to illustrate the ambiguity of written test requirements.  In all these instances, I took notes 
and drew similar sketches for future reference.  The substantial verbal evidence collected 
here suggests that online or remote interviewing will not hinder data collection. 
Lastly, the significant characteristics highlighted here that may affect a person’s 
experience and management of uncertainty include: years of experience and job title.  
The higher job titles may indicate an increasing level of expertise in and responsibility for 
decision-making.  Higher job titles may also indicate more opportunities to interact with 
other stakeholders in design.  There is not yet enough evidence to support a gender 
difference, but there is room in the study to investigate this further.  These key 







Phenomenography can take at least two paths of analysis: 1) place the whole 
transcript into a category or 2) extract the quotes specific to the phenomenon into a 
category.  In this work, I decided to place the entire transcript into a category.  This is 
because the protocol is structured such that the beginning questions on design necessarily 
situate the experience of uncertainty within that design project.  Therefore, most of the 
transcript focuses on one design project.  Either way, “In the analysis stage, the controls 
involve: 
 The use of no other evidence except the interview transcripts 
 The bracketing of the researcher’s own relation to the phenomenon 
 The use of group analysis in order to ensure the first two controls are effective, and 
 The analysis of the structural relation between the categories of description being 
postponed until after the categories have been finalized.” (Bowden & Green, 2005). 
 
3.10.5.2 Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis in developmental phenomenography is the whole transcript, 
fit into a category.  The researcher must be careful to say that the transcript and not the 
participant fits into a category, because it is unjust to categorize an entire person in only a 
two hour conversation (L. Mann, 2014).  Transcripts within a category have marked 




There are factors to consider in analyzing the data, according to the literature 
review.  Firstly, there may be a range of responsibility for managing uncertainty, from 
individual to distributed responsibility across a small team, even up to a whole company.  
Secondly, at any systems-of-systems level, all of the participants are likely describe 
themselves as functioning in a Naturalistic Decision Making environment, though they 
may not use these words directly.  NDM factors include organizational goals and norms, 
so it would be good to capture the influence of the levels at which the participants operate 
in complex systems-of-systems.  Thirdly and most importantly, the level of awareness of 
the different sources of uncertainty for each participant is the driving factor of the 
outcome space. 
 
3.10.6 Outcome Space 
The outcome space of this study will primarily include some description of an 
individual’s awareness and management of uncertainty.  It is possible to use Dorst’s 
levels of expertise in Table 2.4.1, but not so early in the analysis that it violates the first 
and second principles of analysis in Section 3.10.5.1 above.  It is possible that the 
outcome space will have one, two, or three dimensions, but it would be difficult to 
visualize more than three axes of variation.  More than three dimensions of variation may 
indicate another iteration of analysis is necessary.  A category will have participants with 
common experiences, and different categories will highlight different experiences. 
The resulting categories shall have substantiating evidence only from the 
transcripts (L. Mann, 2014).  Each category will have a name or handle, hopefully 
condensed to one word.  There will be a one sentence description.  Following will be a 
63 
 
few paragraphs of researcher interpretation, including supporting quotes from the 
transcripts in that category.  Also, as mentioned in Section 3.2.2, the categories should be 





CHAPTER 4. RESULTS: WAYS OF EXPERIENCING UNCERTAINTY IN DESIGN 
DECISIONS 
The analysis resulted in identifying five categories of experience of uncertainty in 
design decisions.  Several key pieces of literature provide the vocabulary to describe 
these resulting categories.  The categories are shown graphically in Figure 4.5.1 with the 
horizontal axis indicating forms of uncertainty based on Thunnissen’s taxonomy.  The 
second vertical axis represents skill in team engagement, where the elements of expert 
teams in Table 2.3.1 are identified.  There is a third dimension of the participants’ 
responses to uncertainty by which the categories are named. 
Even though phenomenography has no expectations or propositions at the 
beginning of a study, it is still essential to the analysis that the outcome space refers in 
some way to the phenomenon under investigation.  Therefore, there is a necessary 
dimension of uncertainty in the outcome space.  There is also a dimension named here as 
response to uncertainty, where in the preliminary stages of the study, I called it 
management of uncertainty as an answer to the second guiding research question of this 
work. 
The most surprising dimension of experience is the pervasive response “talk to 
people” to the protocol question “what was your process for making those decisions”, 
which upon analysis, I developed into discrete team engagement behaviors.  Even though  
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I presented expert teaming in Section 2.3, I did not specifically ask or lead the participant 
with any of the identified team behaviors.  Since participants specifically elaborated on 
talking to other people, it must be represented in the outcome space. 
 
4.1 Process of Analysis 
The execution of data collection and analysis merits a brief description here for 
reliability and validity purposes, with further details of the iterations of analysis provided 
in Appendix C.  The first cycle of familiarization with the data after obtaining transcripts 
from a third party service was accomplished by my listening to the audio and correcting 
the transcripts.  The corrected and de-identified transcripts were sent to the participants 
for any and all edits they wished to make; 16 of 25 participants returned edits and 
comments.  These member-checked transcripts and the other transcripts appear in the 
final analysis. 
I alternated between electronic and printed versions of the transcripts, keeping the 
electronic versions as the full archival record of my analysis.  I printed, read, and 
highlighted paper copies of the transcripts.  The handwritten notes and memos were 
transferred into an nVivo10 project.  I put paper copies of transcripts into groups; I 
created nodes for the groups in nVivo.  I wrote memos explaining similarities and 
differences among groups of transcripts.  I shared the groups and memos with another 
researcher familiar with aerospace and phenomenography for further review, questioning, 
and perspective.  As the appendix shows, I conducted at least 13 iterations of 
categorization before converging on the final results shown here. 
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Part of the evidence of having reached a valid outcome space is that subsequent 
cycles of analysis result in the same groups of transcripts (Bowden & Green, 2005).  
After 12 rounds of creating categories, the same transcripts converged into clusters for 
each perspective considered.  The second piece of evidence is that the explanations of 
categories were reviewed by another researcher and found to be logical and consistent.  A 
third piece of evidence, though less emphasized in phenomenography, is that there is no 
obvious and unjustifiable contradiction in this outcome space with other published 
literature.  The reliable and valid results are presented as common elements and varied 
elements in the sections below. 
 
4.2 Themes Common to All Participants 
The main objective of phenomenography is to identify difference of experience, 
whereas the main objective of phenomenology is to identify the common experience.  
Because of the common context of the aerospace industry, there are common elements to 
all transcripts.  Several of these items were delineated as the context of the study in the 
literature review CHAPTER 2.  These common elements help to describe the backdrop of 
each participant’s story, which backdrop is mostly a Naturalistic Decision Making 
environment as presented in Section 2.2. 
The aerospace field is data-driven, including negotiated and written contracts with 
tangible requirements and specifications.  The participants describe alternating between 
“big picture” and “smaller pieces” as they work through problems, leaning towards a 
systems thinking view of requirements to product design (Defense Systems Management 
College, 2001).  The top three are cost, schedule, and performance, where performance 
67 
 
cannot compromise flight safety.  The matter of flight safety and cost align with the 
aspect of high stakes in Naturalistic Decision Making environments, and the matter of 
schedule aligns with the aspect of time stress.  Because of these major criteria, engineers 
are encouraged to document lessons learned, and they encourage each other to learn from 
failure as well as success, touching on the research questions posed by Deshmukh in 
Section 1.2. 
The corollary of being data-driven is the expectation that most things have been 
tried before; it is just a matter of finding the data or the analogy so that the engineer can 
set the expectation or the baseline.  The participants describe documentation review as a 
key part of the design process.  Having a baseline helps participants apply structure to ill-
structured problems in a Naturalistic Decision Making environment. 
The participants describe review cycles where they genuinely want someone else 
to validate their work.  First, the engineer does his/her own work.  Second, the engineer 
seeks an informal peer review.  These two steps may be iterative between themselves.  
When the engineer converges on a decision with conviction, then the engineer is ready to 
present to their bosses or team leaders formally.  This element aligns with the aspect of 
having feedback loops and having multiple players in Naturalistic Decision Making 
environments.  Since these all are common elements, the following sections below will 
highlight the variations of the participants’ experiences. 
 
4.3 Categories of Description 
The metaphor of materials’ responses to stress (Callister, 2000) is used here to 
name the categories, symbolizing an internal response of the engineer to encountering 
68 
 
uncertainty.  Brittle materials fracture rapidly without appreciable macroscopic 
deformation.  In other words, brittle materials have a dramatic reaction to stress.  Plastic 
deformation is permanent or non-recoverable shaping after a load has been applied and 
released.  In other words, a plastic response moves one way and stays that way.  Tolerant 
materials do not fracture quickly under stress and are also called “forgiving”.  Robust 
(Park et al., 2006) materials are ready for the load for which they have been designed and 
will perform well.  Resilient materials have the capacity to absorb energy when deformed 
(Callister, 2000).  In other words, resilient materials can recover quickly (Hollnagel, 
2011). 
The participants are grouped by their similar responses to uncertainty and the 
groups are aligned along two dimensions representing the other aspects of the 
participants’ experiences that differentiate them from one another. The first dimension is 
the complexity of the design tasks they undertake, as indicated by the quantity and 
quality of forms of uncertainty they are aware of.  The second dimension is their skill at 
engaging their teammates and other stakeholders as they work through design tasks.  The 
engineer’s internal response to uncertainty is the unifying dimension.  So, there are three 
major aspects to each category of description. 
I describe each category below by discussing each of the three aspects of their 
experiences.  There were three primary questions explored with the participants in 
Section 3.10.3.2.  They were: 1) an experience of decision-making in design; 2) 
experiencing uncertainty in design; and 3) reflections on learning about uncertainty.  
Example quotes from participants of each category are provided to illustrate each 
particular way of experiencing uncertainty. For uniformity of flow, quotes of each 
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transcript will present significant themes of experience elicited by the primary questions: 
1) forms of uncertainty; 2) team engagement; 3) personal response to uncertainty; each 
category is summarized with participant reflections on personal growth in managing 
uncertainty.  The following sections answer the first research question in Section 2.8. 
 
4.3.1 Category 1: Brittle 
The first category is named Brittle.  The engineers in the Brittle category are 
uncomfortable with uncertainty and their teaming mechanism is to push the decision 
responsibility to someone else, typically a boss or team leader.  Their being 
uncomfortable with uncertainty can also manifest as being afraid of the consequences of 
being found ignorant by their superiors.  The form of uncertainty these engineers 
experience is only epistemic, where they are aware that there is subject matter that they 
have not yet studied.  This aligns well with Baillie and Johnson’s findings that fear of 
uncertainty is a reason that knowledge may be troublesome to some learners (Johri & 
Olds, 2014).  The tasks they have undertaken are typically managed as individual work 
and possibly soliciting informal peer review. 
Negative emotions frequently appear in these transcripts, some of it stemming 
from an unsuccessful attempt at engaging stakeholders in the design and associated 
decisions.  The level of support and attitude of their bosses or team leaders is highly 
influential on the emotions these engineers expressed.  Unsupportive leaders cause the 
engineer to hold a negative view of the project while supportive leaders cause the 
engineer to have confidence in themselves and the completion of the project.  Yet the 
engineers in this category have all completed assigned tasks satisfactorily. 
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The participants whose transcripts compose this category are Margaret, Philip, 
Ross and Silvia.  These participants are primarily speaking from the experiences of senior 
design projects or internship design assignments. Two, Margaret and Philip, are in their 
first full time assignment and included those experiences. 
 
4.3.1.1 Forms of Uncertainty 
The participants whose experiences categorized the Brittle group only identified 
epistemic uncertainties.  In particular, the participants describe ignorance of subject 
matter that they think is crucial to the success of their design projects.  Partly, the 
ignorance may be perpetuated by another stakeholder’s apparent unwillingness to share 
this information, thus linking the participant’s personal response to uncertainty to 
someone else’s influence. 
For Margaret, the largest uncertainties in her research project are understanding 
her customer’s needs, which even her customer had a difficult time defining, and 
obtaining the customer’s historical data in order to validate and verify any new models 
she may develop.  She considered her possible solution space as borrowing models from 
other disciplines, but her unfamiliarity with what other disciplines have developed has 
hindered her progress.  Her solution paths, or her uncertainty management strategies, 
include what she describes as a randomly organized literature review, presentation to her 
immediate boss, and presentation in professional conferences for feedback.  She said: 
When I do my literature review actually it's more random… It's kind of 
you start it very random. Then you find something interesting or closely 
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related to what you're doing… Then you do some more reading about this.  
My difficult part is I have hard time to set the stop line of your literature 
review…Then my adviser tells me, 'Okay, you can stop now. You can just 
do this.' At least he will give me a deadline... I need some external power 
to let me make the decision more efficiently.  The conference is also 
another external power for me…since the conference is coming I need to 
have something to have stop those random literature review and I need to 
think of what my work is. 
 
Philip’s industry experience has included flight simulation, flight test, and 
manufacturing.  Philip had two primary epistemic uncertainties for his simulation task: 
“to be able to do it on time” and “to be able to do it at all”.  Philip described how he 
decided what coding language he would use to create a simulation model:  
Some people still love Fortran. You just have to ... It's all good. You can 
do it in Simulink, and it will be fine. You can do it in C, and it'll be fine, 
but I prefer to do in Simulink, and he prefers to do it in C, so you just have 
to argue a little bit. Then ultimately, whoever yells the loudest usually gets 
the final say in things like this, because this is a lower level thing…I've 
already started on it, and this is what we're going to do.  I put my foot 
down. Sometimes you've just got to talk over the guy. 
 
Ross, currently a senior design student, primarily spoke of one of his internship 
experiences.  His task in his internships was to automate data acquisition in the 
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laboratory.  He described his problem solving process as “trial and error” and “you’ll get 
a problem and just be completely overwhelmed... break it down into sections that seem 
more manageable”.  He saw two solution paths: “really advanced costly accelerometers 
for vibration, as well as just cheap Arduino do-it-yourself”. 
He described his decision based on individual work: “I came to the conclusion 
that I would just do it myself, plus that way if there were issues, I would know, I wouldn't 
have to wait for someone or go through anyone…I would be the one fixing it and 
knowing everything about it.”  His work was successful: “As long as they didn't touch the 
code, they were fine. They were pleased with it just because at the end, he told me 
honestly he didn't expect me to finish it.” 
The uncertainty in this design task was “all of it”.  He said:  
I came into this knowing nothing about this specific programming area, 
circuits, I've never worked with Arduinos…It was a daunting task at the 
beginning because I was uncertain about the whole thing.  I've never done 
this, I broke it down a lot… I didn't realize the Arduino has a little 
community in itself… each day, there was a tiny little accomplishment or 
large frustration…It was more about what I could do and learn in the time 
frame then the best, not always the best solution but what worked for me 
at the time…I've never finished a project and say okay, I can explain 
100% of what's happening here and we're done with it…I've never 
finished a project and say okay, I can explain 100% of what's happening 




Silvia’s responsibility in her senior design project was an opportunity to explore 
emerging technologies as potential components of the final solution.  She spoke generally 
about keeping a customer in mind, about managing a budget and schedule to finish the 
project, and about the trade-offs between the technical parameters of batteries’ weight to 
power density.  But as for these new technologies, she had epistemic uncertainty:  
Sometimes when we look into internet and we see a lot of theory that's 
available to us, we only see the good sides because when a company is 
trying to put a product into the market, not every bad aspect ... industry 
secrets they would not let us know…Sometimes we look at the technology 
and wonder why they haven't been installed and why they haven't been 
used already because it sounds so perfect, but then if you do more delving 
and more research and you talk to people specially your professors or your 
TAs, you got to know that, oh, there's the side effect to the technology. 
 
4.3.1.2 Team Engagement 
Participants here tend to start work individually, and seek help infrequently.  
Participants here tend to see their team leaders as judges to whom they must show and 
defend their work.  In this category, participants accept the relationship that others, 
whether bosses or team leaders, are final decision-makers on their work. 
Margaret’s team engagement is informal and infrequent, but she notes an 
improvement.  She said: “I usually discuss with my group mates. I don't know why but at 
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that time I get afraid to discuss with my adviser. Then last year, yeah, last year, I discuss 
more with my adviser.” 
Philip described his process for management approval as moving from casual to 
formal conversations:  
You feel good about this decision. Then you try to defend your choice. If 
other people can't shoot it down, then that's it and you're going to make 
this choice…I talked at them about it, and I bugged them about it, and I 
talked to them some more, then used a lot of hand gestures… It's like 
grassroots. You've got to build it up. You've got to get people on your 
side. Eventually, there's going to be a design review. Then that's like the 
formal decision where you've got to speak in business talk to people. But 
before that, you try and convince everybody that you've got the right idea. 
That's casual. You can be standing in line, like at lunch. 
 
As Ross described his aerospace senior design project, he noted that his senior 
design team’s responsibilities did not require him to make decisions.  His task was “most 
of the sizing code in terms of figuring out what the weights are, what numbers need to be, 
not so much trade studies…I'm not doing a lot of the actual physical choosing the exact 
designs”.  His investment in the project’s success he described as “NASA won't see 
anything until the final week of the project, but throughout, we all are doing presentations 
and just for the grade…We want to do the best as we can but the NASA thing is just an 




4.3.1.3 Personal Response to Uncertainty 
Participants in this category described a strong link between their feelings about 
uncertainty in the design to their leaders’ perceived feelings.  Participants also have 
waves of positive and negative feelings as they progress through their design projects.  If 
they perceive that something is not going well, at least according to the supposed judge or 
decision-maker, a negative feeling can be quite apparent. 
Margaret described her personal experience of uncertainty as a process of 
emotions.  She said:  
You're afraid, you have the fear. You have something, probably there's 
something unknown that will completely destroy your research. It might 
mean your research don't make any sense… You kind of reject it; you kind 
of unconsciously then you have to gradually just accept it…I discuss more 
with my adviser…you have more confidence to okay, he's good with it ... 
Feedbacks from group member they're also good. Sometimes it's very 
diverse. You cannot address all of them…I feel like I'm more of risk 
averse. 
 
Philip described his personal response to uncertainty as an emotional cycle as he 
moved through his design project in a trial and error fashion:  
It would take too much money and too much time to go back and redo it, 
so it will be what it is… didn't know if it was going to work or not…you 
just face the consequences of it and afterwards you find out what 
happens…Part of it was acknowledging the fact that if it didn't work, then 
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you're going to have to push the schedule back, and the company's going 
to lose some money. Then I'll probably get fired. That's the mental part of 
it…You just get thrown into the mix, and then you've got to learn things as 
you go, which is the [company] way. They throw you in, see if you can 
handle it. 
 
Silvia described her strategy for managing uncertainty as soliciting judgment calls 
from her superiors: 
I think uncertainties are inevitable in a design…the only way to do it is to 
test it and the only way we can test a conceptual design is by talking to our 
professors…I think the only way to deal with uncertainty is to rely heavily 
on people who are experienced… Like [professor1] who is working with 
us on senior design…seniors who graduated and who are actually working 
in these industries…usually TAs have a lot of internship experience…go 
into companies like Boeing, Lockheed, Airbus, so we get a direct review 
of our product from the people who are already in the system and who are 
already working with these products. 
 
4.3.1.4 Reflections on Learning to Manage Uncertainty 
All participants were asked to reflect on their growth in ability to design, but only 
Silvia had a marked opinion.  Like Margaret, Silvia explained about gradually accepting 
uncertainty will be present and cannot be eliminated.  She has gained some theoretical 
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knowledge from systems engineering classes: “I think when we deal with uncertainty 
when we were taught in the class was to make a fail-safe design. Even if you fail, you 
assume that you're going to fail but you're going to have something so that you know that 
you're going to fail safely.”  For now, Silvia described her personal response to 
uncertainty as growing a little from life-changing events:  
I hate uncertainties, personally, because I have always like things 
planned…I think moving from a different country to the United States… 
being by myself was a big way of knowing that life is full of uncertainties 
and you need to just work through it…you're allowed to have these ideas 
and you're allowed to dream... You're made to believe that you can 
achieve anything…gave me a lot of confidence that there are things that 
you need to say you believe in and then prove that you believe in it and 
why you believe in it. 
 
4.3.2 Category 2: Plastic 
The engineers in the Plastic category find comfort in the “fact” that most things in 
aerospace have been tried before, so they just have to move in one previously-proven 
direction to finish their design tasks.  Because of their adherence to a single solution path, 
their behavior may look like design fixation (Gero, 2011).  They acknowledge that they 
are young so there must be someone more experienced to assist them as they explore the 
design solution space and make decisions.  These engineers take some initiative to gather 
new knowledge as identified by more experienced engineers. They take a cycle of 
78 
 
decision-making to justify their solutions to themselves first, or to convince themselves 
first. 
They present their solutions to their bosses and team leaders for further review 
because they are beginning to view projects as team efforts, but it is a limited view.  They 
acknowledge that other engineers have unique and complementary knowledge.  They 
solicit peer review.  They especially solicit Subject Matter Expert opinions and they do 
not demand data-driven justification from the SMEs. 
Plastic engineers encounter epistemic uncertainty, such as topics they have not 
studied before.  They also describe the new responsibility of creating or predicting 
schedule and budget of projects.  Technical, cost, and schedule knowledge for Plastic 
engineers is best discovered by asking others directly to provide their opinions and to 
continue on the trajectory suggested by this resource. 
The participants whose transcripts compose this category are Bernard, Diana, 
Edmund, Luciana, Miranda, and Vincent.  Luciana and Diana have the least amount of 
experience at two years.  Bernard has the most years of experience in this category; he 
hails from the pre-space-flight era of aerospace engineering but made a career change out 
of aerospace into self-employed handyman services after about 15 years, due to his 
uncertainty of the financial situation of his aerospace employer. 
 
4.3.2.1 Forms of Uncertainty 
The participants whose experiences categorized the Plastic group identified 
epistemic uncertainties as the Brittle category did, but with added schedule and budget 
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impacts.  The Plastic group, compared to the Brittle group, has a quicker tendency to ask 
others about these uncertainties, since they presume that the more experienced coworkers 
or the ones who went before them have correct insight into these uncertainties. 
Bernard’s transcript included four unique design experiences where he was given 
the task, he made drawings and prototypes, his idea was approved by his management 
team, and the idea was implemented with no apparent iterations or problems.  His tasks 
were executed in a linear design process from problem definition to implementation.  
Bernard seemed to be sufficiently competent at designing that none of his ideas needed 
revision, so the “trial and error” mentality resulted in no errors.  One of these experiences 
occurred over a very short time frame:  
There was a change in hydraulic systems of the airplane. One afternoon, 
the panels, the switches, had to be redesigned. They wanted, it was sort of 
a critical time element here, to get these parts designed and get into 
manufacturing.  That night, that evening at home, I came up with a new 
arrangement for the controls of the hydraulics systems.  The next morning, 
I gave the way I thought it ought to be, and they could go ahead then with 
getting the final design papers drawn up and get this into manufacturing. 
 
Bernard’s most memorable design experience for the cockpit layout he drew from 
his pilot experience even though he was a young engineer at the time who felt humble in 
the presence of senior design engineers who worked on some of the first commercial 
airplanes.  It is memorable to him because his design was used later in spacecraft: 
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I made the comment that this was going to be a short range airplane. There 
would be a lot of visual flying into airports. The pilots would really need a 
horizontal reference to fly the airplane, a reference to the horizon for level 
flight. To do this, the glare shield over the instrument panel could be made 
flat across the top as much as possible before it curves…the project pilot 
said to make a glare shield over the instrument panel in the mock up that 
we had of the cockpit and he would take a look at it… when he saw it, he 
thought it was a good idea and the design should be that way.   
 
Later, Bernard’s former boss participated at least tangentially in the design of a 
space shuttle.  His former boss told Bernard that he recommended the flat glare shield 
idea.  Even young engineers, as Joel in Category 4 points out, can have great ideas that 
older engineers need to learn to solicit: 
Because [the space shuttle] was basically a two man cockpit, “they came 
to us to go over the design of the [AIRCRAFT1] to see how they might 
incorporate some of the features of the [AIRCRAFT1] in the space 
shuttle… the space shuttle crew might like to have for a horizontal 
reference to fly the airplane and land it” …and that's the way they 
designed the space shuttle. 
 
Bernard described a sense of uncertainty in design in only one of his experiences.  
He designed an external camera mount that would be used for a very short time as a one-
off situation while he was employed at an airline (OES).  He had only his calculations 
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and no test data before the design was installed.  Here, he followed a linear design 
process with no prototypes or bench tests where the actual use of his design was the one 
and only test.  He did, however, have the airframe and powerplant integrator engineers 
review his design:   
There were speed restrictions on the airplane because of the tail camera 
that [company1] said we should not exceed… It was like a cold sweat 
flying to [location1] with the camera because of any unknowns on how the 
tail was going to react on the airplane… the first thing I did was look out 
the airplane when we landed to see that everything was still in the right 
place on the airplane. We did. 
 
Edmund talked about a recent design experience that he thinks could have gone 
better if his management team had a different risk attitude.  He was part of a 
multidisciplinary team looking at a particular system, where the designers belong to the 
propulsion group, the dynamicist studies vibration, and Edmund owns electronic 
monitoring systems that can detect vibration.  Here, Edmund encountered epistemic 
uncertainty regarding whether the propulsion system would have unacceptable vibration 
or not.  His response was to engage higher management in the decision process: 
The dynamicist was stating that he believes the drives need to have the 
option to be balanced and we should have the ability to measure the 
balance of them and to modify the balance of them on the aircraft and to at 
least measure the balance of them in case we have problems. That was his 
side but then the design side, the transmission side stated that they don't 
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feel that it needs to be balanced. The vendor will balance them before they 
will deliver them. They will be fully balanced. There won't be an issue… I 
was stuck in the middle because I have the system that actually measures 
the balance of the drive shafts… I don't not trust the dynamicist guy but I 
worked with the designers more… We put together a risk. We talked 
about it. We had 2 different sides that were completely in disagreement 
with each other. We brought it to management. 
 
Luciana had both senior design experience and internship experience but her 
transcript focused on her senior design experience primarily because the interview 
protocol questions focused on experiences of her making decisions. The most difficult 
part of the senior design experience was the fly portion, in which the pilot experience can 
be classified an epistemic uncertainty:  
The biggest problem was we had to fly it ourselves. None of us in my 
team had any experience with flying an RC aircraft… It crashed pretty 
much immediately and a lot of teams had the same problem but it was a 
little disappointing to not really get to see if our airplane really was able to 
do all of the things that we said it would do... We didn't know how our 
friend was going to be able to fly the airplane... I think that was the thing 
that I was most annoyed about in the whole thing… that was really 




Decisions on Luciana’s team were emotionally driven even though there were 
more objective tools at their disposal, such as a decision matrix:  
We thought it looked better so we wanted it… It was we'd recognize that 
they all were fairly good and we just had to pick one… I felt like a lot of 
times it was out of frustration… I felt like we were making the decision 
matrix the way we wanted it to be… which one would be the right 
decision? A lot of times you just have to wait and see or like pick one and 
see how it feels… There was no way, with the knowledge that you had at 
the time of the decision, that you could have known any better. 
 
There were design configuration and sizing epistemic uncertainties that Luciana 
encountered: “how would our battery last the longest. What was the least weight? What 
was simplest to build also is a big component.”  So she and her team conducted a few 
bench tests:  
Helping us decide what wheels we wanted. We would test a bunch of 
different wheels and see how long they took to stop in order to be able to 
calculate the takeoff distance …we tested a couple things out with how 
much power did our motor and propeller system really have… we were all 
a little concerned because our tests all came back fairly different… We 
tried it out a couple of times in terms of we would turn it on and drive it 
around the hallways in the basement but not fly. Sometimes we would turn 




Miranda experienced simultaneous and interrelated epistemic uncertainties in 
cultural differences, data management, and schedule management in one of her first post-
doctoral assignments in a research laboratory in a foreign country.  She was trying to 
decide whether to include a baseline experiment or to use some form of previously 
measured data, and this was an agonizing decision for her:  
It's been a really big cultural difference for me learning how information 
flows… No one wants to give you information… lost information because 
of legal reasons …my primary responsibilities are designing the human in 
the loop experiments… I was trying to figure out whether we'd run a third 
[experiment]… Do we have a reference point? How are we actually going 
to say that our [design] is super useful if we don't have anything to 
compare against. … It was a really big deal though, because it also meant 
increasing the amount of work that we had to do. It also meant delaying 
some of the real actual work that we were on the hook for …first time I've 
dealt with a moderate level of responsibilities… I have regretted and 
rethought this decision 1,000 times, because this is the biggest one I've 
made so far on this project. It also shaped everything because it was made 
so early on. 
 
In an event that Stephen in Category 4 describes as the “gotcha” moment, 
Miranda discovered a resolution to an epistemic uncertainty that she had not considered 
during the planning stages.  She found out in the execution of her experiment that there 
was baseline data that she could have used:  
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[Experiment participant] said ‘I don't understand why we need to have this 
discussion because there's a whole project already devoted to answering 
all these questions. You are effectively redoing all this work’… It was so 
tense in this meeting room because everyone was looking at each other, 
and then [experiment participant] looked at us and he said ‘do you know 
of [project3]’... My first reaction was I've never heard of this project… It 
never occurred to me to really look at all the other projects that had been 
done. I just put the information that was given to me from the project 
manager because I started on the project late. 
 
Vincent has a few years of professional experience and has been assigned 
schedule and budget responsibilities in addition to technical cognizance responsibilities.  
He spoke of two incidents, one having a pressing schedule requirement and the other not 
as urgent. 
For the urgent issue, Vincent faced two epistemic questions: “number one, can 
this part even be installed on the aircraft… second question being, how is going to affect 
the way other pieces interface with it.”  His solution strategy was first “, rel[ying] on my 
expertise on that point and knowledge of how things are fitting together. With that 
particular component, I own the other pieces that are around that component.”  Secondly, 
he “got with my designers and I said ‘CATIA support,’ and then I had them help me draw 
up a worst case installation… Also talked with a couple of manufacturing folks that 
actually do some of the installation on the floor. Those guys are a great resource… We 
were able to use that, put a case together, and present it to engineering management”. 
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4.3.2.2 Team Engagement 
Plastic participants give the design their due diligence and then ask for informal 
peer review quickly.  Sometimes, their due diligence includes checking their work 
through a checklist or process that someone else created or established.  That someone 
may be within the company or team, or it may be a broader pool of knowledge from a 
professional society.  This two-step process gives them more confidence to take their 
recommendations to higher management to make the final decision. 
Bernard engaged his superiors and teammates to review his designs after he gave 
the design his best effort, but not before or during his design work.  He mentioned 
generally his engagement with his superiors and teammates: 
You try to be as thorough and try to get other people's feelings on what 
you're doing and see if it is the right design… When you try it out, you see 
if it works or not… the main thing I think is important is to try to get as 
wide an outlook, as wide a view, with other people, get as much open 
view, of what's all involved, what other people are doing, how they're 
connected. Good communications… Be more thorough, you just learn, 
you never stop learning in most anything. 
 
Diana earned an electrical engineering degree and went to work at an aerospace 
company, so she needed to learn the company’s product line in addition to understanding 
the responsibilities of the job, which primarily includes defining requirements for 
contractors and then verifying the contractors’ work.  Her company abides by a clear 
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decision process, including large meetings to prioritize problems to fix, and more 
discipline-specific checklists to verify fixes:  
I need to make sure that my change is not going to somehow mess up their 
whole system or their system design is not going to somehow negatively 
impact my change, so we do have a lot of checklists and a lot of 
procedures to review all the changes and make sure that we've focaled 
with the right people, and we also have a lot of meetings with the supplier. 
 
Edmund’s management team decided to take the “wait and see” route.  The 
consequence of “wait and see” on performance and schedule was clear when they found 
unacceptable vibration later.  The solution from the management team was to do 
something quickly and move on, and this annoyed Edmund:  
The risk was actually realized where they ended up having a really bad 
issue of unbalanced drive shafts on the aircraft. It delayed ground testing 2 
months… It was not an optimal solution that we could pull together 
because we didn't have the amount of time to pull it together and do the 
usual design paperwork… We had to band aid something on to try to 
continue ground testing… we spent more money than we would've 
because it was emergency fashion instead of normal planned work. 
 
Miranda considered several options for obtaining or creating the reference point 
data and summarized the data in a decision matrix, a tool that Edmund and Luciana chose 
not to use.  In addition to leveraging her own knowledge of running experiments, the 
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biggest decision making steps to populate the decision matrix were cycles of 
conversations and approvals from stakeholders:  
I talked to people in the group. I talked to my boss. I relied a lot on my 
own experience because I had done a similar validation study… big 
meetings with the head of the departments here and there, or all the big 
players, the bosses of everyone who had an investment in this project… 
Then we're going to try to clear this with the [government office 1], which 
they said they were okay with. Then we went ahead with it. 
 
Much like Philip, Miranda wants to talk to her teammates as her uncertainty 
management strategy: “our lunch hours are a good hour long and we have breaks, there's 
a lot of exchange of ideas that happens and enriches all our research… Talk to other 
engineers who know the field.”  She noted that there are hindrances to having effective 
conversations “when you want to leave good impressions on people you are so stiff and 
unlikely to admit when you're wrong, or when you're not sure, of when you don't know.”  
Much like Margaret, Miranda noted external influences can mitigate uncertainty:  
Conferences, or had to give these talks. I've had to take 2 or 3 steps back 
and try to express to someone who's never seen it, and it gives me a little 
bit more reassurance that the decisions that I made, or we made, were 
worthwhile…you make the decision and then you talk to a lot of really 
smart people about it. You get everyone's perspective, and at some point 




Like Miranda, Vincent has improved in his engagement of peers and engineering 
superiors to mitigate his uncertainty: 
I ran it through a peer review as well to make sure I wasn't losing my 
mind… I use a lot of peer review. I rely very heavily on my peer's inputs 
and opinions… the analysis was very well received because everybody 
was already in the loop, everybody knew it was going on already. Again, 
that goes back to reaching out to folks that know a lot more than you do… 
just having everybody in the loop, everybody knowing what's going on, 
and you're kind of presenting the analysis as you go, and everybody's 
giving their input and helping to make corrections… Doesn't mean that 
every suggestion is right or can be implemented, but at least you're not 
flying solo… You've got some backup, you've got people that are more 
experienced than you are by doing that for you. 
 
Vincent continued to note the value of more experienced engineers, seeming to 
take their word at face value: “Getting coordination, coordination's key. Making sure you 
got the right people on the project is key… people that are far older, people have been in 
industry a lot longer, and you ask around. You ask your peers in your immediate group, 
you ask your supervisor, they'll point you to the right guys because they've worked with 
them before.”  He values the more experienced engineers’ tacit knowledge: “I think a lot 




4.3.2.3 Personal Response to Uncertainty 
Plastic participants have gained some proficiency in asking for help and 
overcoming the hurdles of being unfamiliar with a subject or topic.  Equipped with 
information from others, a Plastic participant has a subdued emotional response to 
uncertainty.  There is comfort in following someone else, and it may even be confidence 
to finish a design project well. 
For Diana, the second part of the design process is specific to her job.  Following 
predefined processes is her management strategy for uncertainty; the completion of the 
checklist is the signal that her work is complete:  
We update our requirement documents and send it off to the supplier and 
the supplier will update the software based on those requirement changes, 
send it back to us, we test it, we make sure everything's good, catch any 
problems, make updates, test it again, and we're good to go… There's 
always some uncertainty, and it's really following the processes, getting a 
lot of input and support from other group members, and we've got all of 
these checklists to follow and so forth to try to limit any uncertainties. 
 
For Edmund, his management strategies for uncertainty include leveraging his 
knowledge first, then following the program procedures of apprising superiors, and then 
consulting with Subject Matter Experts, but not formal design process management tools.  
What the lead engineer chooses is the path to follow: 
I think about my past experience, my knowledge of the systems, of the 
physics involved, not equation based but past experience, and your 
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engineering intuition. Then you follow the procedures the program laid 
out… Give them a one slide quad chart presentation. If you put green on it 
they're happy, if you put red on it they're not happy… they said use ace or 
six sigma tools but we don't use any of that stuff. We just ... get a small 
group of knowledgeable people, not in a room but in a conversation, and 
brain storm together and have the lead pick what he wants to go forward 
with… We usually don't debate too much on various options because they 
cost more to debate than just to pick one and go forward. 
 
Edmund prefers his individual work to get an approximate solution based on his 
prior knowledge and make progress, but he still leaves a little room for new ideas from 
other teammates:  
They just want us to make an 80% solution and not make sure it's going to 
100% work. They just want to get us 80% solution with the cost of 80% or 
40% and move on to the next thing. Then not have to make a science 
project out of it and just pick something and move on. … We don't want to 
sit here bickering about which way were going to do things… I've done 
this before, I know which way will get us complete on the project. Might 
not be the most efficient but I know it will work, but I will listen to what 
you have to say so please give me your opinion… You don't know what 
their opinion is unless you actually tell them what's going on so they can 




Luciana managed her uncertainty by relying on other teams’ previously proven 
work and by relying on the approval of her superiors.  Luciana even expressed 
confidence about her task: 
We didn't have a huge concern about it because the kits had been used for 
years. This project was something that had been done over and over again 
every senior year… I felt almost like no matter what decision we made it 
would be fine. That was pretty comforting. I knew that there wasn't one 
absolute killer decision… there were lots of solutions and that no matter 
what we did, we could optimize it… [Course professor] was extremely 
involved. He was at all of our design presentations and gave feedback. He 
was often down in the senior lab helping us design our aircraft and build 
them… Also just having our professor and our classmates all see what we 
were doing. It gave us the feeling like what we're doing makes sense… 
Everyone was able to ask questions and challenge you on your decisions. 
Sometimes from those presentations you make changes and things like 
that. I found that really effective. 
 
Notably, Luciana mentioned the matter of gender as non-negligible.  She was 
inspired to pursue engineering by a female science teacher in high school.  But 
particularly in her senior design project: “it was the very first all female team at 
[university1] that had existed. What was interesting was that our professor was really 
excited about it… All of them had on their goal list to beat the girl team… Our professor 
got really upset with all the teams and he gave us this big ethical and gender speech in 
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class.”  While this did not appear to have an effect in her team, it seemed to have an 
effect in other teams. 
Miranda described her emotional process of making these decisions and executing 
on them, including confidence in a decision because of justifiable evidence:  “Personally 
I felt really good about our going forward… It was very classic. I knew I could justify 
why we had certain results. … lot of times we really, really regretted this decision, 
because it felt like we were stagnating on something that wasn't even critical to our 
project… It's not fun because you are essentially redoing and emulating work.” 
Vincent is not afraid of uncertainty; rather it is a warning that the design is not 
complete: “I would say be aware of it and learn from it, but don't be scared of it because 
it's always going to be there. You're never going to get away from it, so stop trying to get 
away from it… Uncertainty is a good warning that maybe you don't have the right answer 
to the problem… you have not been able to convince yourself, then maybe there's still a 
problem.” 
 
4.3.2.4 Reflections on Learning to Manage Uncertainty 
All the participants were asked to reflect on their growth in ability to manage 
uncertainty.  Edmund thought his process has not changed.  However, Diana continues to 
learn: “a lead, actually once a week or twice a week, would take all of the new hires and 
interns and just talk about airplanes. He’d just start teaching you about the system and 
held classes… I had started taking on more responsibilities and you start at square one 
again. It's like ‘Okay, well, let's learn this system now’.” 
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Now as Luciana has moved to other projects, she has reflected on her growth as a 
designer:  “I notice a lot of iteration in my research… just taking the time and being 
patient is really important to move forward and to trust that you'll continue informing the 
problem as it goes on, which is something I like… Just being willing to know that your 
answer might change.” 
Much like Luciana, Miranda noted her growth in appreciating the complexity of a 
problem: “Obviously you can't control everything. Obviously you cannot control who is 
going to talk to you, who you're going to get information from… the process is iterative. 
There is definitely maturation when it comes to understanding the nature of a problem… 
Fully having an appreciation for the complexity of a problem comes in stages.” 
Vincent noted his growth as a designer in completing this design project:   
Give me a little bit of confidence having never really done it before… my 
transition to the [AIRCRAFT1] program, was a big one. That was a big 
confidence booster for me… For me it was getting thrown into the deep 
end there, and then just practicing executing on it… I relied a lot on my 
peers, and I think they're largely responsible for my growth as an engineer, 
for the success I had making that transition… The design process is the 
same, the decision process is the same. You're just executing some things 
a little bit faster… I would say that the majority of engineering problems 




4.3.3 Category 3: Tolerant 
Tolerant engineers have a good awareness that uncertainty is ever present and will 
never be eliminated in the physical parts and systems that they are designing, and there is 
another source of uncertainty as they engage customers and teammates more deeply in 
the design task.  Tolerant engineers are trying to understand the goals and concerns of the 
other stakeholders, which may remain undeclared.  Though they describe projects as team 
efforts generally, they simultaneously express a significant sense of ownership or 
investment in the design task.  They are guided by foundational scientific principles, an 
expert behavior of deep conceptual understanding (M. T. H. Chi et al., 1981).  That deep 
investment and deep understanding may be the signal to others that they are Subject 
Matter Experts. 
Tolerant engineers use almost no emotions to describe themselves, other than 
taking an experimental attitude, which is to acknowledge that some solution paths may 
fail and that is better to know than not to know.  However, they may use emotional terms 
to describe the components of a system interacting with other components, and viewing 
the component and the “owner” (another engineer) of the component as being happy 
when the components and their interaction satisfy all specified requirements. 
The complexity of the design task requires careful planning and long term testing 
and experimentation in order to reduce epistemic uncertainty.  Tolerant engineers are 
confident that there is an answer to the problem, whatever the problem may be.  It will 
just be a matter of schedule and budget constraints on whether they will proceed to 
execute the tests to gain the knowledge.  Tolerant engineers may describe uncertainty as 
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risk, where the attitude is to manage risk rather than manage uncertainty; risk is 
frequently thought of by the indicator “critical to flight safety”. 
The participants whose transcripts compose this category are Abraham, Bertram, 
Jacques, Nathaniel, Oliver, and Viola.  These participants are spread across research 
institutions, propulsion companies, and airframe and powerplant integrator companies.  
Abraham is the most experienced participant in this category, having 34 years’ 
experience.  Viola is the least experienced participant, having 4 years’ experience. 
 
4.3.3.1 Forms of Uncertainty 
Participants in the Tolerant category have a deep conceptual understanding of 
scientific principles that govern the performance of the systems they are designing, and 
that knowledge equips them to explore epistemic uncertainties well.  They are now aware 
of aleatory uncertainties in their respective subject matter areas.  They have a broader 
view of their peers as teammates who share decision-making authority, and 
communication with peers concerning design introduces ambiguous forms of uncertainty. 
Abraham’s most recent design task is conceptual development of a new aircraft 
configuration.  He describes his responsibility as an iterative converging design process 
to find a compromise solution among multiple systems that meets the key aerodynamic 
and manufacturing requirements.  Some portions of the work are individual and other 
portions are collaborative:  
Individual engineering tasks or items to do myself, but also have the 
responsibility to consult with our various flight technology engineers to 
97 
 
design and solve numerous problems… basically I'm allowed to observe 
all aspects of a design… so I can spread my experience around. to make 
sure that each designer is following the 4 basic rules or requirements to 
minimize: 1.) drag, 2.) weight, 3.) cost, 4.) schedule.  I go around and 
check on every part to meet the requirement for that part as well as the top 
four items.  It's a continuous iterative process to keep checking on all the 
designers until you find a compromise solution that works... Most 
engineers think you can cycle through this process once, but it's not true. 
You have to go through it about every six months because you're evolving 
the design and narrowing in your requirements. 
 
While most of his work focuses on four basic rules, Abraham cannot ignore 
anything that is a flight safety risk.  Part of his Subject Matter Expertise focused on fly-
by-wire controls for the pilot.  Silvia had classes on building in triple redundancy, and 
Abraham is actually using redundancy as part of mitigating risk of safety critical designs.  
Abraham has a clear process of identifying and prioritizing flight-safety critical items:   
If you're wrong on drag, it's not going to kill anybody. But flight controls, 
if you have a failure mode that you haven't thought of, don't know how to 
account for it, it could be a disaster. Those are the ones, that ambiguity, 
are really more important to catch them, there has to be no question as to 
how it's going to work… then it gets down to creating the failures and 
making sure you've covered all the possible paths. And then you 
categorize them, these are critical, these are not so critical, and these are 
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benign. There are many failures that are in the nuisance category. If you 
have enough redundancy, it's okay. Then you come up with , after you 
solve the critical ones, make sure those that are life-threatening or aircraft-
destroying but still nobody hurt, take care of those first… keep working 
the most critical ones first, and work your way down to the nuisance ones. 
Then flight test and you’re ok. 
 
Abraham describes his experience of uncertainty as an awareness of ever-present 
uncertainty and long-term management strategy.  His strategy is to focus on the four big 
requirements, to spend some time doing textbook analysis, and then moving to small 
scale testing before full scale testing.  His process follows government and military 
product development (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2011):  
Ambiguity is everywhere, and what you have to balance is how much, 
kind of back to the basic four, drag, weight, cost, schedule. You have to 
determine how much trade study or analysis is enough. Because you never 
get a 100% answer… Analysis has reached its end and the only way to 
reduce ambiguity further is to do some sort of small bench test… that gets 
you close enough to go forward with the design and then you would go to 
the small test (like wind tunnel) to remove further risk before you get to 
the final design decision… get further into the full aircraft simulation 
model, and run through scenarios in that. That part's pretty important, 




Bertram has nearly the same years of experience as Abraham, but with 
considerably more variation, first in running a family-owned manufacturing business and 
then moving into the customer support side of engineering and design.  He views the 
engineering drawing as the final design authority, but that it is clearly a team effort: 
“engineering drawing or overhaul, there's always more than one signature at the 
bottom… You can look at drawings and who worked on the team that developed the 
part… no one person has all the answers. We have become so specialized. The breadth of 
what I work on is a lot and there's very few of us that do that.” 
The forms of uncertainty that Bertram encounters are more schedule-oriented for 
repair and overhaul responsibilities: “I think that's the biggest difference, that there's a 
little more uncertainty about what tomorrow's going to look like on the repair side.”  He 
gave an example of finding an unexpected failure and providing key in-service 
information to the design teams about that failure:  
If all of a sudden a gear has come apart and they don't know why, they 
will ground the fleet… As overhaul and repair, we might be going back 
and looking at those parts that have come in on an engine for repair, even 
if it's not in there for that part, we might get an order to pull those pieces, 
whatever they are, and do an analysis… they look for historical 
information if we have it… We keep a lot of data to mine. We will supply 
whatever they need… When you absolutely have to get something done, 
you'll find whatever resource you need in order to get your parts made or 




Jacques’ most recent experience included “redirecting the program and rebuilding 
the program… reconstruct the design of the whole research project program to find a way 
that we could use these [components] in a value-added research context so we can do 
some research that will be valuable with the [components] without scratching all the 
work that's been done on them.”  The goal of his effort was to “Improve communication 
along all lines, improve transparency” because “it's my job to make sure the sponsors get 
what they want” from a supplier with whom the sponsor had a “history of a pretty poor 
working relationship”. 
The uncertainty Jacques encountered most was epistemic, the volitional 
uncertainties of the supplier and the sponsor.  His action to this was “collecting 
information, getting every party's point of view, understanding the stakeholders, 
understanding a little bit of the history of why things were the way they were. The first 
thing was fact- finding and information gathering, and the second part is to take action 
based on that information”.  He noted behaviors such as “People have their guard up and 
you're going to get a lot more opinions and negative comments.”  He noted several 
sources of uncertainty: “You're still dealing with people, personalities, attitudes, time 
constraint, budget, and there's someone supervising you. You have a customer.” 
Nathaniel’s most recent assignment occurred because of sudden personnel 
changes that are expected in the aerospace business: “When he got laid off in one of the 
big layoffs that happened, they dragged me off of the project I was on to come replace 
him as the experienced technical oversight… At the time, there were about 5 people on 
the project. Now, we’re coming really close to completion and we’re down to three 
including me.”  Nathaniel was assigned technical cognizance responsibility where he saw 
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multiple systems related to propulsion interacting, and he led the converging design 
process to a compromise solution:  
The challenge of moving it all over the place is that each system has an 
environment that it has to live in…creating an environment for all the 
different systems, electrical, hydraulic systems, fuel systems, pneumatic 
systems… Everytime we moved it to a new location, there may be 
components that had to move along with it that really didn’t want to be 
what we were taking and having to rebalance all of those compromises 
just to try get a happy system and an efficient structure. That is the 
challenge that the designer is tasked with solving. 
 
Nathaniel’s design process included balancing trade-offs, where he describes 
encountering design uncertainty that Thunnissen (2003) defines as “variables over which 
the engineer or designer has direct control but has not yet decided upon.  An example is 
the choice an engineer has in selecting a given component among a set of possible 
components.  Design uncertainty is eliminated when a system is complete as all choices 
have been implemented”:  
You typically start with ... I like to call them blobs. They’re space 
holders… So I don't go model that starter in great detail. I’ll model it as a 
cylinder that gives me a physical shape… We went through many 
iterations of exhaust configurations to produce the right amount of 
pumping to get the right kind of mass flow rates. We moved inlets around 
based on the shape of the contour… We struggled with at least 4 different 
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iterations, major significant iterations of engine mount systems and 
actually wound up using an example of an old [aircraft2] to build what we 
termed a space frame, which is actually a pretty old concept… That came 
from a much older and more experienced design engineer that I’ve been 
pretty fortunate to work with several times in my career. He was there just 
for such an occurrence. 
 
Oliver describes his flight test responsibilities as preparing and executing flight 
tests: “It's writing test plans, it's executing the flight tests, it's writing the reports, doing 
the post processing analysis…Working with the pilots…Have them use the charts and 
make sure that they're comfortable doing it before it gets out to the pilot 
community…Make sure that you meet the contract.”  He describes his goal as: “You're 
trying to flight test the aircraft. You're trying to make a good product that's reliable, 
repeatable, and safe of course.”  He is also balancing his superiors’ expectations: 
“Program management is jumping on top of us to say whatever way is the shortest time 
and the lowest cost.” 
Oliver emphasizes that the goal of flight test is to obtain repeatable data to support 
the designers who will support the end-user pilots: “you need to repeat some of those 
points or open the envelope a little bit deeper and the other pilot can't repeat it, what's the 
sense in even trying it…you've got to think strongly about the repeatability…If you can't 
get that repeatable on a conservative level from all the pilots that have ever tried it and 
know how to fly emergency maneuvers, then you're doing it wrong.” 
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Viola considers the design of aerospace curriculum as design.  She faced a 
decision point of re-envisioning the whole course apart from other seasoned professors to 
stay with the incumbent routine that she felt was not meeting the need of the customer, in 
this case, the student:  
Do I go with the path of I should probably get along with my colleagues 
and just work with them and the way they're doing it?... or... Design the 
course I really want, which is very engineering design heavy? Introducing 
students to the problem solving process, very student driven, more my 
style… if I designed the course the way I wanted to it would look very 
different from the last five sections of the course, well the other two that 
the faculty was doing. 
 
4.3.3.2 Team Engagement 
Tolerant participants view themselves as an owner of a system, and they see their 
peers as owners of systems that interact with their systems, so communication and 
coordination are valuable for the success of the whole project.  In this context, a system 
could be an engine or avionics, or it could be a process such as flight test or a learning 
environment; the key element is that the engineer has responsibility and authority for 
whatever happens.  They view other engineers and their systems as one entity or the 
engineer as the spokesperson for the voiceless system, so to make the engineer happy is 
to have found a desirable solution to the design problem. 
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Abraham describes a sizeable list of stakeholders in the design process, with 
particular emphasis on his engineering team, which are his peers and his superiors.  
Marketing coworkers are expected to interface with the customer:  
Every IPT leader, every group involved in the design, as well as chief 
engineers, and/or folks like me, tech fellows, and/or staff engineers. There 
are regular meetings between different groups, to keep everybody 
collaborating… we're going out with different mockups at trade shows, 
CGI kind of stuff, trying to get the product reviewed by the customer 
before we make it. Our marketing folks see what the customer wants… 
The customer was pleased enough. The customer is invited to all of our 
meetings, even internal design decision meetings. They don't always 
participate, but, the invitation is always there… it's mainly up to us to 
meet our own requirements, to get a demonstrator out the door. 
 
Bertram’s response to uncertainty is reduce or eliminate uncertainty because of 
flight safety, but not as an individual: “there's a little more uncertainty about what 
tomorrow's going to look like on the repair side… we can't live with uncertainty in 
aerospace. We spend every hour of everyday trying to make that people are safe when 
they fly… If there is something that is uncertain, we need to make it certain, that we 
understand everything about it.”  In particular, he coaches younger engineers to get 
comfortable with the team environment, noting that being uncomfortable can lead to 
problems with career longevity: “hasn't spent any time working on the shop or working 
with mechanics, it can be very intimidating. We lose a lot of people because they're not 
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comfortable and it is so challenging… And you're not going to be on your own. You’re 
going to learn from everybody else.” 
Nathaniel’s attitude about teammates is positive, where he seeks informal peer 
review as a check on himself and appreciates that engaging others may accelerate the 
convergence to a compromise solution:  
The difference, in my opinion, between an average designer and a good 
designer is the good designer knows who he needs to talk to to get what 
kind of information… A good seasoned eye will take at least one, maybe 2 
iterations out of a design cycle... All opinions should be welcome because 
there is something to learn pretty much from everybody, even the people 
that are hard to work with…We’ve got another very experienced engineer 
who probably doesn’t need my oversight technically, but I provide for him 
a sounding board, same as he does for me…  I just need somebody to look 
at it and give me a sanity check. 
 
Oliver relies on previous work documented after flight tests and others’ 
experience in planning flight tests: “design these test plans, a lot of it is history based so 
what did we do before. Look at the reports, look at the test plans that were done 
before….History-based is one way but then talking to all the experienced people 
obviously… experience and the history. Those are my primary two things.”  For example, 
“The pilot will come in there and tell you if it's safe, if it's viable, if they could fly it.” 
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Oliver iterates almost individually on his design of test plans, acknowledging 
trade-offs of schedule, cost, and volume of data, in preparation to present to the other 
stakeholders, especially his management, for their approval:  
PowerPoint slides, called the quad chart review process, but you come up 
with different options and you lay out the options. You try your best to not 
be biased when you're trying to make this… think about the positives and 
the negatives of doing each individual one… review that presentation 
material with the people that did have those ideas… That's what you want 
to convince yourself of when you do this exercise. You want to see are 
you making the right choices even though you might not believe that the 
other choices are the right choices you've still got to put them on the table 
… laid out in such a way that the tradeoffs are very well expressed…I'll 
go though that process a couple times until I feel that it's at a point where I 
could present it in front of a large group of people. At that point we will 
try to conduct a meeting with everybody that's involved. 
 
Oliver experiences phenomenological uncertainty in flight test because his team is 
testing new configurations, new software, and new maneuvers.  So he and his team have 
to be prepared for surprises:  
If it's a new helicopter design … we're going to get different results and 
we've got to be totally open minded about that …we tread on a lot of new 
turf… developmental testing. We find out surprises… in the performance 
group you don't see too many surprises…Structures, propulsions, they're 
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going to see other things that are very characteristic to each individual 
aircraft. 
 
Oliver’s toolkit for measuring the uncertainty includes documentation review and 
consulting with other Subject Matter Experts.  Troubleshooting of data collection 
instrumentation is another popular option, including consulting with SMEs specific to 
that instrumentation.  As well, he thinks about the newly recorded flight data in 
comparison to the textbook analytical data he already has: 
Try to research it… we go back to the subject matter experts… I've had to 
dig into old data to see if on other aircraft… We tend to hunt after the 
instrumentation systems first … At first we thought maybe the 
instrumentation something got knocked and maybe we need to recheck the 
calibrations… getting the engine rep out to [city6] to do some 
inspections… then that's the revealing point of, OK, we've learned 
something new… we document this well… instead of looking at the 
instrumentation first, we might go re-brief, make sure that we're safe, and 
do a mid-point… something that threw the trending off a little bit and let's 
just repeat the point… that you didn't screw up a formula. If you're still 
uncertain you repeat the point as long as it was safe. 
 
Viola’s design process included a significant amount of data collection from 
stakeholders and then to try a few prototypes, both are human-centered design tools 
(IDEO, 2009; Maguire, 2001; Zoltowski, Oakes, & Cardella, 2010): 
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I typically talk to other people. So I try to get feedback from lots of 
different individuals… got feedback from my boss, I got feedback from 
my fiancé, I mentioned it to him. I got feedback from a colleague of 
mine… I did some very, very, very little rapid prototyping. I'm using the 
word very loosely, of what would the course look like… I attended 
meetings with the other faculty to see how they were thinking about 
designing the course. So I tried to understand that design alternative as 
well… I actually emailed all of my students from when I taught the course 
in the spring of 2014… I got responses from actually about 12 to 15 
people out of a forty-seven student class giving me feedback. 
 
The implementation of her idea has some areas of behavioral and schedule 
uncertainty from the users, and Viola viewed these uncertainties as risk.  Another element 
of risk was not getting feedback from the user about the design meeting expectations:  
I had no control over the topics that the students were doing for this 
project. This is the most risky part of my design… I was a little nervous 
because it was hard to predict. I didn't know how long these things would 
take… making sure my users understand that they should tell me if things 
aren't going well. That's been really hard with this group. To get them to 
complain unless I push a lot… knowing that I'm not going to get all the 
information that I need even if I ask for it in class and needing to find 
other ways of gathering that information… you're working with a user 
group that has a life outside your class. 
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Like Oliver, Viola encourages questions: “I know many many people who don't 
ask for advice. They just don't ask questions. Who don't talk to people when they're stuck 
and they just get in a worse and worse place.”  Like Abraham, Viola notes a particular 
view of uncertainty: “Uncertainty is less of a fear as much as a problem.” 
 
4.3.3.3 Personal Response to Uncertainty 
The Tolerant participants have an almost neutral emotional response to 
uncertainties they encounter, because they are comfortable with the notion that some 
ideas or paths will be productive and some will not.  They are confident that an answer 
exists to the design problem, and that it will take resources and iterations to find it.  This 
is in marked contrast to a Brittle participant’s low confidence that a task could be 
executed at all. 
Abraham described his personal response to encountering uncertainty as a 
welcome challenge to be addressed as a team:  
Have patience. There is ambiguity and uncertainty at all levels… 
Ambiguity should be something to look forward to… something not be 
feared, but it's a challenge to go figure it out. try to be clever enough to 
solve that uncertainty …an answer that's either 80% good, or design a 
trade study that you can deal with that ambiguity in a manner that won't 
take forever… you should never think of it as something you have to solve 




Jacques’ personal response to encountering uncertainty is much like Abraham’s, a 
welcome challenge: “I took it as a challenge and opportunity… Get everyone's 
perspective and to really be patient and make sure I understand things very well before I 
took any action… maybe that's the way you manage risk: you take the middle ground.”  
Primarily in this design situation, “Understand the risks, not only to you but to the 
stakeholders and to the other entities that are involved in any decision. Also, timing. I 
think there's a time for action and there's a time for fact finding and information 
gathering.”  He re-emphasized patience while converging on a solution like Abraham did:  
Understand or quantify risks. Understand what the risk of a certain 
outcome would be. Understand the possible outcomes. Understand the 
risks associated with those outcomes. Make sure that you have a good 
understanding of the situation before you take any action because 
sometimes it can be harder to undo a wrong action. You have to be patient 
and wait for the right time to take action. Believe in yourself and have 
confidence in yourself. Know also that it's okay for things to go wrong. 
 
Nathaniel’s overall summary of his job is: “I’d say uncertainty to me is anything 
below about 95% sure. I spend most of my time dealing with a tremendous amount of 
uncertainty… not certain that it’s going to function appropriately. We mitigate the 
uncertainty with experience, interactions with other groups, to help us make design 
decisions.” 
Nathaniel’s personal approach to managing uncertainty includes a “good air of 
humility”, like Jacques and Abraham mentioned about patience:  
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It helps me when I come into a project early enough in the design process 
that I can grow and learn the particular peculiarities of the design… The 
most important difference between me and a new hire is I'm experienced 
in dealing with problems that I have created on my own. At this point in 
my career, I'm not so proud or so sure of myself that I'm right, that I have 
balanced all of the compromises appropriately, or that I even am aware of 
all of the compromises, all of the requirements that I have to actually 
meet. I'm very active at seeking out the people that I do know I need to be 
working with. 
 
Oliver’s personal response to uncertainty includes comparing new data to some 
baseline, expecting data to look like the baseline, but not ignoring the data if it does not 
follow the baseline:  
Every other helicopter that [company3] had has been pretty much the 
same design when you think about it. It's one rotor blade system with a tail 
rotor blade. We kind of know what to expect for the most part… 
performance testing, you go by a lot of trending… Don't ever, ever assume 
that things were supposed to happen the way that they have in the past… 
make sure that you always expect the unexpected… Try to have a plan if 
deviations come up. 
 
Viola’s personal approach to uncertainty is experimental: “I treat them very 
carefully. I don't take things personally which I think is very difficult as an instructor… 
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my attitude had been more experimental… I'm testing it in the classroom… I check in 
with them a lot… We're prototyping constantly as an instructor.”  She noted an adherence 
to foundational principles as a mitigation of uncertainty:” with the uncertainty is really 
sticking with what you know … underlying principles are still working for them… I'm 
going to stick with what I know works. Those underlying principles and then test little 
incremental things as opposed to large scale changes.” 
 
4.3.3.4 Reflections on Learning to Manage Uncertainty 
Tolerant participants look back on their supposed failures as teachable moments.  
They have had enough time to find that they can recover from those failures and that the 
next time they will be more thorough now that they have expanded their awareness of 
sources of uncertainty. 
Nathaniel noted his own growth in managing his emotions towards design 
projects: “you feel very overconfident and you come out of school… lacking the 
fundamental understanding that the complexity of what you’re about to do and the 
number of compromises that you’re going to have.”  Like Miranda, Nathaniel mentioned 
“compromises that are made early in a project can haunt later aspects of a project.”  Like 
Ross, Nathaniel mentioned “to start taking apart into its simplest pieces, to start dealing 
with those pieces as they pertain to the requirements, and to begin balancing those 
compromises.” 
Oliver noted his personal growth as a designer, including learning from failure, 
breaking problems into smaller pieces, and managing his own feelings toward failure:  
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My senior design project was totally something that we've never tried 
before… you had to pick apart your problems, know how to attack them, 
figure out the options of the paths to go, what the best choices were, and 
make sure that everybody is in agreement … It was disappointing. We did 
fail. We learned a lot... you can't look at anything in engineering as ever a 
total failure…So ask the right questions, because without experience you 
can't ask the right questions all the time. Getting rid of the fear of not 
asking the right questions I think is the important key here. 
 
Viola notes her growth in accepting that there might be failures and those can be 
learning experiences.  She also notes getting her emotions under control as she works 
through successes and failures:  
You think you know what you're doing and oh no you don't… I'm going to 
just try and we're just going to see what happens and it's going to be okay 
if it doesn't work out, and so with the uncertainty part you're saying it is 
totally uncertain because you haven't had the experience yet… definitely 
being more flexible and not taking things personally, because I think there 
is so much uncertainty in where their projects are going to go, what their 
interests are, how busy their going to get… not taking things personally 





4.3.4 Category 4: Robust 
Robust engineers anticipate the unexpected, which makes them willing to try new 
methods, new processes, and new solutions.  Novelty requires real data instead of opinion 
to verify and validate decision paths.  Because of the complexity of the design tasks, they 
must have significant engagement with their teammates and other stakeholders.  Team 
engagement, because of the demand of actionable data, may become confrontational. 
Epistemic uncertainty is the uncertainty that can be reduced when their teammates 
produce actionable data within their subject expertise.  Aleatory uncertainty (irreducible 
uncertainty) is now a fact of life because the goals of the complex design tasks they are 
working on may include dealing with the fact that no two people do the same thing the 
same way, whether a manufacturing task or a pilot task.  Additionally, because of 
confrontational team dynamics and because of engagement with customers, partners, and 
suppliers, the ambiguity of volumes of verbal communication is introduced (Daft & 
Lengel, 1986; Eppler et al., 2008; Philippo, Heijstek, Chaudron, Kruiswijk, & Berry, 
2013).  Even if a requirement is written and agreed upon, it is still open to interpretation. 
Robust engineers hint at strong emotions tied to the apparent success or failure of 
a large design project, but they also describe their confidence and their willingness to 
persevere even though there is a high risk to completion.  It is in this category that 
engineers may use the word “intuition” as they create new methods, processes, and 
solutions, an intuition that is supported by years of experience in completing similar 
projects.  They also amass large enough teams that they must manage others’ emotions 




The participants whose transcripts compose this category are Curtis, Frank, Joel, 
Ronald, and Stephen.  It is this category of participants that have handled their complex 
design tasks well outwardly and have some inward struggle.  The robustness manifests in 
handling the stress of the task well, accomplishing the goals they set out to achieve.  Part 
of the credit for handling complex design tasks well is following some prescribed process 
for which the participants received formal training or have a reference text, such as Six 
Sigma, Systems Engineering, or test pilot training. 
 
4.3.4.1 Forms of Uncertainty 
The participants whose experiences categorized the Robust group identified 
epistemic, aleatory, and ambiguity uncertainties.  They mostly described design projects 
where they were exploring phenomenological uncertainties (pushing the boundary of the 
state of the art, trying something for the first time), which are mostly high-risk endeavors 
that need a lot of data to confirm that the new ideas are safe and useful.  To do this well, 
the Robust participants need many teammates with their respective specialties to examine 
the new data, and that introduces ambiguous uncertainties as they communicate their 
findings and their opinions. 
Curtis very much defines his role as a test pilot, a surrogate end operator.  Flight 
safety is the driving reason he participates in design.  He had several design tasks that he 
called efficient and straightforward, such as inserting previously proven attitude 
indicators from one aircraft into another.  He also participated in more complex design 
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tasks, such as designing threat displays, which involves human interface or how a pilot 
interprets data, and how to classify and prioritize detected threats.  He said:  
What we did know, what are the general capabilities of what those sensors 
could determine about a threat, and what information about the threat they 
could display to the pilot…But what we didn't know was how the threats 
were going to be encountered in theater, so then that makes the 
prioritization a little more difficult task. How many threats do you want to 
display at one time? 
 
In a different design project, Curtis and his team found a new phenomenon during 
flight test where they should not have “poke[d] that monkey in the eye again”:  
We were testing the wind condition, we were coming in to land, then it 
happened to be next to the superstructure of the ship. We didn't know 
what's going to happen, that's why we were testing it…The more he stayed 
up there, the more difficult it was for him to land, until finally, he got into 
this big pilot-induced oscillation and just waved off…and not wanting to 
have his manlihood questioned, he came right back and landed in the 
same, exact spot before the engineers could tell him, "Don't do it," or right 
before anyone could kind of figure out what just happened. In retrospect, 
probably wasn't the smartest thing to do, as I talked too about build up and 
understand the next point and all that, but - added to the mystery - because 




As a materials process engineer, Frank has steadily improved his technical 
cognizance.  He designs and delivers materials to aerospace customers with particular 
requirements.  Frank has consistently demonstrated his design abilities and his job now 
requires him to exercise these skills even more: “a process engineer. It’s more for 
seasoned engineers, advancing engineers, who are more keen towards problem solving 
and long term problem resolution. That’s kind of where I’m at right now.”   
Frank had a particular design task where he was uncertain of the customer’s 
design requirements at first, which researchers have shown to be troublesome for design 
and implementation (Philippo et al., 2013) : “They wanted different properties within the 
same material… we needed to go back and ask the customer ‘is this what you really 
want?’ that really drove the decision to push forward with our process evolution… It was 
more about how do you design a fixture or a process around the material. It was more 
driven around material requirements and customer requirements versus our existing 
process how we manufacture a material.  It’s kind of a game-changer.” 
Joel as a director-level test pilot had engineering responsibilities: “technical 
conscience totally on my shoulders… my name goes on the flight clearance, so the 
technical conscience resides with me. I've got to make sure that we have done our due 
diligence.”  Here, he switched from singular voice to plural voice to indicate his team.  
He described his job as: “leading very smart people” and “it turned very personal for us” 
because of the conflict between engineer and pilot having different interpretations of the 
same phenomena: 
 No pilot’s going to love an engineer… There's always pushbacks, because 
there's some capability [engineers] want to take away from [pilots] that 
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they know better, whether it’s pride or whether it’s just because they see 
from a different perspective. [Pilots] know Bernoulli, because they interact 
with them every day. [Engineers are] just plotting them out on a chart. 
 
Ronald worked in a small company with a specific culture of taking risky projects 
to demonstrator prototype phase.  Ronald described it as: “the company has a reputation 
for doing a lot innovative thought… So there's not a lot of entrenched knowledge that 
people have. It was strongly encouraged to investigate new ideas and different ways of 
doing things.”  To that end, Ronald said of the company, like Luciana, Abraham and 
Nathaniel desiring to stay with a project start to finish: “Engineers in that particular 
company were strongly encouraged to take a given area of a project all the way from 
conceptual through planning through detailed design and then some manufacturing 
engineering.”  The company attitude was still grounded in production reality: “we, 
working the engineering field, were very strongly encouraged to spend a third to half of 
our hours on the floor, working with the techs… If you couldn't build the product, you 
weren't allowed to release the drawing.”  This company culture probably accelerated the 
growth of his attitude toward uncertainty compared to his peers in other companies. 
Partly driven by his uncertainty about his qualifications to get an engineering job, 
Ronald took the initiative to study beyond an engineering degree to earn a pilot’s license 
and an A&P license to be an aircraft maintenance technician.  He followed a conceptual 
to detailed design process as he designed a control cable out of a new material.  He said:  
I was responsible for conceptual and detailed flight control design of this 
particular part… Initially it was me by myself. Several months into it they 
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decided that the scope had gotten too large… worked with a few design 
engineers familiar with that area… hand calculation analysis for thermal 
expansion…handbooks and FAA advisory circulars… existing guidance, 
rough sizing for characteristics like handling qualities… Not analysis 
specifically, we went to testing. We did do physical testing. We built 
samples of the cables. 
 
In particular, Ronald leveraged his A&P knowledge efficiently: “FAR part 23 and 
25 laid out maximum pilot effort. So you design for what an average human pilot is able 
to exert on the control input. You assume that that is the highest load that the system will 
see.”  Then he applied the company ground rule of getting to manufacturing: “we had 
tried a few different manufacturing methods and had come up with a way of building and 
assembling these, and testing them that made us comfortable that we could manufacture 
in a reasonably cost effective manner.” 
Ronald, like Oliver, had baseline expectations about the performance of the 
control cables out of traditional materials but had an eye out for different sources of 
uncertainty:  
Steel cables have been in existence for so long that everyone knows how 
to check for damage… Carbon tends to be more unknown and more 
intolerant of minor damage, in that a small amount of damage doesn't 
necessarily progress at a predictable slow rate to failure… is this going to 




Stephen has held a variety of engineering responsibilities, some less exciting than 
others.  In some roles, he described himself as a designer and in other flight test director 
roles, he described himself as an editor.  The flight test role required due diligence much 
like Joel described: “Pretty high stress job. You have to do lots of simulations and be 
fully prepared for any emergency… Lots of room for risk and because you're going 
supersonic, you've got to fly pretty far from where you could land, so there's lots of 
danger there.” 
 
4.3.4.2 Team Engagement 
Participants in the Robust category need many teammates to help them make 
sense of their design tasks as they gather new information.  However, it can be 
uncomfortable to confrontational when teammates offer opinions instead of analysis.  
Robust engineers have demonstrated success in managing uncertainties from systems, 
and are now taking on larger responsibilities that involve people more deeply so that they 
can move collectively to a secure stance to make a good decision. 
Curtis described the design process he followed, with significant emphasis on 
early involvement of the user:  “I did some research… access to battle damage reports… 
design team had to make some decisions on how to display [threats]… We have operators 
involved in the design… scribbling things on the wall, we had operators involved in the 
design, and resource managers.”  He advocated prototyping early for all the stakeholders 
to see:  
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Through modeling and simulation, in [company2]'s [simulator], we're able 
to actually utilize those in an operational scenario, and I have to say that is 
hugely important in making design decisions, getting whatever your 
decision is to as close to operational representative as possible….might be 
cartoons on the wall…you can get some really good animation in a 
PowerPoint slide now… the point is prototype early and often-- there's no 
prototype that's too primitive. 
 
Curtis, again referring to ideas that have been proven, along with his team, 
converged upon a layout of the display: “So we separated the threats into immediate 
action required and not immediate, more advisory nature…Those are similar to how the 
aircraft emergencies are categorized, and we wanted to remain consistent with those.”  
There were some decisions that felt arbitrary, such as how many threats to show to the 
pilot in command: “everybody in the room including the operator and the design engineer 
said, ‘Okay, three.’”  He noted the complexity of designing a display as an ambiguity, 
particularly a visual one (Eppler et al., 2008): “where a human is involved, that adds a lot 
of complexity to the design. Like five pilots, six opinions, especially when interpretation 
of displays is involved.” 
Curtis summarized the design process as the management strategy for uncertainty, 
using the plural voice exclusively, because Robust engineers need their teammates to 
create and interact with prototypes and simulations:  
That's how we handled that unknown, and I would say that that was-- we 
made it as little-- we eliminate as much of the unknown as possible - 
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researched, brought the user in who was kind of the expert, and then-- but 
at some point we had to make a decision. There again, this is where the 
PowerPoint slide came in. We did have some real prototypes on a 
PowerPoint slide… They set threats up in the simulator; we'd fly through 
them and we'd go and look at them… this incremental approach. When the 
design was young, we had options. Then as the design matured, we'd 
narrow those options. 
 
However, as Robust engineers may experience some confrontation, Curtis 
described reactions to design changes by the operators, whom he feels he represents: “But 
then it gets out to the operators and they don't see the agony, they don't see the whole 
decision making process. And they just see a warning… they have some unknowns and 
they started putting their own safety factors on their operations, not fully understanding 
that that's not their job.”  Another change: “pilots were freaking out a little bit when they 
could sense their controls moving. That was kind of an assumption that we thought a little 
big of ourselves as, ‘Oh, I'm a test pilot. I'm so smooth, I can detect it but they won't 
know,’ and move on. There is nothing special about us.” 
 
Even with intuition working for him, Frank still follows a prescribed design 
process of simultaneous exploration of possibilities, where he deployed several of his 
teammates to gather data: 
Six Sigma Black Belt. We have a "toolbox", a set of tools that we use. One 
of those is a thought-map process. We go explore all the different 
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opportunities and options that you have… you look at the pros and cons, 
and the variables that you have that are controlled and uncontrolled… it's 
more an evolution in the [company1] methodology, like the thought map 
process where it's more an exploration phase. We may go down a path that 
leads to a dead end, for example, but at least you learn something… you 
get to a path that gives you some promise, then you start setting up 
scenarios, different outcomes … it's more about the broader scope and 
once you get the thought mapping done, and then drive down into 
specifics through process mapping and [Design of Experiments]… I had to 
manage different trial work, different paths, if you will, trying to figure 
out what made sense. So I was more the wheel on the hub and we had all 
these different spokes going out that you get information from the outer 
spokes… six or seven people. they had different projects, mini projects… 
those types of six or seven different areas we worked, it kind of gave us a 
direction of ‘the process has to be change’ to give us better material. 
 
Frank further reflected on the indispensable need for his teammates as owners of 
resources necessary to solve a problem:  
It’s a matter of making relationships and communicating with others in 
trying to avoid reinventing the wheel…It goes into a spiral where you can 
ask them why and get to the root cause, they're going to help resolve that 
issue…who is the person who can help me with resources…it's a matter of 
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going to the people who actually control those factions and getting those 
resources secured. 
 
Frank now manages other stakeholders’ uncertainty as part of his job by 
producing reliable data to prove a concept:  
We're an industry that thrives on standardization, that thrives on 
consistency, and anytime you throw a change in that process, it meets with 
resistance right away. It was more about me as the manager of the project 
trying to sell this solution to others that would buy into it once I proved 
success…Our customers generally require a regimented program in order 
for us to produce material for them under contract…we have to build 
between 3 and 5 lots of materials, which goes through the full regiment of 
testing…we have to build between 3 and 5 lots of materials, which goes 
through the full regiment of testing. 
 
Because of the deep personal investment in decisions, Joel demands tangible 
evidence: “you have to put yourself on trial… There's got to be some breadcrumbs trails. 
There's always that ‘go test it’… I'm always scared of intuition… tell me the history… 
developmental tests community is really good at is documenting stuff… then operational 
test… deficiency reports… facts should back it up.” 
One of the problems Joel notes is the loss of facts among teammates as a design 
matures even though they follow a well-defined design process, where “seams” between 
phases are the culprits: 
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If I'm moving from systems readiness review or a developmental to 
operational test to production or to in-service, each time there's a seam for 
that transition, I can guarantee you the people that are in position are the 
wrong people… there's collateral damage there, because so much tacit 
knowledge left with them, and that stuff you just can't get from a report. 
 
In response to this, Joel took on responsibility to gain defensible knowledge: 
“joint discrepancy reporting system… so I was a big fan of that, because I could read all 
this stuff… this really established my technical credibility… I think from a discipline 
standpoint, is that people get away with how long they’ve been on a program or what 
their credentials are and they never have to reference a fact or a report.”  There were 
consequences to his confrontation of other Subject Matter Experts: “They hated me, and 
sometimes, people went silent on me. You have stuff like that.” 
As Joel’s team attempted to solve the unpredicted failure mode of a flight-critical 
component, his team suggested a short term solution to buy time to find the root cause.  
The inspectors implemented a frequent visual inspection, which inherently has high 
variation (aleatory uncertainty).  Joel called in a particular Subject Matter Expert, 
“They're specific engineers, and when you're going from failure management strategy, 
you have to have reliability engineering there… the unsung hero of all of this.”  He noted 
the team dynamic: “nobody double checks his information. That’s the value of me sitting 
there going, I haven't done anything in three days. Let me go check this out. I think 
there's not enough teammates that actually help do that.”  Here, Joel demonstrated that he 
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is as much a teammate as a boss, even though his double-check of the work could be 
construed as another confrontation. 
In a second design experience, Joel found teammates’ behaviors hindered 
progress of integrating aircraft with aircraft carriers: 
I have competing egos… I am always conscious of guys that know too 
much, the ones that are over confident in their position before we've 
assembled all the facts and put the body of evidence out there… guys that 
are taking a look at it from a shipboard compatibility standpoint. 
Multidisciplinary, multi-background, but we have to get on our ship within 
two days… even though it’s the same class of ship. Each one was 
different… they now think it was missing was the thermo-analysis piece. 
 
As Joel once took responsibility to gain defensible knowledge, in this shipboard 
compatibility test, Joel took charge to find the right SME, who was rejected by the rest of 
the team:  
He's like the head thermo-dynamicist for [COMPANY8] and he didn't 
charge any money for it or anything… [he] offered some suggestions… It 
really mitigated the effects that were happening out there… some of this 
ego stuff getting in the way and no one accepted… they just were very 
resistant into incorporating his opinion... most of these engineering events 




Joel handles so much information from so many teammates that he has to have a 
sense-making strategy of a concise narrative:  
You're not going to veto the guy who’s done the most homework or make 
some more sense. You're probably going to veto the guy who’s the most 
emotional or the guy that wants to give you the doctoral dissertation on 
[failure mode]. You want to veto those guys, but the one that comes in and 
says, ‘That’s a story I can wrap my head around.’ 
 
In a second design experience, Ronald encountered epistemic, aleatory, and 
behavior uncertainties when he and his team were tasked with deciding whether and how 
to repair an expensive part that was dropped accidentally.  He said:  
We really don't know anything about how it was damaged, the manner it 
was damaged, where it was damaged. That was a case of uncertainty just 
showing up unanticipated… coordinating the diagnostics to figure out the 
extent of the damage that was in place, coordinating with our own 
company and the other company their repair methodology that they 
accept… coordinating the diagnostics to figure out the extent of the 
damage that was in place, coordinating with our own company and the 
other company their repair methodology that they accept. 
 
Ronald’s team temporarily integrated with the customer’s team to solve this 
problem, and there was initial skepticism on the part of the customer:  
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The company we were working for actually had assigned about 6 
engineers and a dozen or so shop technicians that were temporarily located 
at our company…the customer was more familiar with higher level 
manufacturing production, and we were more familiar with the materials 
we were working with…  Within our own company on my previous 
program, we generally got overwhelming support for trying a new idea. 
Working with the customer's engineers, there was more skepticism on 
their part that we could accomplish what we said we could…from a larger 
company, a more conservative mindset, not really as willing to try new 
things. 
 
Ronald and his team worked through the problem thoroughly by leveraging each 
company’s strengths in the design process where it made the most sense:  
Not an unusual repair, it was more no one had ever talked about trying to 
do it on a 1 foot by 12 foot disbond area. We were relatively confident that 
we could map out the extent of the damage and make sure that we got that 
area that was cracked glued back together. The customer was not as 
confident that would solve the problem. If that repair didn't work, there'd 
be no way to know…  we did some subscale testing, the test article 
verified that we could use pressure to force in lots of small places far away 
from where we were injecting it. We did testing and we were able to 
document to the customer… use their x-ray and ultrasound to verify that 
our repair was complete. 
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Stephen noted where the difficulty is in his job, not the technical side but 
convincing others of the quality of the work: “hardest part of a lot of engineering is 
actually not doing the work, but communicating your effort and why you made your 
decisions and why it's the best approach.”  Communication is continual and 
confrontational through the design process like Joel:  
You do have to keep close meetings with all the parties that are affected. 
It's not just what you want. You've got to make sure, because you have to 
a give and take…sometimes the first answer they'll say is no, it can't be 
done. Then you need to say prove it to me…I believe you, but you 
sometimes have to be a little bit confrontational…so you've got to talk 
with a lot of people. You have to go up to them and let them know that 
they know more about their topic than you'd know about their topic…have 
meetings often. Show your progress to somebody. For one thing it keeps 
you on track, it forces you to be good about what you're doing and it also, 
maybe somebody didn't speak up in the first however many meetings and 
now they want to give you something…There's going to be push back in 
the beginning. There always is, so in the first few meetings as I was saying 
what I did, there was a whole lot of smirks and giggles and that kind of 
thing in the room…You may be mad at that person, but hey, they just 




4.3.4.3 Personal Response to Uncertainty 
Curtis’ personal approach to managing uncertainty is to redefine uncertainty as 
risk in order to create measurands: “uncertainty is binary, you either know or you don't 
know… Risk, you can manage… what changing uncertainty to risk does is allows you to 
measure it… Measure it and manage it and budget for it.”  Here, Curtis also describes 
technical risk as influencing cost and schedule risks, and he is responsible for all three. 
Curtis described his test pilot training as the key procedure for mitigating risk of 
phenomenological uncertainty, starting from a known point and methodically stepping 
towards the unknown:  
It's called build up and they pound this into your head at test pilot school. 
You don't go straight to the cliff. You incrementally approach an 
unknown. You start from an area of known, and then you slowly work 
your way into the unknown… even if things are going perfectly, stop, 
watch the trend, try to predict where the trend is taking you, look for 
things that you're not looking for. 
 
Frank has deployed his intuition on recent design tasks: “I’ve run across several 
times where I add more heat, I will speed up the process, for example, based off of 
internal instinct from my previous experiences.”  For this most recent design, Frank 
exercised his intuition to reduce the design time: “My decision was to change the process 
to fit the material. And that was what drove everything. My gut feel was not to try 
different parameters in the producing process that would not work out.” 
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Like Oliver, Frank looks for repeatability of a phenomenon to confirm that it is 
real: “like the experiment you set up that then reveals two factors that you never thought 
would be important, but they are…The proof is really in what the data is telling you that 
drives you in a direction that you want to go…they go through repeatability trials just to 
confirm what we've learned the first time wasn't a fluke.” 
 
Joel noted his uncertainty management strategy of applying a conservative factor: 
“data points are hard and expensive to come by, and there was a lot more uncertainty 
with that and I think that your level of conservatism goes up with the level of 
uncertainty… you don't need to do that, look, yeah, 50%, and at some point it is 
cultural… they've been living the culture forever and they're okay with it.”  Because 
uncertainty can never be eliminated, he added: “You just live with uncertainty… there's 
informed risk and you need to be comfortable taking risks… we talk about failure 
management strategy, but it is really about risk management… both consequence and 
occurrence.”  He noted others’ learning to manage uncertainty: “what I sense from people 
is that they would rather rely on somebody else's experience." 
Joel also has the same strategy as younger engineers for breaking problems into 
smaller pieces: “Before it had been a bundled risk and so what we did and so what we did 
is we dissected different parameters so they could run the risk model on only those 
separate parameters… I didn't know that you could reduce the risk by breaking it down 




Ronald’s personal management strategy for uncertainty is to explore possibilities 
and to base decisions on real data, like Joel advocated.  Those possibilities come from 
other teammates, and Ronald brings a technician perspective that other participants do 
not mention:  
Always good to hear everyone's input. Some different ideas, different 
perspectives…  add more options that you can easily come up with, 
evaluating each on their own merits, testing whatever is feasible to verify 
areas where uncertainty is… exhausting all the different possibilities and 
doing whatever testing is available to you, talk yourself into it… generated 
data is something you do you yourself or tie in research that other people 
have tried or you reach out to other organizations or companies that may 
have done testing in a similar way…A lot of things have been tried before 
by someone, and you can find it somewhere… design manuals… 
approved structural repair manuals… The FAA's own documents, they 
have advisory circulars, the FARs, you have design, testing, and repair 
manuals in A&P. we relied on those a lot… It’s been tested, it's been 
approved, and we’re very comfortable that if you do the repair the way it's 
been prescribed, you're going to meet or exceed the original strength of the 
product. 
 
Ronald has a thorough approach to managing uncertainty, exploring depth and 
breadth in a prescribed incremental build up flight test process:  
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Flight test itself is a very well regimented step in increasing capability, 
checking it in flight. Uncertainty is dealt with by procedural process of 
their rigorous testing, from benign conditions to severe…uncertainty itself 
makes you more likely to checking more things, makes you test more and 
inspect more… The uncertainty makes you more likely to make the load 
cyclical, hundreds of thousands of times, repetitive, cyclic… it could be 
prone to cracking and failing and corrosion. So I think that uncertainty 
drives you to do a lot more of and varied test than you would do if you're 
using traditional solution. Presumably, someone 10 or 50 years ago has 
done that testing for you. The long track record gives you that, if removes 
the uncertainty just by it's been in service for so long and people assume 
it's able to do the job…you start thinking about all the other possible 
variables it could have and should address. It makes you think about 
additional testing that you want to do to try to eliminate unknowns. It 
pushes you towards more testing before production. 
 
Stephen takes spends considerable time triangulating the truth with biased sources 
of data to create or understand a baseline, just like Miranda’s experiments needed a 
baseline, but Stephen doubts his results:  
You start with the back of the envelope so I went to the textbooks… so 
you might start with asking around… you calculate the numbers that you 
have on the baseline of the aircraft. Something that you know. You start 
with something that you know and you build… You need a baseline… 
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how do you know that your work is right? You don't know. The only way 
to know is to test it against things that you do know…I started with these 
textbook designs. Got what we thought were the results for other versions 
of the [aircraft1], which is only one. I looked at that. I looked at what the 
[simulation1] model of that gave me and I looked at what the wind tunnel 
test of that gave me. 
 
Stephen’s personal approach to managing uncertainty is to confront his emotional 
response and move on to obtaining a team consensus:  
Uncertainty is really frustrating. It's one of those things that can really 
bother a designer…  Now you question everything. Now you wonder what 
is truth… there's error in everything. Uncertainty runs and there will 
always be uncertainty so you just try to mitigate it… if you look at as 
many different aspects of your design as possible, you can get confident in 
that and then you get that uncertainty level to a small enough number and 
you show that number to people. You let everyone know and then you 
design the safety factor into that. Then you've got to run it by everyone 





4.3.4.4 Reflections on Learning to Manage Uncertainty 
Curtis specifically self-educated by reading The Goal (Goldratt, 1992) and using 
the concept of Theory of Constraints for budget and schedule management as they relate 
to test and development risk.  He said: “Plan well inside the buffer, and then things will 
come up unexpected-- the unknowns, that's how you account for the unknowns. That's 
your buffer.”  He also said:  
If you set a target - and especially in challenging, complex systems - it 
always moves right, it never moves left because people kind of work to the 
target but don't try to exceed it… let's back up until we find where the 
known is, and then draw a path from the known to the unknown and figure 
out how you're going to get there… in flight tests, there's pretty severe 
consequences to walking off the end of the cliff, so you take a very 
deliberate approach. 
 
Frank reflected on his growth of ability to manage uncertainty and, like Abraham, 
welcomed a challenge: “Don’t look at uncertainty as a bad thing; it's an opportunity to go 
exploring more into why is it uncertain… The mystery and going digging and doing some 
research, the answer is going to be there.”  Now, he has internalized his thought process 
to the expert level where he does not express it verbally (Ericsson, 2006; Hoffman, 
1992), which he calls intuition: “it's really driven based on Six Sigma principles is what I 
do, that I’ve learned to expect the unexpected. That’s always there. But the more I do 
this, the more I get instinct, or mother's intuition.” 
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Joel had several suggestions for learning to anticipate uncertainty, primarily to 
follow a prescribed process: “Whether it is a failure management strategy or system 
engineering V or you're moving from one acquisition process or phase to another, you 
don't to have to reinvent that.”  Also: 
I need to isolate the scenario for the learning objective and be able to kind 
of tweak it based on the learner and then see that multiple times until he 
gets a pattern of recognition down so that he can go ahead and deal with 
uncertainty, because he has a pattern of recognition, he knows what it 
looks like and he knows what the possible outcomes can be. 
 
Stephen noted his personal growth in anticipating uncertainty, especially after 
having to recover after a failure or embarrassment:  
You see an older designer and they look really confident and they look 
really sure of themselves and they look really relaxed…being put on the 
spot a few times. When you go out and you present something and you 
didn't put too much time into it and you didn't really fully prepare to 
present it and you show this to somebody who's been there and done that, 
they're going to ask you questions that start off really benign and then they 
circle it…They're leading you into the gotcha question. Then you just sit 
there and you have nothing to say. It's a pretty horrible feeling. You feel 
really stupid and unworthy, but they know because they've been there… In 
real life where we live, you're going to make mistakes.  Just don't let it get 
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you down. Just try to learn from your mistakes… you learn how you work 
best. 
 
4.3.5 Category 5: Resilient 
For Resilient engineers, uncertainty is a fact of life in the business, and for the 
items within their control, they know how to get the right data at the right time at the 
right fidelity from the right people in order for them to make the big decisions.  They may 
even be in a position to “lead the market”, or make company-culture-changing moves, 
because they have increased their engagement with key stakeholders, a key habit of 
human-centered design and empathic design (Zoltowski, Oakes, & Cardella, 2012).  
Their emotional response to big moves is that they “have gotten over it”, referring to the 
criticism and resistance that typically follows project changes. 
Resilient engineers describe a trusting engagement of their teammates and other 
stakeholders, making sure their teammates have the resources, authority, and courage to 
investigate parallel solution paths.  The engagement of their teammates and stakeholders 
is early in the design process and significantly sustained throughout the process.  In most 
of these transcripts, the participants used “we” instead of “I” to describe the path to 
solution.  The complexity of the design projects is such that epistemic, ambiguous, 
aleatory, and interaction uncertainties are all present, and the best management skill is to 
engage large teams because an individual Resilient engineer cannot do the work alone. 
The participants whose transcripts compose this category are Alonso, Duncan, 
Malcolm, and Peter.  Alonso has 16 years’ experience and Peter has 32 years’ experience.  
They all have very definite leadership roles, which we can assume they earned because of 
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their continued demonstration of proficiency in managing people and projects 
successfully. 
 
4.3.5.1 Forms of Uncertainty 
The participants whose experiences categorized the Resilient group identified 
epistemic, aleatory, ambiguity, and interaction uncertainties, with the greatest 
concentration on interaction of stakeholders inside and outside the design projects.  In 
these transcripts, whole businesses may be interacting, with their own agendas and 
resources possibly in conflict or being kept confidential.  Wherever data is available, 
Resilient engineers expect their teams to do their best to make sense of it. 
Alonso describes his role as: “Leader of the Analytical Integration Team, that is a 
team that manages all the different design aspects such as handling qualities, dynamics, 
aerodynamics and simulation.”  Because of the new configuration of aircraft, Alonso’s 
team encountered phenomenological uncertainty in a new maneuver that necessitated an 
investigation: “We have had specific problem in a certain maneuver and we experienced 
very high load unexpected… almost like an accident… What we have to do is go back 
and find the cause.” 
Alonso speaks about boundaries of the problem as a guide of where he should 
concentrate his efforts: “you have many different areas that you can follow. Another 
important part is to limit or cut at some point, the boundary of your investigation and then 
solution of the problem…I have to do these three because this will give me the maximum 
and the minimum.”  Here, he is referring to pursuit of the largest influencing factors 
139 
 
under the control of the designers to mitigate the consequences of this new maneuver as 
the boundaries. 
In particular, Alonso reflected on experiencing interaction uncertainty when his 
organization moved between countries: “we had to restructure the company… 
organizational wise because that was a lot of uncertainty in how to manage the problem 
and now we are in a different country with people on both sides of the ocean…in the US 
I’ve seen that there is more work then separate and then going together…We did away 
almost with the word meeting because people are meeting all the time and there is a 
continuing interaction but sometimes it can be chaotic.”  This is different from Miranda’s 
and Silvia’s experiences, as they were individuals moving between countries, and Alonso 
moved an entire organization.  So Alonso is aware of more varied forms of uncertainty 
here. 
Duncan describes himself as having a systems view of design: “you've got all 
these people who are specialists in all these different things and they're great at that, but 
some task are just better handled if you looked at it from our systematic standpoint.”  His 
high level view of design allows him to see how his company and his customer may 
interact: “you're waiting for some new program to come about or you're actually trying to 
form the business in the first place and you're working with a potential customer… you 
can get the requirements tuned to the strength of your company.” 
Duncan described his design process as a mix of textbook processes and a 
personally-styled approach of making decisions in what concepts to pursue and develop:  
After the requirements, of course they'll eventually turn into 
specifications, but then it's trying to get those bounded enough so that you 
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can then come up with what your initial concepts might be… at the very 
beginning then you do make a conceptual design you make the decisions 
that I would be making as the designer ahead of time before I really talked 
to anybody else, assuming they all have a general understanding of what 
the requirements are… Then there's a whole other set of decisions that 
would then come up is when you start showing your things to management 
and they make their call. Then there's the whole decision that pops up 
when we as [company3] will be talking to the government or the customer 
and what happens then. 
 
Duncan noted the indispensability of iteration like Abraham mentioned because 
an engineer can get fixated on one’s own idea, like Nathaniel mentioned:  
The initial concepts, you're testing those out. I guess the biggest thing for 
us is the iterations with it… More often than not it's not usually the best 
answer so then there's different iterations trying to optimize to get a better 
solution… From a designers standpoint maybe there's some technical 
judgement calls about things you might want to do, because it's kind of 
your baby… there's a distinct style… the artistic part of it. 
 
Malcolm described his career trajectory as being in the right place at the right 
time with the right willingness to take the work.  He experienced several transitions as 
aerospace companies acquired other companies.  He found himself entering programs at 
various stages of completion, such as conceptual design, developmental flight test, or 
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close to transition from engineering development to manufacturing.  Now Malcolm 
describes his senior program manager job as: “to make sure that we execute to, we have a 
statement of work, and we have a procurement spec. I have to make sure that the overall 
team is meeting those objectives…We have to have a structure in place to make sure that 
ultimately we fully meet these requirements that we signed up to deliver.” 
Malcolm typically presents several options and associated assessment strategies 
for meeting design requirements: “Usually, we present multiple options; usually they 
want to see a risk posture of choices… at the beginning of the project, you identify ‘these 
are our requirements’ and then you map out ‘how am I going to verify every requirement 
that I own?’… Some of them can be verified with analysis, some of them will be 
similarity from similar programs, some of them can be in simulation labs, some of them 
will require flight test or other type of test data.” 
Malcolm specifically noted the “risk posture” of companies and the uncertain 
interaction of risk posture with the buyer:  
You have to understand the risk posture of your company and of the 
various divisions within the company and the various players. [company4] 
as a company is extremely risk averse. They will not lean forward hardly 
at all; they're always going to take the low-risk answer… This culture, 
which usually starts at the very top, the CEO level, tends to flow down. If 
the CEO is risk intolerant and profit is everything and they don't want to 
risk that, they want steady cash flow and so on, it's going to flow down 
through all the levels and it quickly becomes known that you do not 
tolerate risk… take those risks and assume they happen, which means 
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baking them into your plan. What you do is you increase the cost… You 
got to be careful here because you could put yourself out of business. 
 
Malcolm, like Curtis, thinks of uncertainty in terms of risk, and risk is divided 
into the typical top three constraints: cost, schedule, and performance or technical 
aspects.  He is not the only one making the decision on these constraints.  He said of 
technical or performance risks: “If it's a technical risk, what we tend to do is bring in our 
technical teams… if there's a technical problem, I’ll work with my engineering managers. 
And we'll assess, ‘do we have the necessary expertise to answer this?’ ...sometimes we 
had to hire external SMEs.”  He said of cost and schedule risks: “that's more in the 
domain of the program management team. Just based upon experience and knowledge, 
you know what works, you know what doesn't because of your time and working over the 
years. You’re able to make schedule assessments.” 
Peter advanced from engineering into leadership roles quickly, first taking 
technical responsibilities as a manager and then transitioning to leader responsibilities.  
He obtained a breadth of experience within a company: “I actually worked in the factory 
also which I think really helped shape me as a leader… how decisions are made in other 
parts of the business really help shape you for making decisions as a leader.”  He 
obtained further breadth of experience between companies: “took a great opportunity 
here at [company3] to be the CTO at [company3] which has really shaped me as a global 
leader not just as a more focused product leader around a certain element of portfolio.” 
Peter has significant decision-making responsibility which he takes very seriously 
and desires to pass to the next leaders.  He said:  
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I would say it happens almost every day. A lot of it comes down to, I 
think, intuition and judgment because I do think if I take a step a back, one 
of our biggest problems in our workforce today is not making decisions. 
We're ineffective at making decisions… what is the information that’s 
necessary at what fidelity level to make a decision and once you agree that 
this is the information and the fidelity, making the decision is easy. 
Making sure that it encompasses everybody’s stakeholders requirements 
around it… Not all of them were successful but you can always recover 
from a decision, you can't recover from no decision. 
 
Peter sees a host of interaction uncertainty sources that other participants did not 
mention: commodity prices, foreign exchange issues, locations suitable for 
manufacturing, and the customers in their own contexts.  He said: “Do we really 
understand how and what products and services they need for them to make and be 
competitive in their market space. A lot of our customers compete against each other 
which makes it even more difficult.”  Global and political events are also uncertain:  
There's ambiguity. There's volatility. There's churn… Understanding the 
markets, understanding the pending strength of the dollar, understanding 
the talent of our individuals in the region for the region… ambiguity 
around that because who could’ve ever said that from [country4], which 
was growing at 15%, is now really they say 7 but it’s really around 2… the 
president would say and tax business people that use business jets… don’t 
know what the workforce demographics are going to be. 
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Peter sees design as far as 20 years away that may become high priority because it 
has been matured by designers 3 to 5 years away from delivery.  He said:  
On the technology front I don’t think we have as much as a challenge as 
people may think… what is in the incubation state and really 
understanding what are those platform agnostic technologies that we see 
that eventually could lead to some differentiation in our product field. And 
you have to invest in those also so there's a wide lens of looking at kind of 
what's really emerging and how those things really trend itself into our 
product portfolio or adjacent markets that we’d be interested in. They 
could be 10, 15, 20 years out… product infusion in the next 3 to 5 years 
and then making sure that you're investing appropriately to mature the 
technology and the manufacturing at the point where the business decision 
is needed. 
 
Peter sees long term aspects of the business that allows him to predict the 
significance of a trend, especially related to economic cycles and disruptions:  
I’m a big believer if you missed that window, and they're cyclic windows, 
what you invested in today is probably obsolete by the time you get the 
next opportunity… Once you get the product into the workplace and 
industry it usually stays there… it’s very hard to displace an incumbent, it 
really is. You have to beat the incumbent by more than just the baseline 
cost price… logistics, everything that goes along with once you have that 
infrastructure in place… purposing and making sure that our decisions and 
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our investments are aligned with buying decisions and timelines 
associated with our key customers’ decisions are really the element that 
we continue to push on… how do you get in front of that market… 
investing in new products as the cycle is coming down and then when it 
bottoms out you're on the incline and the inflection point that we start to 
bring new products in as that market recovers. 
 
4.3.5.2 Team Engagement 
For Resilient engineers, immediate distribution of work to several teams of 
engineers is the primary design process they follow.  The projects and objectives are 
simply too large for one person or a small team to have all the necessary specialties.  
Resilient engineers are different from Robust engineers in that Resilient engineers have a 
positive and confident view that they have the best people working the design problems 
to provide them the data they need to make decisions.  Resilient engineers have the added 
responsibility of interacting with outside stakeholders, so they apply their intuition, built 
from years of experience, on those interactions. 
Alonso immediately planned a team effort to investigate several possible 
influencing factors simultaneously.  He expected that these parallel efforts would provide 
indicators of relative influence and then he could provide further direction to the team.  
He said: “it was my decision in the end on how to proceed in this. My specific role was to 
develop separately with every separate functions… To develop a path on how much 
going deeper and how to go in deeper on these aspects”: 
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How many other aspects of the same problem you have to look…They see 
was this the worst of the worst cases. Trying to define a limit of the 
variable coming from something that is not totally realistic…We put this 
cases and that was something very idealistic because you didn't consider 
all the feedback from the other disciplines…That was something that 
allow us to see at least where were moving… I let it go, this person 
reiterating on his design. Only at the end, I did the merging of these two 
world that this point have done quite separate work only towards the end 
that they were merged to demonstrate that everything made sense. 
 
Alonso’s main responsibility is to keep his team talking to each other until there is 
enough actionable data for him to make a decision: “they need to continuously to 
exchange their information. You have to drive this and you have to actually to take the 
information and give the information... Making sure that this was happening and actually 
that all these areas were talking to each other. Then decide when to stop that was the 
important part because this could go forever, it could never stop.” 
Alonso described his parallel team efforts in another way: “I knew that I had a 
couple of weeks just to investigate every different area and see all the different 
problems…In the beginning my team was good to have everything going on separately 
and then I started to close the loop and continuing with two or three big items.”  Alonso 
noted carefully about having Subject Matter Experts on his team: “if you don’t have with 
you I mean good people you don’t go anywhere.” 
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Alonso remembers his prescribed requirements but also expands the list 
depending on the new knowledge his team gained, and continues to demand proof of 
meeting the requirements: “I have demonstrated that what I’ve designed satisfies some 
objective that I have decided… I've also found that what was designed before didn’t 
satisfy something else that I didn’t know. I had to put another 20 percent of requirement 
before I didn’t have… I have to re-verify that everything that I had done before wasn’t 
changed.” 
Duncan’s strategy is to gather evidence right away, even if it is just an indicator, 
so that he does not experience the “gotcha” moment that Stephen mentioned.  He also 
advocates assembling a supportive team:  
The big thing is you're always trying to get yourself educated enough and 
rescope the problem… You never want to get into any meeting where your 
answer is, ‘I don't know.’… so that it doesn't get to the point where you're 
just coming in and you don't know. Part of it is trying to minimize that. If 
you don't know, then you're setting up things that do let you know. That's 
why you may do some outside analysis... Getting as well versed as you 
can on what it is you're working on and then certainly trying to surround 
yourself with people who are like-minded. 
 
Duncan has a team of specialists and that includes his customers.  His design 
specialists, like Nathaniel noted, can remove a few cycles of iteration.  He also maintains 
communications with the customer as a means of reaffirming the requirements, but he 
does not describe it confrontationally as Frank did:  
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You have the formal requirements and everybody goes through and so 
that's been formally issued… certain people in the company who 
specialize in dissecting that… it's also working with the customer to make 
sure you're still on the same page with them… you can get "the older" 
engineers who've seen a lot of things and know a lot of things… have 
enough experience that they could look at it and probably give you a 
pretty good estimate of what it could and couldn't do and tell you whether 
they think it will pass muster… If you're seeing it from them and you're 
seeing it from your A-team of people then they feel pretty confident. 
 
Duncan sees internal and external interaction uncertainty within the company’s 
hierarchy and with the customer, where the priorities of each party may be in conflict:  
Prior to probably coming from a customer, you've probably been told a 
few things as to what they want… there's a little bit of a hierarchy… 
program manager wields a lot of power…management has certain 
expectations… our plan as a corporation on how we want to solve this… 
what the customer told you in the requirements… That one pretty much 
overrides anything… You're juggling both of those. 
 
Malcolm’s team experienced significant schedule uncertainty that tied closely 
with performance uncertainty, which would ultimately negatively affect the customer: 
“One of the problems we've experienced recently is there's been problems on the jet as far 
as [company3] providing us the time we need to be able to test. And it's impacting the 
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way we can execute because we're not getting the flight data and that feedback loop, 
we're not able to incorporate the changes and do the verification we need… fleet was 
going to be grounded for a period of 4 months.” 
Malcolm’s response was broad coordination on a plan: “We had to make some 
decisions. We ended up working closely with my [company3] team, their program 
manager came out, we sat down with my team, some of my counterparts within 
[company4]. We developed a plan of recovery, we vetted with [company3]. We 
presented it to the executive management. They gave us feedback and adjustments.”  The 
secret to successful execution of the plan is: “It’s all about getting, within this span of 
authority, you have to find the decision maker who has the stand of authority to truly 
make and own that task. And you got to put it at the right level.”  The success was 
obvious to the customer: “they heralded that meeting as an example of supplier-prime 
contractor, meaning, [company3], [company4], this is how we should be working. We’re 
finding answers.” 
Malcolm again emphasized his lateral and vertical team providing him the 
knowledge he needs to make decisions:  
Usually the key here is, if decisions are going to hold, you have to vet 
them. A lot of junior PMs move and make decisions very quickly and if 
they're not vetted… looks like you're an idiot. So it's usually best to have a 
very broad coordination, make sure everybody's aligned before it ever gets 
to that executive review. Then you're presenting a cohesive team review 
that's been fully vetted by all parties… what's the appropriate level. If this 
decision is going to be elevated all the way to the vice president level, for 
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example, I can't just engage the lower level stakeholders, I’ve also got to 
engage their management chains all the way up that will be reporting to 
that vice president. 
 
Malcolm’s attitude to managing others’ uncertainty is one of partnership:  
The suppliers will say ‘it's not my problem. I have this statement of work, 
this is your problem, it's not my problem.’ And they have very rigid 
boundaries… really want them not to be so rigid. You really want them to 
work closely with you. You want them to have some level of flexibility to 
give and take. It makes the process much easier… show that we were in a 
partnership, not in a supplier relationship… things don't go according to 
plan… So we've had to do adjustments to that plan along the way in order 
to be flexible, in order to come up with an option. 
 
Peter sees his teammates as stakeholders, quality leaders, manufacturing leaders, 
engineering leaders, research centers, and the sales force.  He especially relies on his 
sales force for actionable data about the customer: “our customers are becoming much 
more educated on the overall lifecycle of their product. Our sales people and our 
engineers are really working very hard to be very integral to their key relationships with 
inside those customers.” 
Peter noted the indispensability of his teammates to manage their subject matter in 
order to provide him actionable and reliable data: “the biggest element in the product 
design cycle today is that we don’t have all the right people at the right time ensuring that 
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the product portfolio is moving at the pace it needs to… really makes you think a lot 
different for where you put people and where you're going to invest in your product and 
how do you get more stability in the currency exchange where you can insure that you 
don’t have the volatility.” 
Like Joel, Peter sees design happening over such a long period of time that 
engineers may become attached to the work, like Nathaniel and Duncan point out, “I'm 
pregnant with the idea, it’s my baby” that Peter must face his team’s attachment: 
“engineers will fight to the end to maintain and give you every argument why they should 
continue… you have to make the decision where do you get the best return for that 
investment… you have to get past a personal part of the decision.”  However, Peter has a 
high level vision of repurposing designs for which there has already been investment: 
“I'm a big believer is that at some point some of the things that we worked on it just may 
not be the right time and some of the technologies that we work on may be applied 
somewhere else… we don’t throw everything out… We shelf it, make sure we know 
where it’s at.” 
Even though Peter said he relied on judgment and intuition for some decisions, 
there are decisions for which there is evidence, and he reflects on the quality of that 
evidence in order to enhance his intuition:  
I think you'll find in industry that the depth of the information that’s 
actually being looked at is probably not the depth of the information that 
really needs to be looked at… I’m a big one on lessons learned… you start 
to look for an inflection point when the program starts to look like there is 
something going wrong, you stop and you pause there and you really start 
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to look at what information were people looking at at that time period… 
looking for inflection points and looking for the information that was 
actually being viewed… That’s usually our biggest problem, I think, in the 
industry is that we don’t focus on the information and the people that is 
necessary at the time to insure that we're at the level that we need to be 
during the program. 
 
4.3.5.3 Personal Response to Uncertainty 
Resilient engineers tend to formalize and externalize their thought processes for 
design and managing uncertainty.  They have an altruistic motive to preserve the hard-
earned knowledge they have.  It also allows for these thought processes and data to be 
examined and evaluated by others for further refinement, a welcome step of the design 
process.  Resilient engineers are even optimistic about uncertainties in design because 
they have decade-long views of products being matured. 
Duncan’s approach to managing uncertainty is to stay abreast of the current 
published data and new possibilities, especially coming from his teammates:  
Come in as prepped as you can… knowing the literature. Look at what has 
been done with what's out there… you also want to be flexible enough to 
flex with something that may not be exactly what you think it might be… 
Then when we get to the different people in different disciplines and 
different specialties and they're certainly keeping up with their particular 
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field… To be in that particular role you had to be versed enough to be able 
to talk to the discipline specific person. 
 
Because of the volume of data and uncertainty that Malcolm encounters, he 
applies limits and boundaries of what is acceptable:  
As long as you're inside the upper bound and lower bound, you're ok. If 
you aren't and you have a deviation, that's when you have to go and make 
changes… anything that's critical, we have boundaries for what's 
acceptable or not. What that does is it makes, whenever you do the 
analysis, it eliminates the decision…you identify your critical parameters, 
your engineering parameters, and what the margins are for those, so that 
you know if you have success or failure.  The other uncertainty comes in, 
the cost and schedule, is a bit more amorphous. It’s usually managed 
through the risk process. 
 
Malcolm has several tools at his disposal for formalizing risk, like Abraham, Joel, 
and Frank had mentioned.  Like Curtis and Edmund, there are costs associated with 
continuing to reduce risk, so Malcolm has responsibility to determine the stop point, like 
Alonso had to do:  
There will be company guidelines. The company will write a risk policy, 
and their risk policy is heavily influenced by their corporate culture… 
variety of tools. Some companies have homegrown tools…. we take a 
look at everything we've learned over the last quarter and we do a 
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bottoms-up estimate-at-complete... you typically use what they call a risk 
cube… plots consequence, the impact if it happens, versus probability… It 
costs money any time you do a mitigation plan or anything about it, it 
costs money to maintain this process. And they recognize they don't just 
want to throw money at it and do everything. When you have a moderate 
risk, most companies require that you have a mitigation plan in place. 
 
Malcolm anticipates uncertainty and has plans in place for the unexpected: 
“You’re always going to be getting surprised… When you're in the design and 
development side of the house, you have to be prepared. You're working in a very 
different environment. You're going to have surprises… if you have a robust risk process, 
you can hopefully, if your risk process is working, what should happen, you should 
identify these potential scenarios before they occur… you identify contingencies.”  
Malcolm has a history of relative success in predicting the consequences of uncertainties: 
“probably 60% of the things that have happened, have happened within the risk process 
and we have been able to execute those contingencies… 40% have come up where either 
we simply didn't think of them, or the risk plan didn't fully foresee the magnitude of what 
could happen, or the contingency wasn't sufficient enough to be able to deal with it.” 
Malcolm’s personal approach to uncertainty has been tested by failure and he 
recovered:  
They're not doing their job if they're not having failures as well as 
successes…we ended up crashing both of [prototypes]. And that was even 
with all the plans we had, all the contingencies… we executed to the best 
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of our ability…I took a lot of responsibility for that failure, I really did, 
and it took me a while to get over it… you're measured on how you react 
and how you handle them. You also want to be as proactive as you can… 
you need to be as transparent as you can, you need to identify the correct 
level of risk… you shouldn't be taking it personally. You have to end up 
taking the cards you're dealt, you do the best job, you make sure your 
communication is crystal clear as you can. What happens, happens… They 
have to recognize you cannot do this all on your own. You need to be 
reaching out, networking, have allies, have mentors in place. 
 
Peter noted his personal approach to uncertainty as a balance between intuition on 
risky decisions and getting his team to provide the right data to make a decision: 
Very carefully. It’s hard. At some point you have to go with intuition on 
some of those ambiguous ones… You can't be risk-averse on everything 
and I think there is this balance on risk-averse and intuition and judgment 
and making sure that you're not waiting for the market to come and you're 
leading the market to get to a place that you think is going to be viable… 
but there is so much ambiguity but you have to at some point have 
intuition, judgment in everything… How do you really insure that you're 
asking the right questions at the right time? What questions should you be 





4.3.5.4 Reflections on Learning to Manage Uncertainty 
Participants in the Resilient category found that their personal response to 
uncertainty is not hidden, that others are watching them.  They are also watching 
themselves and discovering that they have improved both their awareness of forms of 
uncertainty they encounter in design and accompanying management strategies.  They 
have become comfortable managing their own uncertainty and can now help others 
manage their feelings and uncertainties. 
Alonso noted his personal growth in managing uncertainty: “I learned now how 
interconnected things are… when you have to press and when you have to wait…  you 
have to give some time to the idea to evolve…variables can be even interconnected 
between themselves… There are stronger variables and less strong variables but you 
don’t know this at the beginning…even if it is uncertain it’s still something that you 
manage.”  Another aspect is confronting his own assumptions: “spoiled basically by your 
own pre-concepts…sometimes you get stuck on something…you leave something 
outside just because you don’t have a good relation with the person… so you have to be 
open.” 
Duncan identified his growth like Frank had: “You go through each one of these 
steps, probably fairly systematically, and I think the more experience ... You still follow a 
process but you jump to things pretty quickly… iterations internally may go around a lot 
quicker… but the more you've done it ... There is a process but you can run through the 
steps probably a bit quicker and it probably gets more merged.”  Duncan now coaches 
younger engineers through design problems:  
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We want you to get comfortable with the chaos… You may not know all 
the answers, but again, you're comfortable with dealing with it and making 
assertions and assumptions and trying to be able to back up those 
assumptions so you can move forward… How would you do any real 
complex thing? You don't try to solve it all at once. You try to get into 
those simpler parts and eventually you get the whole thing solved and 
coming together to a solution… If you came in new, you were probably 
paired off with somebody who's a bit more senior and you probably are 
going to pick up some of the habits that they had. If it's valid and if it 
looks like the people are respecting them and it's something that the 
company likes, then you make pick up those different habits and you put 
your own spin on it too. 
 
Malcolm has also been a teacher of risk management at the corporate level.  His 
lesson includes the major points summarized in his transcript, particularly one’s personal 
response to uncertainty and failure:  
Your management is going to be looking at you at how you responding, 
and how you're executing once that occurs. They’re not going to be 
looking at you and blaming you because it occurred… over communicate, 
think broader… you want to be more inclusive… build a broad 
consensus… categorize the uncertainty… you have a stoplight chart… 
trending lines, is it getting better or is it getting worse… When we talk 
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uncertainty, it's measuring versus that baseline… All the customer 
deliverables, every piece of it. 
 
Peter learned how to manage his own uncertainty and others’ uncertainty from 
observing a mentor in action:  
 ‘What I’m going to teach you about is around dealing with people, 
dealing with ambiguity. How to interact and how do you message? What 
should you really be paying attention to? What's the depth of, if you're 
leading something what's the depth of what you should really 
understand?… Don’t ever worry about being an expert in every area but 
you have to at least know what quadrant the answer should be in…. 
messaging and understanding the level of fidelity that I should be paying 
attention to’… I shadowed him for quite a bit in a lot of the senior 
meetings. 
 
4.4 Differences Between Categories 
Since the goal of phenomenography is to find variation of experience, and the 
outcomes are logically related, typically by a hierarchy, the differences here imply a 





4.4.1 From Category 1 – Brittle to 2 – Plastic 
One of the key differences between Brittle and Plastic engineers is the amount of 
fear they discuss; Brittle engineers are considerably more emotional than Plastic 
engineers.  This may be related to the dimension of teamwork; Brittle engineers describe 
mostly their work as individual projects and Plastic engineers are beginning to leverage 
knowledge of their teammates, however superficial it may be.  Brittle engineers are aware 
of the fact that there are subjects they have not learned, but Plastic engineers are aware 
that other teammates may know that subject, so Plastic engineers have reduced their 
negative emotional response by convincing themselves that someone nearby will know 
what they do not know.  Brittle engineers, however, have not yet mastered the ability to 
ask someone else for help and advice. 
Brittle engineers have not made informal peer review a part of their design 
process yet.  Brittle engineers are trying to perform to summative reviews rather than 
formative reviews (Pellegrino, Chudowsky, & Glaser, 2001).  Brittle engineers think of 
reviews as a pass/fail moment and their emotions are tied to that result; for Margaret and 
Philip in particular, they fear that failure will terminate their careers.  On the other hand, 
Plastic engineers seek peer review regularly with less fear of failure.  Rather, Plastic 
engineers acknowledge that they may have made a mistake and another perspective is 
valuable to catch it. 
Because of Brittle engineers’ focus on summative review and the fear of failure 
associated with it, they tend to push decision-making to their immediate superiors.  
Plastic engineers, on the other hand, have learned to judge themselves first and assemble 
a defensible position.  Plastic engineers still rely on superiors because they respect their 
160 
 
superiors’ breadth and length of experience, but their superiors are now teammates 
instead of judges to them. 
Brittle and Plastic engineers both experience epistemic uncertainty, and if they 
gained knowledge, then their uncertainty would be reduced.  Brittle engineers tend to 
continue to learn individually and suspect that the “whole story” is hidden.  Plastic 
engineers have a different attitude that they are fairly certain that everything has been 
tried before, and now that they are “in the real world”, working for pay, they have the 
freedom and responsibility to ask questions of others and expect to get the answers. 
Brittle engineers are named thusly because their response to uncertainty is to 
break easily emotionally.  Plastic engineers are named thusly because their response to 
uncertainty is to make design moves in a certain direction, and when they have reached 
the end of the checklist, they deem their uncertainty eliminated.  The checklist to Plastic 
engineers is some process defined by other more experienced engineers as the external 
embodiment of knowledge, and that is satisfactory to Plastic engineers. 
 
4.4.2 From Category 2 – Plastic to 3 – Tolerant 
The difference between Tolerant engineers and Plastic engineers is not the 
difference in years of experience but that Tolerant engineers view themselves in a 
network of engineers, with themselves having a systems view or broad view of the design 
problem.  A Plastic engineer’s view of the design problem is that he is looking up the 
hierarchy for people with answers, whereas a Tolerant engineer looks across the 
hierarchy and can assemble a team in a day, but it will take the team more than a day to 
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converge on a solution.  A Plastic engineer’s view is that a design problem could be a 
team effort, whereas a Tolerant engineer’s view is that a problem must be a team effort. 
Now that a Tolerant engineer must function in a team because of the complexity 
of the design tasks, the Tolerant engineer now experiences ambiguity uncertainty in 
addition to epistemic uncertainty, where ambiguity comes from the team and their 
customers.  Ambiguity is present in communicating in oral, written, and visual forms.  
The Plastic engineer, on the other hand, is not aware that any communication could be 
interpreted in several ways, depending on the speaker and the audience. 
A Plastic engineer may feel disconnected from a design task, especially if they are 
following a checklist, because they are relying on others’ experience and knowledge.  A 
Tolerant engineer, on the other hand, feels a significant investment in the design, a sense 
of ownership and responsibility.  A Tolerant engineer, then, feels empowered to make a 
decision and enforce it, whereas a Plastic engineer may not have the strong sense of 
wanting to enforce a decision in a design. 
It is at this point that a Tolerant engineer may be a Subject Matter Expert in 
others’ views.  Tolerant engineers have a deep understanding of fundamental principles 
of physics and engineering and these principles are their guides.  Plastic engineers, on the 
other hand, may use what other people simply tell them as their guide.  Tolerant 
engineers now have a view of at least one system, recognizing that there are many other 
systems, but the other systems are not within their purview of responsibility; rather the 
Tolerant engineer can and will converse with other system owners, where boundaries 




Tolerant engineers have an experimental attitude, in that they expect that some 
things will fail, whereas Plastic engineers tend to believe that following the checklist will 
catch and prevent failures.  Tolerant engineers are named thusly because they are tolerant 
of the possibility of failure as part of design and the certainty that uncertainty cannot be 
eliminated. 
 
4.4.3 From Category 3 – Tolerant to 4 – Robust 
Tolerant engineers appear to take on individual work still and mention teams in 
general, but without a strong emotional response to team aspects.  Robust engineers have 
taken a step up to bear responsibility for team performance, and that new responsibility 
may be a cause of anxiety.  Team performance now refers to teams of teams managing 
systems of systems.  Robust engineers now have an emotional response to both project 
and team, because they view their teammates as responsible for certain systems.  Robust 
engineers experience conflict between teammates and have the responsibility to manage 
that conflict to finish the design task.  Robust engineers are named thusly because they 
have enough managerial courage to get the design job complete to design requirements 
and specifications. 
Robust engineers can reach back to the habits of Tolerant engineers and ask for 
evidence as a means of confronting another teammate.  Sometimes, Robust engineers rely 
on their intuition, which they have described as being developed through repeated 
experience.  Tolerant engineers do not use the word intuition.  Tolerant engineers are not 
yet completely comfortable with their level of experience, whereas Robust engineers are 
very comfortable with their experience, though it may not be entirely reliable.  
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Overconfidence, mentioned as part of “bad” decision-making, seems to be part of 
intuition.  As a comparison point in aviation, it has been shown in Figure 4.4.1 below that 
accident rates of pilots with thousands of hours increase at 3,000 to 4,000 flight hours 
(Aircraft Owners and Pilot Association, 2007).  But beyond 4,000 hours, accident rates 
decrease, perhaps indicating a humbling experience that caused the pilot to return to real 
data instead of intuition as the evidence for making a decision. 
 
 
Figure 4.4.1 Accident rates of private pilots as a function of hours of flight time, 




From Table 2.3.1 description of expert teams, Robust engineers may have all the 
elements except develop a sense of teamness, collective.  A Tolerant engineer is also 
missing have strong team leadership as a personal characteristic that distinguishes a 
Tolerant engineer from a Robust engineer.  Either way, the Tolerant and Robust engineer 
would be viewed by peers as a good engineer. 
 
4.4.4 From Category 4 – Robust to 5 – Resilient 
Resilient engineers have mastered expert teaming in Table 2.3.1 especially by the 
trust in Develop a strong sense of “collective,” trust, teamness, and confidence.  Resilient 
engineers spoke with the plural voice instead of singular; that represents the extent that 
they integrated themselves into a team.  For Resilient engineers, trusting teamwork is the 
only way to manage all the forms of uncertainty that they encounter, whereas Robust 
engineers may be sheltered from some forms of interaction uncertainty, such as changing 
market demands. 
Resilient engineers are named thusly because they have appropriately managed 
their teammates to recover from a realized risk item, which in some cases was high 
severity and unpredicted.  Joel in particular is on the edge between Robust and Resilient, 
because the design teams he had were much diversified, but his emotional response was 
quite strong, whereas the participants in the Resilient category have a comparatively 
subdued emotional response. 
Resilient engineers also differ from Robust engineers because Resilient engineers 
have almost an optimistic sense of the positive impact of the designs they are delivering, 
in that they could “lead the market” and shift their buyers’ opinions.  Robust engineers, 
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on the other hand, can and do fix the problem to finish the design task, and that is enough 
work to handle.  To that end, Resilient engineers spend significant time crafting their 
message through the ranks and to the customer, whereas Robust engineers concentrate on 
what they say instead of how they say it. 
 
4.5 Relationships Among Categories 
It is typical in phenomenography to represent the relative comprehensiveness of 
outcome categories graphically.  While Category 2 is more inclusive of types of 
uncertainty than Category 1, Category 2 is exclusive of Category 1 with regard to the 
participant’s personal approach to uncertainty and skill in team engagement.  Therefore, 
Category 2 is represented higher and to the right of Category 1, but not overlapping 
Category 1.  The same follows for the relationship between Category 2 and 3 and so on. 
In Figure 4.5.1 below, a mathematical layout of axes is applied, where higher and 
to the right of the origin implies a greater value.  The first dimension shown horizontally 
is the complexity of the design problem, where the indicators of complexity in the 
transcripts are the greater number and greater variety of forms of uncertainty the 
participant is aware of.  The second dimension shown vertically is the increasing 
necessity of team engagement as a significant means of coping with the increasing 
uncertainty.  The colors of the discrete values of each axis are meant to correlate with the 
colors of each category.  The third unifying dimension of the five categories could be 
read like a typographical map, where a colored outline represents a constant elevation, 
and here it represents a constant category. 
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For consistency, in Figure 4.5.1 below, the forms of uncertainty are named from 
Thunnissen’s taxonomy’s first level, but the details of the second level are not shown for 
simplicity’s sake.  Epistemic uncertainty is present throughout all the transcripts, so its 
stripe goes from origin to the far right.  Tolerant, Robust, and Resilient engineers 
experience ambiguity, so its stripe goes from Tolerant to the far right.  Resilient engineers 









In Figure 4.5.2 below, the names of the participants are located in the categories 
to demonstrate some stretch in either dimension within a category. The skill levels in 
team engagement are shown as discrete values and should be interpreted thusly.  The 
vertical distance between participants within a category represents a small difference in 
skill in team engagement.  The vertical distance between categories is significant.  The 
superscript number next to each participant’s name represents the years of experience 
listed in Figure 3.10.2 in Section 3.10.1.2. 
 
 
Figure 4.5.2  Outcome space for ways of experiencing uncertainty in aerospace design 




4.6 Summary of Categories 
A summary of each category appears at the beginning of Section 4.3 above.  It is 
repeated here in Table 4.6.1 for quick comparison.  The colors correspond to the outlined 
categories in Figure 4.5.1.  The third column represents the horizontal dimension.  The 
fourth column represents the vertical dimension.  The second column represents the 
categories, which I have called the third unifying dimension of experience. 
 
Table 4.6.1  Summary of Category descriptions. 




of uncertainty) Axis 
Skill in Engaging 
Teammates Axis 
Brittle Uncomfortable with 
uncertainty or afraid of the 
consequences of being found 
ignorant by superiors; 
strategy or recourse is to 
push decisions to someone 
else, typically boss or team 
lead 
Epistemic only; they 
are aware that there 
is subject matter that 
they have not yet 
studied 
Individual work, 
and maybe some 
informal peer 
review 
Plastic Takes solace in the fact that 
most things have been done 
before in aerospace and that 
there will be someone more 
experienced available to 
assist; will take some 
initiative to gather new 
knowledge and to justify 
decisions to themselves first, 
but also rely on superiors for 
decisions 
Epistemic 
uncertainty as the 
Brittle category, but 
also including 
schedule and budget 
constraints 
Describes 
projects as team 
efforts, 
acknowledges 









Table 4.6.1 continued. 
Tolerant Good awareness of 
uncertainty in the physical 
parts and systems is ever 
present and will never be 
eliminated, uncertainty also 
comes from customers and 
teammates in attempting to 
understand their goals and 
concerns 
Epistemic 
uncertainty that can 
be reduced through 
planned and long 






projects as team 
efforts, for which 
they feel a 
significant 
investment or 
ownership in a 
crucial part of the 
project 
Robust Anticipating the unexpected, 
willing to try new methods, 
processes, solutions, and 
looking for data instead of 






decisions hinge upon 
having real data and 









Resilient Uncertainty is a fact of life in 
the business, and for the 
items within their control, to 
get the right data at the right 
time at the right fidelity with 
the right people to make 






interactions could be 
global/political, 
customer-vendor, or 











courage to deploy 
teammates on 






CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION 
Within each category, the demographics of the participants vary, suggesting that 
the essence of the experience of uncertainty is deep and broad.  Within Category 1, there 
are men and women, students and working professionals, those with international 
experience and those without.  Within Category 2, there are men and women, pilots and 
non-pilots, researchers and those in private industry, and one with international 
experience.  Within Category 3, there is one woman; there are those with greater than 20 
years’ experience and those below 10 years’ experience.  Within Category 4, there are 4 
pilots and 1 raw materials supplier, one with only 6 years’ experience and several with 
greater than 20 years’ experience.  Within Category 5, there is one with international 
experience, and there are at least three tiers of job title represented.  While some exposure 
and experience of uncertainty may be specific to the job title, there is clear evidence that 
an engineer’s personal response to uncertainty is not necessarily linked to the type of 
company they work for or the years of experience they have. 
 
5.1 Shape of Outcome Space 
Categories 1, 2, 3, and 4 in Figure 4.5.1 have an L shape, implying that engineers 
may improve a little in their team engagement or improve a little in their awareness of 
forms of uncertainty, but that their personal response remains the same as others in the 
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same category.  Being able to manage uncertainty better personally does not solely 
involve an engineer becoming more proficient at modeling tools and becoming an 
individual Subject Matter Expert in multiple subjects.  In order to progress between 
categories, then, an engineer needs to realize that the strategy for managing increasingly 
complex design problems must more deeply involve their teammates.  Then, an 
engineer’s personal encounter with uncertainty can become less intimidating. 
It is clear from the participants’ varied experiences that the aerospace business 
delivers complex systems that integrate into systems of systems.  Category 2, 3, 4, and 5 
participants are very clear on their relative location in systems-of-systems business 
hierarchy, knowing that they have customers and suppliers with competing and 
conflicting modes of operations and goals.  These participants are effectively equating 
component systems (e.g., engine, hydraulics, or avionics) to people, engineeringdesigners 
who are responsible for those systems.  Participants deem that making the owner happy is 
equal to making the system functional according to specifications.  Therefore, 
participants make progress in bringing in larger numbers of people into their design 
process. 
Because engineers of higher categories see systems as people, there is empty 
space in the outcome space.  The empty spaces represent that it is not a successful 
strategy to improve an engineer’s awareness of teammates’ contributions independent of 
increasing awareness of forms of uncertainty in increasingly complex design problems 
and vice versa.  Rather, an engineer’s understanding of the value of teammates should 
improve simultaneously with increased experience of complexity of design problems.  
Similarly, as complex problems with increased levels of uncertainty are introduced, 
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development of teaming and interpersonal skills is important.  It is as if the aerospace 
industry with its high level of complexity is indicating that no engineer is expected to be 
an individual inventor but rather part of an integrated team in this competitive, global 
economy. 
 
5.2 Thresholds Between Categories and Demographics of Variation 
It is the personal and internal emotional responses that are the key differentiators 
of participants, more than their apparent awareness of types of uncertainty and their skill 
at team engagement.  This aligns with the concept of “coping strategies”, to suppress 
uncertainty, to acknowledge uncertainty, or to reduce uncertainty (Lipshitz & Strauss, 
1997), where suppressing, reducing, and acknowledging are internal responses and these 
are manifested in outward activities, such as taking a gamble, soliciting advice, or 
collecting more information.  It is these personal emotional responses that are named 
according to the analogy of physical materials’ responses to stress loading. 
The boundaries between each category are drawn to represent different personal 
emotional responses to uncertainty, and there is something unique about Category 1 that 
higher category participants have overcome.  Category 1 – Brittle engineers may allow 
their strong negative emotion to hinder them from making progress on their design, 
hinder them from seeking to learn new information, or hinder them from taking on 
decision-making responsibility.  Category 2 – Plastic engineers still encounter 
uncertainty, but they have developed at least one strategy, such as seeking peer or mentor 
review or viewing failure as a learning opportunity, that gives them the confidence to 
proceed with the design task.  Category 1 – Brittle engineers seem to have the 
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fundamental view that others around them are like judges instead of teammates, whereas 
the higher category engineers fundamentally view others as teammates instead of judges. 
Category 3 – Tolerant engineers displayed almost no emotions in their transcripts.  
Whereas Category 2 engineers express their design process as serial, Category 3 
engineers described their design process as several parallel efforts, where they are 
looking for the biggest influencing factors.  Category 3 engineers are expecting that some 
factors will be more important than others, but at the beginning, they may not know 
which, so they remain open-minded and experimental. 
Category 4 – Robust engineers have faced the possibility that there is aleatory 
uncertainty, which uncertainty that could not be reduced even with more knowledge.  
Engineers that deal with aleatory uncertainty here have operationalized it as risk to flight 
safety, cost, or schedule and have defined some acceptable level of risk.  Robust 
engineers have figured out the inescapable importance of engaging other teammates in 
order to manage risk and it manifests in very frequent use of we, whereas Category 3 
engineers are not always speaking in the plural.  Robust engineers realize the matter of 
managing others’ opinions and feelings in order for the others to be motivated enough to 
finish high quality work on the task.  That is how Robust engineers get the whole design 
task completed, but it can be tiring for them. 
Category 5 – Resilient engineers, especially Peter, Malcolm, and Duncan, have 
taken a step up from seeing only their coworkers as teammates to seeing the customer as 
much a player in the execution of the design task, a human-centered design view (IDEO, 
2009; Maguire, 2001; Zoltowski et al., 2012).  Peter and Malcolm were specific in 
reflecting on their switch from technical-centered to customer-centered design.  It seems 
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that the customer, prime contractor, and supplier interaction uncertainties may dominate 
the attention of Resilient engineers, and they know they have teams of capable engineers 
and others around the business to attend to technical matters.  Resilient engineers have 
enough technical knowledge to stay abreast of the evolution of the solution, and they trust 
the process and the designers to converge on a solution, whereas Robust engineers may 
have some trepidation about converging on a solution.  That is what separates a Robust 
engineer from a Resilient engineer. 
While personal and emotional responses are the primary delineators of categories 
of experience, it does not mean that women are concentrated in one or a few particular 
categories.  It is encouraging to see that although the female participants in this study are 
on the younger end of the spectrum, they are spread across three categories.  It is a 
limitation of this study that I did not successfully recruit women who have been working 
20 years and/or have leadership roles in order to confirm that women’s experience of 
uncertainty in design decisions is no different than men’s experience.  With key 
researchers exploring the gendering of professions (Pierce, 1995) and why highly 
educated women are opting out of the workforce (Stone, 2007), it would not be 
appropriate to make assumptions about what all women would say about their design 
experiences. 
Some participants with pilot experience brought a user perspective to the design 
process but other pilots did not make specific mention of it influencing their design 
decisions.  Bernard (Category 2 – Plastic) and Curtis (Category 4 – Robust) were very 
clear on the impact of their pilot experience on their design process; they considered 
where information was coming from and how much information a pilot could take in.  
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However, Oliver, Stephen, and Abraham did not talk about it much.  Ronald spoke more 
about his technician perspective than his pilot perspective.  Joel talked about pilot 
experience from the perspective of considering flight safety of paramount importance 
because of personal friendships within the pilot community.  However, pilot experience 
by itself was not a sufficiently distinct category for experiencing uncertainty in design 
and decision-making. 
Participants with international experience made comparisons between cultures 
and they are spread across most of the categories of experience.  Miranda and Alonso 
were specific in their awareness of cultural differences having an impact on their style 
and frequency of communication, which in turn affected how they manage the design 
process.  Silvia and Jacques were specific about moving between cultures as having a 
positive impact on their confidence to engage in new circumstances.  Margaret, on the 
other hand, compared the culture of private industry to the culture of research and 
academic environments, saying that her industry experience was more certain and 
comfortable than her research experience, primarily because in industry, she had a 
supervisor with a defined process.  Peter did not make claims of global experience in the 
same manner as Miranda and Alonso, but Peter made specific reference to gaining a more 
global view as he moved from a prime contractor environment to a supplier environment.  
In all these transcripts, it is clear that cross-cultural experiences had noticeable impacts 
on the participants’ awareness of uncertainty, a desirable trait for the next generation of 
engineers (Downey et al., 2006; Jamieson & Lohmann, 2009; K. Sheppard et al., 2004). 
There is a fairly consistent correlation between job title (an indicator of level of 
responsibility) and category, where Category 4 and Category 5 participants had explicit 
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leadership roles and Category 1 and Category 2 participants did not have leadership roles.  
Category 3 participants described responsibilities for which they have final authority, but 
they did not describe these as leadership roles.  This correlation may be the result of 
participant self-selection, where they may have accounted themselves successful in the 
roles they have, and thus feel confident in disclosing their experiences for research 
purposes (note that no participant in this study described themselves as having been 
unsuccessful to the point of being removed from the job).  Alternatively, those engineers 
that develop and demonstrate desired professional skills receive more responsibilities 
through promotion, which would lead to an expected correlation.  These job titles, 
however, were not sufficient to predict categories and participants with similar job titles 
spanned categories. 
Another expected correlation is between years of experience and category.  All of 
the participants were still in the aerospace field so those who were not successful and left 
the field or were fired were not included in this study.  It would be expected, therefore, 
that more years of experience would lead to more experience with mastery of uncertainty.  
This is shown in the data with a cluster of participants with 4 or less years’ experience at 
the bottom left of Figure 4.5.2 and a cluster of participants with greater than 20 years’ 
experience at the top right.  Yet there are exceptions; Abraham and Bertram at greater 
than 25 years’ experience are in the same Category 3 - Tolerant as Viola, with 3 years’ 
experience.  Ronald with six years’ experience is in Category 4 – Robust with Joel at 26 
years’ experience.  Somewhere in the middle between Category 1 and Category 5, the 
participants demonstrate a certain level of willingness to take on increasingly complex 
design tasks, and that internal willingness is the differentiator. 
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5.3 Expert Teams and Ways of Experiencing Uncertainty 
While phenomenography investigates an individual’s experience of a 
phenomenon, there is value to considering the teaming aspects that the participants in this 
study are aware of and mentioned, even though teams were not specifically investigated 
or observed in action.  Referring back to the conceptual framework of expert teaming in 
Table 2.3.1 illuminates key differences for managing uncertainty in teams as shown in 
Table 5.3.1.  Because no teammates from the same project were included in this study, it 
is not possible to uncover the outcome of hold shared mental models beyond the culture 
of aerospace in general as described in Section 4.2 Common Themes.  For future research 
work, it is important to consider these aspects of teaming for identifying skills that 
students may intercoordinate (Fischer, 1980) in order to develop the higher level skill of 
managing uncertainty. 
 
Table 5.3.1  Categories of experiencing uncertainty in design decisions compared to 
expert teams' outcomes and behaviors. 
Ways of Experiencing Uncertainty in Design 
Expert teams… Brittle Plastic Tolerant Robust Resilient 
Hold shared mental 
models  
NA NA NA NA NA 
Optimize resources by 
learning and adapting  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Have clear roles and 
responsibilities  
 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Have a clear, valued, and 
shared vision  
   Yes Yes 
Engage in a cycle or 
discipline of prebrief → 
performance → debrief  
 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Have strong team 
leadership  




Table 5.3.1 continued. 
Develop a strong sense 
of “collective,” trust, 
teamness, and 
confidence  
    Yes 
Manage and optimize 
performance outcomes  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cooperate and 
coordinate  
   Yes Yes 
 
5.4 Design Expertise and Ways of Experiencing Uncertainty 
Because this study focuses on decisions in design, it is appropriate to compare this 
new model of design in Table 5.4.1 with established models of design expertise as shown 
in Table 2.4.1 as part of the validation of the new model.  While phenomenography 
demands the bracketing of one’s own understanding of the phenomenon, including the 
bracketing of results from other literature, during analysis of the transcripts (Ashworth & 
Lucas, 1998), it is desired for validity purposes to triangulate new results with other 
published results.   
Category 2 – Plastic correlates with Dreyfus’ Novice level of expertise in the 
aspect of following strict rules, where Category 2 – Plastic engineers follow procedures 
and they deem their work is complete at the end of the checklist.  By default, then, the 
Category 1 – Brittle engineer may be equivalent to the Naïve level of expertise, where 
Ross and Philip described having one choice or another, and either seemed to be good 
enough, so they picked one because of their relative familiarity with the selection. 
There is a close comparison of Category 3 – Tolerant engineers and Competent 
level of expertise because of the aspect of trial-and-error, which in Category 3 is an 
experimental attitude.  The Competent level of expertise shows an emotional attachment, 
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which is similar to a Category 3 engineer having a deep sense of responsibility as a 
growing Subject Matter Expert and/or system owner. 
Category 4 – Robust engineers, like Proficient level of expertise, seek reasons or 
evidence to justify a decision and can quickly set up well-coordinated plans to execute 
their decisions.  But there is also a layer in Robust engineers of Expert level of expertise, 
especially in the matter of intuition.  So, it seems appropriate to blend a Proficient and 
Expert level of expertise with Category 4 - Robust engineers.  Lawson and Dorst (2009) 
point out that many professionals do not progress beyond Expert Level. 
Category 5 – Resilient engineers have Expert and Master behaviors of reflecting 
on successes and failures and having an acute sense of context as it affects the design.  It 
is the analogy of resilient materials being able to recover quickly that names the 
categories, and the matter of dwelling on success and failure is closely linked to 
recovering quickly.  For Category 2 and above, failure is a teacher instead of a fright. 
 
Table 5.4.1  Categories of experiencing uncertainty in design decisions compared to the 
Dreyfus model of expertise in design. 
Level of 
Expertise 
Approach to Design 
Practice 





Naïve Choice based  Brittle 
Novice Convention based Consider objective features of 




Situation based Situational aspects important, 
sensitivity to exceptions to ‘hard 
rules’ 
 
Competent Strategy based Emotional attachment, trial-and-
error, learning and reflecting, 






Table 5.4.1 continued. 
(Proficient)  Immediately see most important 
issues, appropriate plan, reasons 
what to do 
Robust 
Expert Experience based Respond intuitively, perform 
appropriate action straightaway 
Resilient 
Master Create new schemata Dwell on success and failure, 
acute sense of context, openness 
to subtle cues 
Visionary Redefine field New ways of doing things, new 
definitions of the issues, 
operating on margins of domain, 







CHAPTER 6. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
One of the key implications of this outcome space and its summary is that 
designers in aerospace engineering rely on their peers as their primary strategy for 
managing uncertainty.  The participants acknowledge formalized tools such as software 
packages and design and planning methodologies and of course engineering 
fundamentals and analysis.  These technical aspects are the core of an engineer and they 
are very important within an engineering curriculum.  However, it is significant that the 
ability to work across teams and an appreciation for the work of others is related to the 
advancement of the categories and the participants’ ability to manage ever increasing 
uncertainty.  The study was not probing teamwork in the research questions nor did the 
protocol explicitly probe this area but it emerged from the data analysis.  As noted earlier 
the outcomes space has empty areas.  An approach that guided students down one axis 
emphasizing the technical aspects solely with a plan to add teamwork later appears to be 
counter to how the engineers develop and would therefore have limits on its 
effectiveness.  It would be more effective if these were linked with activities involving 
teams when they are learning how to handle design challenges with uncertainty. 
The participants with significant responsibilities in industry (senior program 
managers, directors, and above) have described teamwork as the foremost strategy and 
have integrated it with their technical decision making.  If the undergraduate curriculum 
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seeks to prepare students to enter this environment, an integrated approach appears more 
effective.  Because this outcome space shows a progression, it is recommended that 
students are not just put into teams in a design class, such as capstone design.  Rather 
they should have multiple experiences where they can revisit teamwork and uncertainty 
in several progressively more challenging classroom experiences rather than to be 
confronted with one capstone design experience, as recommended by Grinter (1955).  
This is not to say that the traditional engineering disciplines have stagnated in the 1950s; 
on the contrary, efforts continue to update the engineering curriculum (Clough & et al., 
2004).  Rather, this work provides a focused lens on what development of the skill of 
managing uncertainty may look like as a comparison point for curriculum developers to 
assess their programs. 
The higher category participants had learned how to respect and verify to their 
satisfaction the work of others.  If teams were introduced early in traditional design teams 
of say four students, basic teaming skills could be taught.  As students progress through 
their curriculum, more complex problems could be given to students where they are 
expected to work across teams in systems of teams.  These experiences in a classroom 
where they can be processed by a mentoring faculty member would allow students the 
opportunity to progress in the model developed in this study. 
 
6.1 For Educators 
In order to be valuable in the aerospace engineering business, an engineer must be 
proficient in teaming and in designing complex systems.  The engineer must also have a 
grip on their own personal feelings, which is not to be devoid of feeling, but to recognize 
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that feelings could hinder their progress, whether it is related to how they feel about their 
teammates or how they feel about the scale of complexity of the design.  The complexity 
and scale of Large Scale Complex Engineered Systems is insurmountable for an 
individual engineer, but can only be controlled by a team of “the right people with the 
right information at the right time”, like Peter remarked. 
As several participants indicated, they discovered the perspective of failure as a 
teachable moment rather than a fearsome event.  It is this coping strategy among several 
that child development researchers describe as “resilient” (Luthar, Cicchetti, & Becker, 
2000).  In this study, some Robust and Resilient engineers note the unfortunate demise of 
younger engineers who could not overcome their fears and grow their understanding of 
the business.  As Malcolm said: “They’re not going to be looking at you and blaming you 
because it occurred… you're measured on how you react and how you handle them.” 
So, aerospace engineering education curricula need to provide multiple learning 
opportunities, including design, of reasonable complexity and personal investment that 
the student has opportunity to encounter these types of uncertainty and face their own 
fears.  The instructor, with the knowledge of a growth in emotional responses, can be 
better equipped to coach students through this growth, knowing that there will be 
uncomfortable feelings for a while.  At the same time, the design environment needs 
teammates (Smith, Sheppard, Johnson, & Johnson, 2005), mentors, maintainers or 
mechanics (a notable experience for the majority of participants), and customers.  There 
is evidence that these experiences do not have to involve an aerospace application to 
develop these skills and can include activities such as community-engaged learning and 
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service-learning (J. Huff, Zoltowski, Oakes, & Adams; J. L. Huff, Zoltowski, & Oakes, 
2014). 
From this study and others, educators can develop authentic design tasks for the 
classroom, within senior design as well as several semesters before, isolating and 
amplifying critical elements for students to develop “patterns of recognition”, like Joel 
remarked.  Authentic tasks have key characteristics: 1) realistically contextualized; 2) 
require judgment and innovation; 3) ask student to “do” the subject; 4) replicate key 
challenging situations in which professionals are truly “tested” in their field; 5) assess 
student’s ability to use a repertoire of knowledge and skill; and 6) allow opportunities to 
rehearse, practice, and get feedback (Hansen, 2011).  This study in particular uncovered 
some of that repertoire of knowledge and skill, particularly managing uncertainty in 
design decisions with teammates and stakeholders. 
This study and others confirm that teaming in class projects needs to be 
strategically organized and that the students need to be aware of and participating in team 
construction, whether in an aerospace-centric course or in another design course.  Several 
examples of design projects throughout the undergraduate curriculum have been 
developed, assessed, and disseminated.  Aircraft design has been implemented at the 
sophomore level (R. M. Cummings & Hall, 2005).  Project-based service learning in 
EPICS (Coyle, Jamieson, & Oakes, 2005) is a design course that could be leveraged over 
several semesters.  EPICS is particularly attractive because the students who return for 
multiple semesters are expected to take on more leadership roles, and, by extension, 
would have more exposure to more forms of uncertainty.  The Learning Factory 
(Lamancusa, Zayas, Soyster, Morell, & Jorgensen, 2008) is another prize-winning 
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concept of multidisciplinary teaming design projects.  Completely re-envisioned design-
centric programs include Iron Range Engineering in Minnesota and Olin College in 
Franklin, Massachusetts.  If laboratory-based design courses are unsustainable for 
administrators, then design projects in typical underclassmen engineering science courses 
like statics (Atadero, Rambo-Hernandez, & Balgopal, 2015) can be employed. 
In any case, the overarching goal is to get students comfortable interacting as 
teams and with other teams in a larger system.  In this way, they can become proficient in 
Systems Thinking in advance of industrial work that deals with Systems-of-Systems.  
Educators may find certain itemized behaviors and tasks in Table 2.3.1 that can be 
implemented or re-emphasized as part of project-based learning (Barron et al., 1998; 
Bielefeldt, Paterson, & Swan, 2010; Dym et al., 2005) environments. 
Because I am advocating the changing of education systems, some examination of 
instructors as part of an academic complex system is necessary.  An instructor may have 
the view of classes as individual systems that the instructor “owns” or has responsibility 
and authority for that class.  But, one class affects another class, the most obvious 
example of that being prerequisite classes.  So, it would be more effective for instructors 
to have a least a Tolerant perspective on uncertainty, where a person has a deep 
conceptual understanding of the system (class) and a sense of ownership, but also that the 
boundaries between classes are negotiable for the sake of the performance of the entire 
complex system.  In other words, the boundaries between classes refers to the content, 
where a design project in a heat transfer class may be of similar content to the 
prerequisite thermodynamics class’ design project, but with increased complexity.  In 
order to negotiate well, instructors need to have some sense of teamwork. 
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The second aspect of students having an awareness of their personal response to 
uncertainty may be uncovered and explored through reflective writing (Kalman, 2007; 
Schön, 1983).  Reflective thinking enhances learning and a student may self-identify 
areas for improvement.  Based on the vertical dimension of the outcome space, and 
especially the depth of reflection from the Robust and Resilient participants in Sections 
4.3.4.4 and 4.3.5.4, an instructor may pose reflection questions to students about 
uncertainty, such as those primary questions I asked in the interviews: 
 Were there things in this design experience that you did not know? 
 Where was there uncertainty? 
 How was the uncertainty treated? 
 How did the uncertainty affect the decisions you made about the design? 
 Did you learn anything about uncertainty in design from your experience? 
 
6.2 For Future Research 
Future research questions first posed in Section 2.8 are revisited here.  Skill 
Theory, first shown in Section 2.6 in Figure 2.6.1 and Table 2.6.1, can assist in a logical 
and hierarchically related set of tasks and skills discovered in this study.  Revisiting the 
theory, a learner intercoordinates sets of skills into a higher level skill, which is induced 
by the environment and the task.  This will be a significant addition to content, 
assessment, and pedagogy of the higher level skills of managing uncertainty, making 
decisions, designing, and teaming.  With the content and tasks defined, then the 
assessment schemes for those tasks should be developed with ease and assurance of 
relevance.  The pedagogy follows that the teams of students should be allotted time to 
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accomplish their design tasks and that the teams of students should be encouraged and 
coached to seek feedback from mentors and customers. 
From each of the categories, key skills and tasks can be identified as a first step in 
developing new and improved curricula.  Since the outcome space of this study is 
hierarchical, it follows that a hierarchy or progression of skills learned can be extracted 
from the outcome space.  A progression of skills through each of the categories should be 
apparent.  This preliminary description can serve as a starting point for future research on 
appropriate classroom interventions for managing uncertainty in design decisions. 
In Category 1 – Brittle, the participants indicated that they were still learning to 1) 
solicit feedback informally; 2) to become more information-literate; and 3) to model the 
different engineering phenomena they were assigned to contribute to the design.  In each 
of these developing skills, epistemic uncertainty is a subset. 
In Category 2 – Plastic, the participants indicated that they were still learning to 
1) solicit feedback from mentors; 2) justify decisions to themselves first and then present 
to others; 3) validate and verify models of engineering phenomena; and 4) manage a 
schedule and budget for their project.  In each of these developing skills, epistemic 
uncertainty is a subset.  This category of participants appears to have attained the skill of 
soliciting peer feedback, and are compounding or substituting mentor feedback now.  
These participants appear to have increased their proficiency in information literacy, and 
are now intercoordinating information literacy with modeling knowledge to create 
validation and verification schemes.  Simultaneously, they are intercoordinating 
information literacy and feedback from peers and mentors to develop the skill of 
justifying decisions.  Though schedule and budget representations are a lower level skill, 
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it seems that the participants did not intercoordinate schedule and budget with design 
until they were required by the task, just as Skill Theory predicts. 
In Category 3 – Tolerant, participants have developed the skills of 1) deep 
conceptual understanding of a particular phenomenon or system; 2) valid experiment 
design; 3) reframing phenomena as trade-offs and risks; and 4) tempering one’s personal 
response to uncertainty.  In this category, participants have intercoordinated feedback 
from mentors and justification of decisions to develop deep conceptual understanding.  
They have compounded justification of decisions with valid experiments, schedule and 
budget, trade-offs and risks, to develop a mental model (Lehrer & Schauble, 2000; 
Magnani, 1999) of a whole system.  Mentors and peers are also part of the mental model 
of a system, especially where a peer “owns” another interacting system.  In these skills, 
aleatory, ambiguity, and epistemic forms of uncertainty are subsets.  Trade-offs could 
have ambiguous choices and outcomes.  Viewing aleatory uncertainty as risk allows an 
engineer to manage risk instead of attempt to eliminate or reduce uncertainty. 
In Category 4 – Robust, participants have developed their mental models of 
systems further to master 1) systems of systems thinking and 2) develop new methods, 
processes, and solutions.  Understanding a person as a customer is a lower level skill, but 
differentiating customer feedback from peer and mentor feedback is a skill more apparent 
in this category.  Participants here have compounded their understanding of customer 
feedback with their understanding of systems-of-systems in order to develop a robust 
design.  Participants here also see peers and subordinates as “owners” of a system as part 
of their mental model, and they see uncertainty in interaction between these systems.  
Participants here also have mastered the skill of experiments, deep conceptual 
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understanding, risks, and trade-offs, in order to develop and implement new methods and 
solutions.  In these skills, uncertainty in developing new methods is phenomenological 
epistemic uncertainty, which can be reduced when the method is implemented.  
Uncertainty with the customer can take the form of behavioral, ambiguous, and/or 
interaction.  In this category, the quantity and quality of uncertainty are increasing 
compared to the lower categories. 
In Category 5 – Resilient, participants have developed the skills of 1) building 
trust and a sense of “collective” in teaming; 2) delegating tasks and responsibilities; 3) 
tempering one’s personal response to others’ uncertainties; and 4) investigating and 
understanding the customer’s needs and feedback within a larger context.  In this 
category, interaction uncertainty is a subset of teaming and understanding the customer.  
There are also all the other forms of uncertainty that Category 4 engineers experience. 
A second branch of research could expand this work with different populations 
and different contexts.  For example, the same study could be conducted with 
underclassmen undergraduates to discover progress made in managing uncertainty over 
the typical four to five years of study.  Also, the same study could be conducted within a 
single aerospace company, or in a non-aerospace engineering industry.  Would the results 
presented here be replicated, or would there be other strategies for managing uncertainty 
discovered in other contexts?  If so, how would the new results be applicable to the 
undergraduate curriculum? 
A third branch of study, stemming from the unexpected results here, is to examine 
teams of teams, in order to corroborate the participants’ perceptions of teamwork with 
researchers’ observations of teams of teams in action.  A different research methodology 
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might be employed here to study groups instead of studying individuals.  This branch of 
research questions aligns with Deshmukh and Collopy’s (2010) questions about 
organizations and teams: “how does the adaptability of an engineering design 
organization impact the large complex systems it develops? … what attributes of a design 
team must be expressed in a useful and rigorous model of design team behavior?”  
Perhaps the expert team behavior models I showed in Table 5.3.1 partially answer their 
second research question. 
 
6.3 Conclusions 
Managing uncertainty in design decisions has been shown in this study to be an 
acquired skill, not just an innate or unteachable skill.  This skill is a system of connected 
lower level skills, and increasing connections between lower level skills indicates a path 
of development that allows for teaching these skills within a student’s zone of proximal 
development (Vygotsky, 1986).  At first, a student developing a skill will mimic or 
imitate an instructor or mentor, but given multiple tasks where a student focuses on 
certain content moment by moment, and given assessments that can also serve as a cycle 
of learning, a student will gradually develop the higher level skills being sought (Fischer, 
1980).  This study has shown that it could be years of gradual development for a skill in 
the workplace. 
The major contribution of this study is the uncovering of the key elements in 
varying levels of awareness of uncertainty in design decisions that allows for future work 
in developing learning simulations and interventions for the undergraduate curriculum.  
While the context of this study was specifically the aerospace engineering because of the 
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industries’ commitments to safety and to expanding the boundaries of knowledge, the 
elements of the skills here are applicable to other engineering disciplines engaged in 
design of complex systems.  The discoveries in this study of key behaviors and cognition 
will ultimately assist educators in better preparing the next generation of engineering 
leaders in aerospace and students who will help solve the world’s Grand Challenges 
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IRB approved the study with Dr. William Oakes as the primary investigator under 
Exemption 45 CFR 46.101(b)(2) (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Sep 
24, 2004).  The study here is human research, governed by 45 CFR part 46.  The research 
involves the use of interview procedures only.  The research does not involve children.  
The final condition “is the information obtained recorded in such a manner that human 
subjects can be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and could 
any disclosure of the human subjects’ responses outside the research reasonably place the 
subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects’ financial 
standing, employability, or reputation?” is not met, thereby exempting the research from 
45 CFR part 46 requirements.  The subjects are not being placed at risk because they are 
simply being asked about their professional experience, a matter of common knowledge 
within their employing companies. 
Required forms for IRB under these conditions are: 
 Exemption 2-3 Form v1-13 
Optional forms for IRB under these conditions are: 
 Participant Information Sheet 
 Recruiting email 
 
The Purdue University Human Research Protection Program Institutional Review 
Board granted my exemption request on Nov 25, 2014.  The exemption document 




places of business, investigators must obtain written permission from an appropriate 
authority within the organization.  If the written permission was not submitted with the 
study application at the time of IRB review… the investigator must submit written 
permission to the IRB prior to engaging in the research activities”.  Data was collected 
after the participants’ regular work hours when they were in the comfort of their own 
homes. 
Secondly, IRB has two rules for recruiting students.  To meet those requirements, 
students were emailed instead of using classtime to announce recruiting efforts, a cash 
incentive was offered instead of offering any sort of class credit, and the confidentiality 
of the students was maintained just like other participants by not informing their 
instructor about any students’ responses or participation.  The rules specifically are: 
1. To recruit from Purdue University classrooms, the instructor and all others associated 
with conduct of the course (e.g., teaching assistants) must not be present during 
announcement of the research opportunity or any recruitment activity. This may be 
accomplished by announcing, in advance, that class will either start later than usual or 
end earlier than usual so this activity may occur. It should be emphasized that 
attendance at the announcement and recruitment are voluntary and the student’s 
attendance and enrollment decision will not be shared with those administering the 
course.  
2. If students earn extra credit towards their course grade through participation in a 
research project conducted by someone other than the course instructor(s), such as in 
the example above, the students participation should only be shared with the course 




credit to be earned through participation in research must also provide an opportunity 
for students to earn comparable extra credit through a non-research activity requiring 
an amount of time and effort comparable to the research option. 
 
Recruiting Email: 
[Potential participant’s name], 
You are receiving this email you have been identified as a good designer and a 
good decision-maker.  We are recruiting participants for a research study on how 
aerospace engineers manage uncertainty when making design decisions.  The information 
you provide will be used to inform the undergraduate engineering curriculum to improve 
students’ awareness of uncertainty in design and decision-making processes.  The data 
you provide by your participating in this study will increase the effectiveness of 
undergraduate education, especially making new graduates more prepared for the 
professional, competitive, high-stakes workforce that you are currently employed in. 
The study will consist of an interview over Skype (or other video chat service) for 
no more than 2 hours.  Questions will focus only on your educational background and 
your design experiences.  You will have an opportunity after the interview to check and 
edit the information that you provided before we include it in any analysis. 
For your peace of mind, please know that there is absolutely no obligation for you 
to participate in this study.  In future publications from this study, there will be no 
identifying information about you, your employer/school, or the projects you have 




publications from this study.  No one, including your employer/professors, will know that 
you participated in this study. 
If you are interested in participating, please email Toni at cumming3@purdue.edu 
for further information or to set up an appointment.  Alternatively, you may contact the 
sponsor of this research, Dr William Oakes, at oakes@purdue.edu. 
Thanks, 
Antonette (Toni) Cummings, P.E. 
cumming3@purdue.edu 
http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~cumming3 
PhD Candidate, Engineering Education 
 
There were some modifications to recruit senior design aerospace engineering 
students, including compensation of $15 for their time.  The first two paragraphs of the 
email above have been modified (changes emphasized in italics): 
 
You are receiving this email because you have been identified as an aerospace 
engineering student with design experience.  We are recruiting participants for a research 
study on how aerospace engineers manage uncertainty when making design decisions.  
The information you provide will be used to inform the undergraduate engineering 
curriculum to improve students’ awareness of uncertainty in design and decision-making 
processes.  The data you provide by your participating in this study will increase the 
effectiveness of undergraduate education, especially making new graduates more 




The study will consist of an interview over Skype (or other video chat service) for 
no more than 2 hours.  Questions will focus only on your educational background and 
your design experiences.  You will have an opportunity after the interview to check and 
edit the information that you provided before we include it in any analysis.  You will be 
compensated $15 for your participation. 
 
As a side note, when a reminder email was sent to the recruits, a more casual tone 
was used, saying, “Hi!  Just following up with the email I sent you two weeks ago.  Am 
hoping you can help me.  I'm interviewing people who have done aerospace engineering 
design work for my dissertation.  Do you have about an hour in the next two weeks that 
we could talk?  I would very much appreciate it.  I completely understand if an interview 
is not possible, but I hope to hear from you!”  At least two of my personal said that the 
first email sounded like spam email to them and that is why they did not respond to the 
first email.  Even though many of the initial recruits were friends, the first recruiting 






Appendix B Interview Protocol 
Thanks for agreeing to be interviewed.  Before we start, I want you to know that 
your participation is entirely voluntary and you can stop at any time for any reason.  You 
should not feel obligated in any way to participate.  I will not reveal to anyone that you 
did or did not complete the interview.  Are you still comfortable participating? 
I will make every effort to make your interview anonymous and unidentifiable in 
published papers.  I will de-identify you, your company, and your projects/products.  I 
will also provide you the opportunity to check and edit the conversation afterwards.  I 
will only include what you are comfortable including. 
You have been identified by your peers as a good engineering designer and 
decision-maker.  The purpose of this study is to understand how you deal with 
uncertainty as it arises in design and decision-making in your career.  From there, we 
hope to use the results of this study to inform the undergraduate curriculum to help 
students become better decision-makers earlier in their careers. 
First, let me ask you about you. 
Interviewee Background Information 
 What is your education background? 
 What engineering positions have you held with other companies before this 
one? 
 What department/unit/section are you employed in now? 
 How long have you worked as an engineer for this company? 




 What is your current range of responsibilities? 
Company Background Information 
 What kind of company, agency, or organization do you work for? (private 
industry, state agency, federal agency, military) 
 How many employees are in your department?  Location? 
 How many other professional, technicians, or other employees are in your 
department, section/unit? 
 Who are suppliers to your company? 
 To whom does your company supply products and services? 
Primary questions on decision-making in design 
 Can you tell me about a time when you had to make a decision on a design? 
 What did that experience involve? 
o What was the goal? 
o What were you designing? 
o Who were you designing it for? 
o Where were you designing? 
o Who else was involved in the design experience? 
o What was your specific role in the experience?  What were your 
responsibilities? 
 What were the decisions that needed to be made in the design? 




 How did you go about determining possible solutions?  What methods of 
analysis were used? 




o Functional description 
 What criteria were used to determine the best decision/solution? 
 How well received were the solutions/decisions? 
 To what degree have the solutions/decisions been implemented? 
Primary Questions on Experiencing Uncertainty 
 Were there things in this design experience that you did not know? 
 Where was there uncertainty? 
 How was the uncertainty treated? 
 How did the uncertainty affect the decisions you made about the design? 
 Did you learn anything about uncertainty in design from your experience? 
Word choices 
 Could you tell me what it means to you when you use the word “uncertainty”? 
 Is there another word or phrase that you would use that describes uncertainty 
in your field? 





 Human or organization behaviors 
 Natural phenomena 
o Uncertainty that cannot be reduced, even with more knowledge 
o Ambiguity in word choices and vocabulary  
o Interactions of organizations 
 What formal training do you have in uncertainty? 
Primary questions on learning about uncertainty 
 Can you tell me about previous experience from similar or dissimilar tasks 
that affected your decision-making? 
 How do you think this is different from the experience we talked about 
earlier? 
 Did you approach the project in the same way as your approached the 
previous one we just discussed? 
 What experiences do you believe contributed the most to your understanding 
of uncertainty in design decisions? 
 What advice would you give to undergraduate students about uncertainty in 
design decisions? 
Closing questions 
 Anything that you want to add about your experiences with uncertainty in 
design decisions that we haven’t discussed yet? 





Appendix C Iterations of Analysis 
The steps are listed below, having been documented in a research notebook and 
replicated in an nVivo 10 project. 
1. Moments after each interview, I memoed my thoughts in my research notebook, 
typically one page of handwritten notes. 
2. After receiving a transcript of an interview from a third party service, I listened to the 
audio recording and corrected the transcript. 
3. I de-identified each transcript, removing university names, business names, and 
project or aircraft names.  Listening to the audio and de-identifying the transcripts is 
the first cycle of familiarizing myself with the data. 
4. Each participant received a de-identified transcript for a member check.  I declared 
that I would respect and include any and all edits they wanted to make.  I asked for 
any edits to be returned to me within two weeks.  I also promised to return the results 
of my study to the participants as to avoid the researcher’s “seduction and 
abandonment” (National Commission for the Proptection of Human Subjects of 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1978). 
5. As I approached 20 interviews completed, I thought I was beginning to hear the same 
sentiments from new participants.  However, I did not have enough females or 
enough voices from subsystem companies, so I continued to recruit. 
6. When I completed 25 interviews, I was reasonably certain that I reached saturation 




7. As Iteration 2 of familiarizing myself with the data, I printed and read 3 transcripts 
per day, noting decisions, design, and uncertainty quotes on notecards.  I grouped the 
notecards by these topics without regard to the clustering of participants.  Purple 
notes were design topics; yellow notes were decision topics; orange notes were 
uncertainty topics.  Left side was before creating categories; right side is after. 
 
Iteration 2 – 2015 08 02 
  
Figure C.1  Iteration 2 of creating categories. 
 
Categories 
 Fear and frustration – need external motivation 




 Ignorance or uncertainty of technical phenomena and analysis tools 
o Silvia, Ross, Viola, Miranda, Diana 
 Rely on historical data, what has been done before 
o Diana, Vincent, Oliver, Curtis, Ross, Ronald, Bertram 
 Base on fundamental principles 
o Bernard, Abraham, Viola 
 Measure risk 
o Stephen, Abraham, Alonso, Curtis, Malcolm 
 Have contingency or back-up plans 
o Joel, Edmund, Jacques, Malcolm, Stephen 
 Rely on more experienced engineers 
o Viola, Nathaniel, Bertram, Bernard, Edmund, Frank, Duncan, Vincent, 
Diana, Jacques 
 Optimization 
o Nathaniel, Silvia, Vincent, Luciana 
 Cycles and trends 
o Abraham, Peter, Stephen, Curtis 
 Repeatability in experiments 
o Frank, Oliver, Miranda, Stephen, Edmund, Ronald 
 Demand evidence now 






 Intuition is developed from experience 
 Iteration occurs with internal and external customers 
 Teamwork helps find distributed expertise 
 Teamwork helps review the design for missing work or errors 
 Proof of concept is desired 
 Evidence can be a Subject Matter Expert opinion or it can be written and 
measured data 
 Everybody wants to do a good job 
 
8. I copied these quotes into nVivo per participant, making it easier to move whole 
transcripts into or out of categories. 
9. I kept notes of my dreams where categories seemed to coalesce and make memories 
(Blakeslee, 2000). 
 
Iteration 3 – 2015 08 04 
Categories 
 Ignorance – will the technology work?  Fear and anxiety; External motivation 
 Trial and error 




 Repeatability and consistency – experiments, standardization, provide evidence; 
technology does indeed work and I can prove it 
 Cycles or trends – temporal, schedule, cost; technology will work, just need to get 
it at the right time 
Common themes 
 Emotional component 
 Recent events  spotlight memories or Law of Recency? 
 
10. I continued to memo my thoughts as I read quotes in nVivo. 
11. I moved back and forth between 20” x 30” paper spaces and nVivo, grouping printed 
sheets of quotes and electronic quotes.  I was able to share printed notes with another 
researcher familiar with aerospace and phenomenography. 
 
Iteration 4 – 2015 08 06 
Categories – Forms of Uncertainty 
 Looking forward (outcomes) 
 At start line 
o Who to ask 
o What to ask 
o What path to take 




 Looking sideways (simultaneous) 
 Looking upstairs (decisions in a business hierarchy) 
 Controllable and uncontrollable (Robust Design ideas) 
o Controllable uncertainties require evidence and repeatability 
o Uncontrollable uncertainties require intuition and judgment from prior 
experience 
 Republican mindset 
o Rumsfeld: known knowns, known unknowns, unknown unknowns 
o Reagan: trust and verify 
Categories – Management Strategies 
 Assume 
 Ignore 
 Break into smaller pieces (but not a systems thinking view) 
 Due diligence (personal, individual) 
o Calculations, analysis tools 
o Prior documentation by others 
 Informal peer review 
o Solicit many opinions 
o Decide which ones are valid (an emotional decision) 
 Formal review board, direct supervisor as your spokesperson 
o Systems view of the design problem 




 Subject Matter Expert opinion 
 Direct hierarchy opinion or decision (HIPPO = highest paid person’s opinion) 
 Margins, boundaries, conservatism 
 
Categories of Key Learning Experiences or Interventions 
 Design projects in school – mandatory 
 Design projects outside of school – voluntary 
 Internships – responsibility and consequences 
 Failures – aircraft loss, loss of life 
 Going to factory and talking with mechanics – having to build something 
 Mentors 
 Home grown decision-making simulations and courses 
o Project management courses, university sponsored 
o 6 sigma courses 
 
Common Themes 
 Flight safety 










Iteration 5 – 2015 08 07 
Category 1 – Bertram, Luciana, Margaret, Silvia 
There are answers (technical solutions) for somebody else prior.  Reliance on external 
confirmation of decisions.   Reliance on patterns of previous successful projects from 
others. Ignorant of product history of a private company. 
Category 2 – Bernard, Diana, Edmund, Miranda, Philip, Ross, Vincent 
Some demonstration of personal ability and previous knowledge.  Apply personal due 
diligence.  In a new task, transfer some skills and develop new skills.  While developing 
new skills, they are unsure if there is an answer or solution. 
Category 3 – Abraham, Nathaniel, Stephen, Viola 
There is an answer or a solution; it is a compromise of technical parameters.  Includes 
more parameters than Category2.  Not yet including users' larger context. 
Category 4 – Curtis, Frank, Jacques, Oliver, Ronald 
Seeking repeatability of results, which implies rigorous testing and good planning ahead 
of test.  Consideration of applying margin or conservatism on top of repeatable results.  
Technical answer or solution definitely exists. 




Company wide systems view of teams solving problems.  Relying on "intuition" as 
developed by much personal experience. 
Category 6 – Joel, Peter 
Customers' larger context and priorities considered.  Identifying controllable versus 
uncontrollable factors.  Relying on evidence, not intuition: what information, what 




Figure C.2  Iteration 5 possible outcome space graphic. 
 
Iteration 6 – 2015 08 17 










 Learning intervention (Critical experience) 





Figure C.3  Iteration 6 hierarchical outcome space. 
 
Table C.1 Iteration 6 category description. 
 Task strategy Uncertainty 
6 External 
customers first 
Controllable evidence needs “right” 
person, “right” fidelity; 







Early and broad coordination; 
“intuition” from experience; systems 
view 
“right” level of 
task ownership 
4 Flight test, safety-
critical 
Find biggest factors 
Stop and examine trends 








Re-use existing technology 
Underlying principles 
Start from known 
Answer or 
solution is some 
compromise 
2 Accountability 
for schedule and 
budget 
Peer review 
Due diligence – break into smaller 







External decision makers 
Explicit decision tools 







12. In Iteration 7, I reviewed the transcripts again just for emotions and created 
categories. 
 
Iteration 7 – 2015 09 06 
Categories of Emotion 
1. Will it work – Philip, Ross, Silvia 
a. Participants are unsure if their designs will perform to the specifications.  
Punishment may follow a failed design.  Participant makes choices of 
what work to do based on their prior knowledge that they have confidence 
in, or reject a task because of unfamiliarity.  Not much sense of being 
responsible to a team.  Needs some confirmation from management in 
order to be more confidence in their own ideas. 
2. Managers Influence Intense Emotions – Edmund, Luciana, Margaret 
a. Emotions of participants correlate with their managers' involvement.  Lack 
of external leadership leads to fear, low confidence, confusion, doubt, 
worry, lack of trust.  Managers' encouragement is very much appreciated 
and is the motivator to make the next steps of the project succeed. 
b. Thrown Into the Deep End – Diana, Vincent 
i. New job or new product, unfamiliar with the rest of the product 
line, being given responsibility and accountability.  Gain 
confidence after seeing onesself succeed with this first 




3. Experimental Attitude – Curtis, Oliver, Stephen, Viola 
a. Participants have experienced some surprises in design.  Participants have 
had a few panic moments within themselves or with their intended users.  
They have separated failure in design from failure in themselves.  But they 
may have had previous design experiences where they felt 
guilty/responsible for a design failure.  They have resolved to be better 
prepared and not to take things personally.  They are getting better 
prepared by planning experiments logically and efficiently. 
4. Managing Teammates’ Emotions – Jacques, Joel, Miranda 
a. Decisions are difficult because they are primarily trying to overcome 
teammates' resistance to change or progress.  Participants are trying to 
identify the right time to introduce the decisions and are particularly 
sensitive to their teammates' reactions.  The participants here acknowledge 
that their own feelings get hurt when they feel that others are blaming 
them.  Doubt and stress are palpable, but there is a likely positive outcome 
happening soon. 
b. Resolving Conflicts in Design – Abraham, Alonso, Bernard, Bertram, 
Nathaniel, Ronald 
i. Conflicts exist among physical parameters, such as forces, 
temperatures, materials, aircraft performance.  These parameters 
may be "owned" by other departments or groups, so resolution of 
physical parameter trade-offs can be described as "making 




panic or a fear that the conflict will not be resolved.  Some 
acknowledge their own bias towards their ideas and are willing to 
seek critique. 
5. Over It Now – Duncan, Frank, Malcolm, Peter 




Figure C.4  Iteration 7 hierarchical outcome space. 
 
13. I reviewed the transcripts again, attempting to bracket out the job-specific language 
the participants use to find the “essence” of their experience of uncertainty, regardless 





















14. I reviewed the emotion categories with another researcher.  The other researcher 
suggested that an outcome space that moves up and/or to the right is the convention 
for “more comprehensive”. 
15. In Iterations 8, 9, and 10, I reviewed the literature again, looking for vocabulary to 
describe categories in one or two words.  Also, I completed a closer read of key 
works and their bibliographies, such as the Expertise Handbook (Ericsson, 2006) and 
the several scales for tolerance for ambiguity (Herman et al., 2010; MacDonald, 
1970; McLain, 1993).  I considered other literature of ambiguity, decision-making, 
and risk (Hollnagel, 2011; Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997; Philippo et al., 2013). 
 
Iteration 8 – 2015 09 09 
Another researcher suggested that I place two names together and describe the 
similarities and differences between them.  Then I should take another name and describe 
the similarities and differences among the three, and place the names in some position 
relative to each other to express some measure of comprehensiveness of experience.  I 
completed this exercise on paper.  The second step was to draw groups around these 






Figure C.5  Iteration 8 hierarchical outcome space. 
 
I considered the nature of the design tasks that the participants described apart 
from their description of their experiences of uncertainty.  I applied a framework of 
sensemaking (Daft & Lengel, 1986) in organizations to the participants to see if any 





Figure C.6  Iteration 8 Daft (1986) organizational uncertainty. 
 
Iteration 9 – 2015 09 11 
An alternative is to consider the literature and see if groups emerge as a result of 
overlaying previously published literature on to the names above.  I considered literature 
on coping mechanisms (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997).  I removed my groups and applied the 
codes from Lipshitz’s table below into Figure C.7 below: 
 
Table C.2  Reproduction of Lipshitz & Strauss (1997) tactics of coping with uncertainty. 
Tactic  Definition 
 Tactics of reduction 
1. Collect additional 
information 
 Conduct an active search for factual information. 
2. Delay action  Postpone decision-making or action taking until additional 




3. Solicit advice  Solicit advice/opinion of experts, superiors, friends or 
colleagues. 
4. Follow SOPs, norms, etc.  Act according to formal and informal rules of conduct. 
5. Assumption-based reasoning  Construct a mental model of the situation based on beliefs 
that are (1) constrained by (though going beyond) what is 
more firmly known, and (2) subject to retraction when and if 
they conflict with new evidence or with lines of reasoning 
supported by other assumptions. 
  
 Tactics of acknowledgment 
1. Preempting  Generate specific responses to possible negative outcomes. 
2. Improve readiness  Develop a general capability to respond to unanticipated 
negative developments (e.g., put forces on the alert, leave 
some resources unused). 
3. Avoid irreversible action  Prefer or develop reversible course of action, prepare 
contingencies. 
4. Weighing pros & cons  Choose among alternatives in terms of potential gains and 
losses. 
  
 Tactics of suppression 
1. Ignore uncertainty  Act as if under certainty. 
2. Rely on “intuition”  Use hunches, informed guesses, etc., without sufficient 
justification. 






Figure C.7  Iteration 9 outcome space with Lipshitz's coping mechanisms applied. 
 
Iteration 10 – 2015 09 16 
A participant provided me a book chapter that she thought would be relevant to 
my study.  I agreed it was relevant to talk about Resilient Engineering (Hollnagel, 2011).  





Figure C.8  Iteration 10 hierarchical outcome space. 
 









highly influential on 
participants’ attitude 




Plastic Trial and error Emotions (confidence) 
tied to whether design 
works or not 
Design makes progress 
when participant finds 





Classic Follow defined 
procedures 
Feels like “being 
thrown into the deep 
end”, confidence from 
following someone 
else who has been 
successful 
design makes progress 
because the checklist 
has been followed 
Tolerant Plan an experiment 
and test 
Experimental attitude; 
accept that some things 
will not work 
Design has some 
parallel efforts, some 
may terminate, and 
some sequential 
efforts; all is 
considered progress 
Robust Early engagement 
of stakeholders 




Designs may have 







Have gotten over the 
likely criticism and 
resistance to decisions. 
Systems level design 
tasks must be parsed 
appropriately 
 
16. Another researcher read several transcripts that I selected as having significant 
variation among them, one that I thought was an expert at managing uncertainty, 
mostly driven by a high-ranking job title, and one who specifically used a number of 
negative emotions throughout the transcript. 
17. I went through four more rounds of category description and differences, expressed in 
paper and electronic formats.  The fourth round mentioned here is the final result of 
this entire document. 
 





Figure C.9  Iteration 11 hierarchical outcome space. 
 





Figure C.10  Iteration 12 hierarchical outcome space. 
 
Table C.4  Iteration 12 category description. 
Category General Description Team Axis Forms of 
Uncertainty Axis 
Brittle Uncomfortable with 
uncertainty or afraid of 
the consequences of 
being found ignorant 
by superiors; strategy 
or recourse is to push 
decisions to someone 
else, typically boss or 
team lead 
Individual work, and 
maybe some informal 
peer review; 
Epistemic only; they 
are aware that there is 
subject matter that 
they have not yet 
studied 
Plastic Takes solace in the 
fact that most things 
have been done before 
in aerospace and that 
there will be someone 
more experienced 
Describes projects as 
team efforts, 
acknowledges that 




as the brittle category, 
but also including 





available to assist; will 
take some initiative to 
gather new knowledge 
and to justify decisions 
to themselves first, but 
also rely on superiors 
for decisions 
review is desired 
Tolerant Good awareness of 
uncertainty in the 
physical parts and 
systems is ever present 
and will never be 
eliminated, uncertainty 




understand their goals 
and concerns 
Describes projects as 
team efforts, for 
which they feel a 
significant 
investment or 
ownership in a 
crucial part of the 
project;  
Epistemic uncertainty 
that can be reduced 
through planned and 




Robust Anticipating the 
unexpected, willing to 
try new methods, 
processes, solutions, 
and looking for data 
instead of opinion to 











decisions hinge upon 
having real data and 
not just SME opinions 
Resilient Uncertainty is a fact of 
life in the business, 
and for the items 
within their control, to 
get the right data at the 
right time at the right 
fidelity with the right 
people to make 
decisions and even 
lead the market 
Significant and 
trusting engagement 
with teammates and 
other stakeholders; 
have the resources, 
authority, and 
courage to deploy 
teammates on 






interactions could be 
global/political, 
customer-vendor, or 








Iteration 13 – 2015 10 07 
 
Figure C.11  Iteration 13 hierarchical outcome space. 
 
Table C.5  Iteration 13 category description. 




Brittle Uncomfortable with 
uncertainty or afraid of 
the consequences of 
being found ignorant 
by superiors; strategy 
or recourse is to push 
decisions to someone 
else, typically boss or 
team lead 
Individual work, and 
maybe some informal 
peer review; 
Epistemic only; they 
are aware that there is 
subject matter that 
they have not yet 
studied 
Plastic Takes solace in the 
fact that most things 
have been done before 
in aerospace and that 
Describes projects as 
team efforts, 
acknowledges that 
others have unique 
Epistemic uncertainty 
as the brittle category, 
but also including 




there will be someone 
more experienced 
available to assist; will 
take some initiative to 
gather new knowledge 
and to justify decisions 
to themselves first, but 




review is desired, 
also subject matter 
expert opinion is 
solicited and not 
questioned 
constraints; 
Tolerant Good awareness of 
uncertainty in the 
physical parts and 
systems is ever present 
and will never be 
eliminated, uncertainty 




understand their goals 
and concerns 
Describes projects as 
team efforts 
generally but not 
specifically, for 
which they feel a 
significant 
investment or 
ownership in a 
crucial part of the 
project;  
Epistemic uncertainty 
that can be reduced 
through planned and 




Robust Anticipating the 
unexpected, willing to 
try new methods, 
processes, solutions, 
and looking for data 
instead of opinion to 











decisions hinge upon 
having real data and 
not just SME opinions 
Resilient Uncertainty is a fact of 
life in the business, 
and for the items 
within their control, to 
get the right data at the 
right time at the right 
fidelity with the right 
people to make 
decisions and even 
lead the market 
Significant and 
trusting engagement 
with teammates and 
other stakeholders; 
have the resources, 
authority, and 
courage to deploy 
teammates on 






interactions could be 
global/political, 
customer-vendor, or 
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